tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5558356564668155112024-03-05T08:13:19.216-06:00Peter Reviews Products & ProceduresMy advice on this blog represents my own personal opinion. Copyright © Peter Melzer. No liability is assumed.Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.comBlogger43125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-65393814402402704962013-11-20T05:00:00.000-06:002013-11-20T09:31:44.412-06:00Fukushima: Gaseous Effluent Handling & Hydrogen ExplosionsIn my last post with the title "<a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2013/11/why-fukushimas-reactors-failed.html">Why Fukushima's Reactors Failed</a>" published online Nov. 4, 2013, I used the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disaster">2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station disaster</a> to emphasize the existential importance of housing cooling water pumps and electric power equipment essential for emergency reactor shutdowns in flood-resistant buildings, particularly for power stations located in flood-prone areas.<br />
<br />
Elaborating on a comment to that post, this essay will point out that exhaust stack elevation could have made a crucial difference in the Fukushima reactor accidents.<br />
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<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/vent_feeds.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="312" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/vent_feeds.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
Electric motor-driven fans support just about every air handling system in the reactor building of a nuclear power station (see the numerous blower symbols in Fig. 1 from <a href="http://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/4385022">Row, 1971</a>), pumping effluent gases to the main exhaust stack and maintaining a negative building pressure that disallows potentially contaminated air to escape unfiltered into the environment. Contaminated effluents are forced through filters and vented through the main exhaust stacks, except for hardened venting. During hardened venting, contaminated steam and gases may directly be routed to the exhaust stacks as a means of last resort in an emergency, relieving pressure from the reactor after all other options have been exhausted. Furthermore, hardened venting may prevent hydrogen produced by melting fuel rod cladding and radiolysis from reaching explosive concentrations.<br />
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<a href="http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp/pict8.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" height="417" src="http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp/pict8.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Bird's eye view of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station after hydrogen explosions destroyed the service floors of units 1 (left), 3 and 4. The tall exhaust stack towers can be seen on the left between units 1 and 2 and at center between units 3 and 4. The small sheds housing the fan gear are located at the base of the towers (source: cyptome.org).</span></div>
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But, the tall exhaust stacks at Fukushima need fan-support to generate sufficient draft. The fan gear is housed in small shed at their base. During a station blackout, the stacks must rely on draft alone.<br />
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According to the <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111202e14.pdf">Fukushima Nuclear Accident Report (Interim Report) Dec. 2, 2011,</a> of the stricken power station's operator Tokyo Electric Power Company (<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/index-e.html">TEPCO</a>), hardened venting released hydrogen in Unit 1's reactor building, flowing back through open valves and baffles. When mixed with air at concentrations above four percent, hydrogen may explosively <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deflagration_to_detonation_transition">deflagrate and detonate</a>. At Unit 3, the hydrogen may have exploded inside the primary containment vessel.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://iangoddard.com/fukushimaFigure0101.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="240" src="http://iangoddard.com/fukushimaFigure0101.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Explosion at units 1 and 4 (courtesy: <a href="http://iangoddard.com/fukushima01.html">Goddard's Journal</a>).</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
By contrast, Unit 4 had been shutdown for inspection at the time of the earthquake, the reactor had been unloaded, and the fuel had been stored in its spent fuel pool. Despite, the reactor incurred a hydrogen explosion during the night after the violent explosion at Unit 3. It appears unlikely that the hydrogen sustaining Unit 4's explosion was produced there.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/sgts.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="300" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/sgts.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Junction of SGTS effluent piping of Unit 3 and Unit 4 at the base of shared stack (arrow) (source: <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111202e14.pdf">TEPCO</a>).</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
TEPCO contents that hydrogen migrated from Unit 3 to Unit 4 through the Standby Gas Treatment System, or SGTS for short (see lower center of schema in Fig. 1).
The SGTS is used to filter contaminated air and funnel it to the main exhaust stack. According to TEPCO, gas from Unit 3's SGTS was permitted to cross over into the piping of Unit 4's SGTS at the junction connecting both systems to the shared stack.<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/STGS_readings_unit4.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="272" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/STGS_readings_unit4.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Unit 4's SGTS filter contamination. The connection to the stack shared with Unit 3 is on the right (source: <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111202e14.pdf">TEPCO</a>).</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
TEPCO supports this contention with finding progressively greater outside-in contamination of the filter cascade of Unit 4's SGTS.<br />
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Had the shared exhaust stacks been tall enough to passively generate sufficient draft, the hydrogen explosions may have been prevented, particularly the one at Unit 4. Therefore, it is prudent to ensure that all nuclear power stations are outfitted with exhaust stacks tall enough to provide sufficient draft when all power fails.<br />
<br />
Tomorrow, Nov. 21, 2013, the US Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety will hold a joint hearing on the "<a href="http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_id=5c15d558-cd3c-89ac-26d6-ec54fcaa59a5&CFID=71490794&CFTOKEN=84590828">NRC's Implementation of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendations and other Actions to Enhance and Maintain Nuclear Safety.</a>"<br />
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Hopefully, the NRC has incorporated sufficient exhaust stack elevation into its recommendations for US reactor operators.<br />
<br />
<b>Reference</b><br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/4385022">Row TH (1973)</a> Radioactive waste systems and radioactive effluents. Georgia Institute of Technology Short Course.</li>
</ul>
<b>Acknowledgement</b><br />
<a href="http://simpyinfo.org/">SimpyInfo.org</a> provided the information for this post.<div class="blogger-post-footer"><div align="center"><iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=12&l=ur1&category=amazonhomepage&f=ifr" width="300" height="250" scrolling="no" border="0" marginwidth="0" style="border:none;" frameborder="0"></iframe>
</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-85448963388620540072013-11-04T09:52:00.000-06:002013-11-06T13:02:47.177-06:00Why Fukushima's Reactors Failed<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/gallery/images/10-01b.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" height="513" src="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/gallery/images/10-01b.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">Bird's eye view of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station before the earthquake and tsunami on Fri. Mar. 11, 2011. Units 1 (right) to 4 (left) are seen in the foreground and 5 (left) and 6 (right) further back. Units 1, 2 and 3 incurred fuel meltdowns (source: <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/gallery/nuclear-e.html" style="text-align: center;">TEPCO</a><span style="text-align: center;">).</span></span></div>
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Three of the six reactors at <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_Nuclear_Power_Plant">Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station</a> 120 miles north of Tokyo on Honshu's east coast incurred nuclear fuel meltdowns after the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami">2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami</a>. One reactor had been defueled for inspection. The station's two other reactors could be shutdown safely.<br />
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/gallery/images/10-02b.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" height="448" src="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/gallery/images/10-02b.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">Bird's eye view of Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station before the earthquake and tsunami on Fri. Mar. 11, 2011 (unit 1 is on the right). All units could be safely shutdown. (source: <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/gallery/nuclear-e.html" style="text-align: center;">TEPCO</a><span style="text-align: center;">).</span></span></div>
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The four operating reactors at <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daini_Nuclear_Power_Plant">Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station</a> seven miles away could also be saved.
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The meltdowns at Daiichi led to powerful hydrogen explosions, releasing amounts of radioactive material over land and sea only rivaled by the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster">1986 Chernobyl reactor disaster</a> in the Ukraine. The government imposed an exclusion zone around the stricken station, because radiation doses were deemed too high for habitation. To date, roughly 70,000 former residents cannot return home permanently. According to Shigeru Sato, Tsuyoshi Inajima, Monami Yui and Emi Urabe's report with the title "<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-10-22/japan-mulls-plan-for-one-operator-to-run-all-reactors-energy.html">Japan Mulls Plan for One Operator to Run All Reactors: Energy</a>" published by Bloomberg Oct. 22, 2013, cleanup and compensation are currently projected to cost 112 billion dollars, roughly equaling the cost for two <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Sandy">Hurricane Sandies</a>.<br />
<br />
A multitude of inquiries have attempted to uncover the causes underlying the Fukushima accident. The operator of both power stations, <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/index-e.html">Tokyo Electric Power Company</a>, tells us what happened in its <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111202e14.pdf">accident reports</a>. The company's fact compilation points to one essential lynchpin: the residual heat removal system must not fail.<br />
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The reactors at Daiichi and Daini are boiling water reactors with General Electric's Mark I or Mark II primary containment systems.<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Mark_1_containment_zps6f03e707.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="320" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Mark_1_containment_zps6f03e707.png" width="297" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Schematic of a boiling water reactor with a Mark I containment(source: <a href="http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1181_prn.pdf">IAEA</a>).</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The Mark I containments consist of a pear-shaped drywell housing the reactor pressure vessel and a doughnut-shaped wetwell, also known as torus or pressure suppression chamber, holding a large pool of water. The drywell is connected at the bottom to the wetwell with equally spaced radial vent pipes.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Mark_2_containment_zps125aec11.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="320" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Mark_2_containment_zps125aec11.jpg" width="277" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Schematic of a boiling water reactor with a Mark II containment(source: <a href="http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1181_prn.pdf">IAEA</a>).</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The Mark II containments are shaped differently, but still consist of a drywell with the reactor vessel and a wetwell with a pressure suppression pool.<br />
<br />
When nuclear reactors need shutdown in an emergency, control and safety rods are inserted between the fuel rods in milliseconds, disrupting the nuclear chain reaction. Furthermore, the reactor pressure vessel's main steam lines may be isolated from the power-generating turbine and main condenser when potential damage to the pipes is anticipated. Without heat transfer, decay heat builds in the reactor pressure vessel, revving up pressure. Water must be injected into the vessel as coolant and to keep the fuel covered to prevent a meltdown.<br />
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Though emergency pumps can inject water into the vessel at high pressure, the pressure must be relieved to prevent damage to the vessel and to facilitate greater coolant injection. Safety relief valves are periodically opened to depressurize the vessel. The valves discharge high-pressure steam into the wetwell's pool, in which the steam is condensed and the pressure is absorbed. If the vessel was breached and high pressure steam bursted into the drywell, the pressure would be relieved into the suppression pool through the pipes that directly connect the drywell to the wetwell. <br />
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At Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the quake vibrations tripped the operating reactors automatically. Control and safety rods were inserted and the pressure vessels were isolated. Access to outside power was lost because of quake damage. Emergency diesel generators started up to provide power.<br />
<br />
About 40 minutes later, tsunami waves flooded power distribution panels and emergency generators located low in the reactor turbine buildings. Battery banks continued to power emergency core cooling systems. Except for Unit 1 which is equipped with a isolation condenser, two reactor steam-driven pumps, the reactor core isolation cooling system and the high pressure coolant injection system, were available to inject water into the reactor pressure vessels, initially from storage tanks and later from the wetwell pools, while the operators attempted to depressurize the reactors, relieving steam into the pools.<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div style="border-color: green; border-radius: 10px; border-style: solid; border-width: 2px; font-size: x-small; height: 100%; padding: 10px; width: 100%;">
<ul>
<li>Eyewitness account of a Daiichi operator:<br />
“We went into the field in order to open the vent valves. When we were at the near the torus (that is, the wetwell, ed.) room, we heard a large, weird popping sound. The valve is at up high, so I put my foot on the torus to lift myself up. Then, my black rubber boot was melted like butter [source: <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111202e16.pdf">TEPCO interim report, Dec 2, 2011</a>, page 53].”</li>
<li>"The decomposition of the rubber-sulphur compound (that is, vulcanized rubber, ed.) takes place to an appreciable extent at the usual temperatures of vulcanization [source: <a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=wv63AAAAIAAJ&lpg=PA512&ots=ugnyhR2eu0&dq=vulcanized%20rubber%20decomposition%20temperature&pg=PA512#v=onepage&q=vulcanized%20rubber%20decomposition%20temperature&f=false">Bureau of Standards Journal of Research, Volume 4 (1930)</a>, page 512]."</li>
<li>"A typical vulcanization temperature for a passenger tire is 10 minutes at <b>170 °C</b> [source: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vulcanization">Vulcanization</a>]."</li>
</ul>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br />
However, once the pool temperature exceeds 100 °C, absorption of reactor pressure becomes progressively less effective. The steam-driven pumps sucking water from the pool stop working above that temperature. Therefore, removing heat from the wetwell pool is absolutely necessary.<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/BWR_RHR_system_zps2650c2c6.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="255" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/BWR_RHR_system_zps2650c2c6.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Schematic showing the residual heat removal system on the right (source: <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/teachers/03.pdf">NRC</a>).</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The residual heat removal system fulfills this function. It consists of electric motor-driven pumps that flush cold service water from a large body of water, known as ultimate heat sink, through heat exchangers, cooling the wetwell pool. In Fukushima, the ocean is the ultimate heat sink, and the seawater pumps of the residual heat removal system were built near the water’s edge 4 meters above sea level.<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://farm4.staticflickr.com/3343/5705985390_f383ffdbbe_o.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" border="0" height="260" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQT6Xk2RdFlg2tkm4Vz9uVew34jTAJnqkq1ztN9qQ2bIGlAxOZtKMG1aYCkmRsatBtLxF2eWvjzVsJuVPEVsQNA9dFlMi2YHKZqGMHrx0nR2PdMMMfZY2jeQd0VQ9HjVxCrpSVNkRM1eMI/s400/seawater_pumps_saisuke_tsuda.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Exposed seawater pumps at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 2011 (source: Daisuke Tsuda). </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
At Daiichi the pumps stood exposed on the dock and the tsunami rendered them irreparable, except one that could be re-powered and jury-rigged to supply units 5 and 6.<br />
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By contrast, at Daini the pumps were housed in buildings that can be seen dockside in the areal view above. The structures were not flood resistant, but withstood the brunt of the debris-laden waves. The pump for unit 3 persevered without loss of function, and the others could be repaired before the reactor fuel was uncovered. All reactors at both power stations with functioning residual heat removal systems could be shutdown safely within days.<br />
<br />
Therefore, electric power must be available and the residual heat removal system must remain operable for nuclear reactors of the Fukushima type to successfully complete an emergency shutdown. These conditions impose a major constraint on accident recovery, representing a fundamental weakness of the reactor design. The residual heat removal system must remain operable under the conditions of flooding and station blackout.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_boiling_water_reactors">Thirty reactors of this type</a> currently operate in the United States. A number are sited in flood-prone areas. A moratorium should be imposed on these reactors, until the operators can ascertain that service water pumps are protected against inundation, debris, and loss of power.<br />
<br />
<b>Related Posts</b><br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2012/07/fukushima-station-black-out-delusion.html">Fukushima: Station Black Out & Delusion</a></li>
<li><a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2012/02/mark-i-containment-recent-insights-from.html">The Mark I Containment: Recent Insights from Japan</a></li>
</ul>
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-29825379033353477652013-07-18T10:19:00.000-05:002013-11-10T20:46:17.783-06:00No Cold Shutdown at Fukushima<table align="left" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/steam_jul2013_zpsf13ed066.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="237" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/steam_jul2013_zpsf13ed066.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: left;">Steam detected emanating from the refueling floor of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 in July 2013 (source: <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130718_03-j.pdf">TEPCO</a>).</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
According to Hiroko Tabuchi's post with the headline "<a href="http://mobile.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/world/asia/steam-detected-at-damaged-fukushima-reactor.html">Steam Detected at Damaged Fukushima Reactor</a>" published by The New York Times today, the operator of the stricken <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_Nuclear_Power_Plant">Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station</a> Tokyo Electric Power Company (<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/index-e.html">TEPCO</a>) noticed steam emanating from the exposed refueling floor of Unit 3, the nuclear fuel of which melted down in the wake of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami">2011 Great Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami</a> and which was severely damaged by a violent hydrogen explosion.<br />
<br />
As I discussed in my essay with the title "<a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2012/02/fukushima-fuel-meltdowns-cold-shutdown.html">Fukushima: Fuel Meltdowns & Cold Shutdowns</a>" posted Feb. 15, 2012, TEPCO assumed having reached temperatures below the boiling point of water, that is 100 °C, 17 months ago, using an improvised open-loop cooling water cycle (see IAEA news by Peter Kaiser with the title "<a href="http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/coldshutdown.html">Cold Shutdown Conditions Declared at Fukushima</a>" dated Dec. 18, 2011). Reaching reactor pressure vessel temperatures below the boiling point of water with closed cooling water cycles after the shutdown of an intact nuclear reactor is known as cold shutdown, a mode TEPCO proclaimed to have achieved at the time.<br />
<br />
TEPCO speculates the steam detected this week is generated by rainwater seeping into the reactor (see TEPCO's <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130718_03-j.pdf">press release</a> in Japanese dated Jul. 18, 2013).
<br />
<br />
Regardless of the source, steam emanating from the primary containment vessel implies that temperatures inside the vessel must be 100 °C or higher. The discovery of new steam proves the company's assertion of cold shutdown incorrect. TEPCO is preparing countermeasures for the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction. Follow the latest developments on <a href="http://simplyinfo.org/">simplyinfo.org</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>Related Posts</b>
<br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2012/02/fukushima-fuel-meltdowns-cold-shutdown.html">Fukushima: Fuel Meltdowns & Cold Shutdowns</a></li>
</ul>
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-90214360134747475532012-12-02T10:25:00.003-06:002016-06-25T10:30:18.151-05:00KitchenAid & Kitchen DamageThis summer we decided to remodel our kitchen. It is an intricate process, involving a contractor, an interior designer, builders, plumbers, electricians, tilers, cabinet installers, counter top installers, appliance installers and flooring layers. Inspectors must approve vital steps along the way. I developed deep respect for the contractor who forged this orchestra into a coherent ensemble.<br />
<br />
The work was finished on time, taking roughly ten weeks. I must warn you that it takes adjustment to live without a proper kitchen for such extended time. Preparing meals for four on one hot plate can be taxing. I recommend an electric induction cooktop like the <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B0045QEPYM/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B0045QEPYM&linkCode=as2&tag=petrevpropro-20">DUXTOP 1800-Watt Portable Induction Cooktop Countertop Burner 8100MC</a><img alt="" border="0" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=petrevpropro-20&l=as2&o=1&a=B0045QEPYM" height="1" style="border: none !important; margin: 0px !important;" width="1" /> for cast-iron ware, but must admit that plenty pizza was ordered.<br />
<br />
The work was finally finished. The day came to test the appliances. We use our old refrigerator and gas range. Their activation was uneventful. The new dish washer and microwave oven posed no problem either. However, when the brand new built-in KitchenAid<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">®</span></sup> Dual-Fan Convection Oven with Steam-Assist Technology (<a href="http://www.kitchenaid.com/flash.cmd?/#/product/KEBU107SSS/">KEBU107SSS</a>) was energized, trouble began. The high-end appliance is set into a large opening of one of the wonderful-looking wood-finish <a href="http://www.merillat.com/">Merillat</a> cabinets at upper body level. It needs a particular high amperage power line and a hose for filtered water. Immediately on activation, the oven's control panel displayed the error message:<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>F7-E2: Boiler NTC out of range.</b></div>
<br />
The service center was consulted. The following week a subcontracted technician paid us a visit, connected his computer to the oven, checked its vital signs, and ordered one W10076760 sensor, one 9758598 boiler and one W10160958 cntrl-elec, worth roughly 450 dollars in toto, on warranty. The parts arrived on the door step two days later. On the third day, two other gentlemen arrived to install them and recheck the ovenly functions. The steam function seemed to work at 500° F.<br />
<br />
Hooray, the great gadget finally seemed to work as it was supposed to without fail! Of course, the technicians did not bake anything in it. The first uses for the brand-new oven were merrily planned for the next day.<br />
<br />
But fate had something else in store. Before we started cooking with the oven, I stepped down into our basement to retrieve the Christmas ornaments, only to find a small puddle of water on the floor encroaching on the cardboard boxes. First I thought our hot water boiler sprung a leak. But no, the water dribbled from above, exactly from the spot where the steam oven is located.<br />
<br />
I ran upstairs, opened the doors of the cabinet beneath the oven. The pots and pans stored on the shelves were filled with water and had overflowed. Water was dripping from above. The laminated shelving was already crumbling. The wooden flooring in front of the cabinet showed signs of warping.<br />
<br />
In the back, I saw the coupling between the water supply line and the oven line. I saw no drops of water on the tubing. I touched the coupling. It was dry.<br />
<br />
No doubt, the water dribbled from the oven above. We could not see precisely where the source was, because a board blocks the view on the oven's underside.<br />
<br />
I turned off the water supply. We removed the pots and pans, soaked up the water with rags, and called the service center.<br />
<br />
The lady from the other side of the globe was friendly. After she verified our coordinates, I explained what happened. She told me that the next appointment with a service technician was available in eight days. I replied that this was no case for a service technician, but for an adjuster to strike up a damage report.<br />
<br />
After a little silence, the sweet voice suggested a service technician one more time. I did not dare turn down her offer in the hope that somebody would show up in the flesh eventually. Furthermore, I asked her to kindly inform her superviser of the water damage to the kitchen.<br />
<br />
One day later, we have yet to hear from the superviser.
In my opinion, our KitchenAid<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">®</span></sup> steam oven is deeply flawed. It was supposed to be a brand-new, high-end appliance and should have worked right out of the box. Sadly, it never ran properly even after massive repairs. Moreover, it severely damaged a brand-new kitchen cabinet.<br />
<br />
It is beyond my expertise to judge whether the manufacturer or the service company are responsible for the damage. Regardless in what fashion this journey will end, the consumer experience has been catastrophic from the beginning. I wonder how the KitchenAid<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">®</span></sup> brand manages to survive against its competitors with such abysmal record.<br />
<br />
<b>Addenda</b><br />
<ul>
<li>A team of experts has visited our home to investigate the cause of the accident. The installation guide for the oven suggests copper tubing for the water supply. The gentlemen divined that the coupling between the copper tubing and the oven had sprung the leak, when the service technicians moved the oven back into the cabinet after the repair. This may happen, I was told, because the copper tubing is stiff and prone to kink. The gentlemen also noted that the technicians had installed only one of the three spare parts that were ordered (12/21/2012).</li>
<li>Two days ago, the kitchen cabinet furnisher delivered a replacement for the damaged cabinet housing the steam oven and a new appliance. The company had both installed yesterday. An expert was called in to connect the water line. Another shut-off valve was placed beneath the oven between the piece of copper tubing connected to the oven and the plastic tubing connected to the water filter. This morning, I checked the cabinet beneath the oven for traces of water and was happy not to find any. This afternoon, we tested the new oven's steam function, baking French bread. The oven was preheated to 450° F. The steam function was activated, and the loaves were placed on the rack. The convection fans in the oven's back spun with unbearable noise. The first oven's fans ran quietly during the technician's brief test. Despite, the oven kept working without error messages. The bread rose. Its crust turned nicely brown. About 15 minutes into the process, when the bread was almost ready, the oven stopped with the warning:
<br /><div style="text-align: center;">
<b>F7-E0: Water is not high enough.</b>
</div>
We checked the cabinet beneath the oven. Plenty water was dribbling from above, accumulating on the shelves. We closed the new shut-off valve and mopped up the spill as much as possible. The bread turned out great (12/29/2012).</li>
<li>Today experts visited us to look after the new oven. They attested that electrical wiring behind the convection fans supplying a water level gauge was improperly fastened, allowing one wire to rub against the spinning fans. The rubbing had caused the noise we heard. Once the wire's insulation had been shaven away, the water level gauge failed. The gauge failure apparently allowed the feedwater to flow uncontrolled, spilling into the cabinet below. Because we noticed the leak immediately and shut off the water supply, no water damage to the cabinet could be found this time. The experts repaired the faulty gauge and tested the oven at 300° F for 20 minutes. No malfunction occurred. Regardless of this progress, two brand-new defective ovens in a row provide disconcerting evidence that KitchenAid<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">®</span></sup> needs to urgently improve quality control. Whoever assembled and tested these ovens should feel profoundly embarrassed for their shoddy workmanship (01/10/2013)!</li>
<li>We have been baking delicious breads four times to date.
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiNX6-XLNAT8KMIWQo80rrSax87xLyI-BPXOHnF129jDsGy4gUsnHLAa_WXD4_YQf4Ph4HDy-OYCskgrKD9Sb6bvy2UvwY9_oeqSgRLFAJnJhBCghEF_m9rJknhFMdGBYgBVsXhK4ZmktOx/s1600/photo.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiNX6-XLNAT8KMIWQo80rrSax87xLyI-BPXOHnF129jDsGy4gUsnHLAa_WXD4_YQf4Ph4HDy-OYCskgrKD9Sb6bvy2UvwY9_oeqSgRLFAJnJhBCghEF_m9rJknhFMdGBYgBVsXhK4ZmktOx/s400/photo.JPG" /></a></div>
The appliance performed well, though a relay seems to stick on occasion, producing a soft vibratory sound. No further leaks sprang up. Other than an urgent review of quality control, I may suggest two additional safety features that may help avoid water leaks. First an expansion joint between the oven pipe and the feedwater pipe may help prevent the coupling between the two pipes from leaking because of potential unequal metal expansion owing to differing temperatures at the terminations. Moreover, an external solenoid-operated stop-check valve should be installed in the feedwater line. The valve ought to fail close on power loss or on error signals from the oven's control board (01/20/2013).</li>
<li>Recently, we had another kitchen appliance-related experience of note. When we bought the steam-assist oven, we also purchased a kitchenaid gas range with a double oven. After the range broke on average once a year because the igniters, the convection fan and the emergency gas shutoff valve failed, we decided to go for a Bosch model from a nationwide retailer that contracts out delivery and installation to different contractors. Delivery took a week. The installer did not arrive for three weeks. When we complained to the retailer in person, the installer played cat and mouse with us. After four weeks we returned the uninstalled appliance at full refund. We bought the same model at a different store, where delivery and installation are carried out by the same company on the same day within five business days at half the cost. Buyer beware! Some retailers have implemented better business models than others (06/25/2016).</li>
</ul>
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-46014247967621095052012-09-28T08:08:00.000-05:002013-11-05T11:43:41.496-06:00Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 1: Blunt Force Impact Damage Inside Primary ContainmentThe Mar. 11, 2011, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami">Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake and Tsunami</a> precipitated losses of coolant and fuel meltdowns in three reactors at <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_Nuclear_Power_Plant">Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station</a>. Unit 1 was the station's first to incur a meltdown.<br />
<br />
Yesterday, the nuclear power station's operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. (<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/index-j.html">TEPCO</a>) released a video of the first endoscopic exploration inside Unit 1's primary containment vessel (PCV) (TEPCO press release with the title "<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120927_02-e.pdf">Punching an Access Hole at the Penetration (X100B
Penetration) of Unit 1 PCV at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station</a>", dated Sep. 27, 2012). TEPCO's video can be downloaded <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/library/">here</a>. General Electric's Mark I primary containment systems are composed of a pear-shaped drywell housing the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and a doughnut-shaped, water-filled suppression chamber, also known as wetwell. TEPCO's video below explores the inside of the drywell (courtesy: <a href="http://simplyinfo.org/">SimplyInfo.org</a>).
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<br />
<div center="center">
<object height="315" width="420"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/XZbMFyr-udg?version=3&hl=en_US"></param>
<param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param>
<param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param>
<embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/XZbMFyr-udg?version=3&hl=en_US" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" width="420" height="315" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true"></embed></object>
</div>
<br />
Note that the upper part of the drywell is filled with dense steam. Water must be boiling at the bottom of the primary containment.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, the dominant color of the drywell's inner surface is grimy black and not brown as observed in Unit 2 (see the video in my post with the title "<a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2012/02/fukushima-fuel-meltdowns-cold-shutdown.html">Fukushima: Fuel Meltdowns & Cold Shutdown</a>" published online Feb. 15, 2012), indicating combustion either by explosion or fire.<br />
<br />
18:05 minutes into the video blunt force impact on the drywell becomes visible. A large piece of sharp-edged debris can be seen deposited adjacent to exposed rebar of a reinforced concrete wall structure. The impact suggests that the location was struck by a heavy object, perhaps the object nearby, either falling from above or projected against the drywell wall like a missile.<br />
<br />
A high-pressure steam jet exiting from a small RPV breach, also known as small breach Loss of Cooling Accident (LOCA), could have blasted chunks off the RPV or its piping, turning the chunks into projectiles that impacted the drywell.
<br />
<b>Addendum</b>
<br />
<ul>
<li>During the past week, TEPCO undertook another video camera foray into the primary containment vessel (PCV) of Unit 1 (TEPCO's press handout with the title "<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_121015_05-e.pdf">Investigation Results of the Inside of Unit 1 PCV at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station</a>" dated Oct. 15, 2012). The company released <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/library/movie-01e.html">three videos</a> of the exploration.<br />
The two pictures below, courtesy of <a href="http://simplyinfo.org/">Simplyinfo.org</a>, were captured between 37 and 44 minutes in the hour-long video.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://simplyinfo.apphb.com/proxy?url=http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8463/8095580963_ce9fcf679f_b.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="213" src="http://simplyinfo.apphb.com/proxy?url=http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8463/8095580963_ce9fcf679f_b.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://simplyinfo.apphb.com/proxy?url=http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8043/8095586098_d7108210b7_b.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="213" src="http://simplyinfo.apphb.com/proxy?url=http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8043/8095586098_d7108210b7_b.jpg " width="320" /></a></div>
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<br />
<br />
<br />
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<br />
<br />
<br /><br />
The pictures show three types of damage:
• the PCV floor fractured (first picture; top left corner),
• scattered metal shards (both pictures), suggesting piping shattered in a blast caused by excess interior pressure, and
• extreme force impact fragmented large structures and components (bottom picture)(10/17/2012).
</li>
</ul>
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-1776718486802527832012-09-20T12:38:00.002-05:002012-09-21T11:06:23.935-05:00Virtualization & The MindIn previous posts published <a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2009/04/windows-7-qemu-internet.html">Apr. 7</a> and <a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2009/11/first-peak-at-googles-chrome-os.html">Nov. 25</a>, 2009, I discussed the use of <a href="http://wiki.qemu.org/Main_Page">QEMU</a> for emulating virtual computers and the use <a href="https://www.virtualbox.org/wiki/VirtualBox">VirtualBox</a> to run Google's <a href="http://www.chromium.org/">Chrome OS</a> on an <a href="http://www.apple.com/">Apple</a> MacIntosh Mini computer, respectively. This post provides more detail on the installation of guest operating systems on two platforms using VirtualBox.
VirtualBox is an emulation application originally developed at <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun_Microsystems">Sun Microsystems</a> and now supported by <a href="http://www.oracle.com/">Oracle</a>. It permits us to operate a guest operating system (OS) on virtual computers installed on a different platform. Two configurations are discussed (see table below).<br />
<br />
<div style="padding-left: 50px;">
<table align="left" border="1" bordercolor="#33CC00" cellpadding="3" cellspacing="3" style="background-color: none; width: 100%px;">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Configuration</td>
<td>Host Computer</td>
<td>Host OS</td>
<td>Guest OS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Apple MacBook</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>Windows 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dell Inspiron</td>
<td>Windows 7</td>
<td>Linux</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div>
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<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<div style="font-family: verdana,arial,sans-serif; font-size: 10px; margin-left: 68px;">
The two test configurations (table courtesy: <a href="http://www.quackit.com/html/html_table_tutorial.cfm" target="_top">HTML Tables</a>).</div>
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One configuration entails running a Linux-operated virtual computer on a <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/default.aspx">Microsoft Corporation</a>'s Windows 7 (32-bit) operated <a href="http://www.dell.com/">Dell</a> Inspiron 1318 laptop (2.00 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo; 2 GB RAM). In the other, a Microsoft Windows 8 (64-bit) operated virtual computer is run on a OS X (10.6.8) operated Apple MacBook (2.26 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo; 2 GB RAM). In both examples, the results have been excellent. The virtual guest machines operate astoundingly fast, while the impact on the host computers performance is acceptably small. Below, find suggestions how to proceed with the installation:<br />
<ol>
<li>Download and install the latest version of the VirtualBox platform package (here 4.2) for each actual computer from <a href="https://www.virtualbox.org/wiki/Downloads">Download VirtualBox</a>.</li>
<li><i>Open the application.</i> The VirtualBox Manager will prompt you to set up a new virtual machine, presenting default options on the right.
Set base memory to not more than a third of the host computer's RAM. The base memory can be ramped up to one half of the host computer's RAM. However, this may slow the computer.</li>
<li>Set the virtual machine's video memory to 128 MB.</li>
<li>I chose VMDK as the virtual machine's hard drive format and an 8 GB, expandable, as hard drive size for Linux and 20 GB, fixed, for Windows.</li>
<li><i>Install guest operating system on the virtual machine.</i> I chose Windows 8 (64 bit) for the OSX-10.6 MacBook host and <a href="http://crunchbanglinux.org/">Crunchbang Linux 10</a> (32 bit, i-386), a small footprint <a href="http://www.ubuntu.com/">Ubuntu</a> Linux distribution, for the Windows-7 Inspiron host. You can either install the guest operating systems from disk or iso-images that must be attached to the CD/DVD ROM drive of the virtual machine using 'Devices☞CD/DVD Devices' on VitualBox's pulldown menu.</li>
<li><i>USB-2.0 support.</i> To enable USB-2.0 devices on the virtual machines, download the Oracle VM VirtualBox Extension Pack for the version matching that of the VirtualBox on your computer from <a href="https://www.virtualbox.org/wiki/Downloads">VirtualBox's download page</a> and install the package following conventional host OS-specific procedures.</li>
<li><i>File sharing.</i> To enable file sharing on the virtual machine, VBoxGuestAdditions need to be installed. If you pull down the 'Device' option on the VirtualBox menu and select 'Shared Folders', a VBoxGuestAdditions iso-disk image containing the necessary files should mount. Eventually, the path to the shared folder on the host must be added to the 'shared Folders' list (see details below). If the VBoxGuestAdditions iso-image does not mount, download the image from the <a href="http://download.virtualbox.org/virtualbox/">VirtualBox repository</a> and mount it on the virtual CD/DVD-ROM drive, using the VirtualBox pulldown menu option 'Devices☞CD/DVD Devices'.</li>
<li>For Windows guests, open the VBoxGuestAdditions iso-disk image folder in the guest with Windows Explorer and simply run the VirtualBox additions executable that matches the guest's operating system. For Linux guests, install the Linux-headers development packages for the kernel of your guest operating system before you proceed. Crunchbang has been developed as a Debian-based Ubuntu distribution. The needed header packages can be added to the operating system with the Synaptic Package Manager.
After the packages have been installed, mount the VBoxGuestAdditions iso-image on the virtual CD/DVD-ROM drive, using the VirtualBox pulldown menu option 'Devices☞CD/DVD Devices'and, using the guest's command line terminal, go to the disk image folder, typing at the prompt:<br />
<br />
<b>cd /media/cdrom</b><br />
<br />
To install the needed additions on the guest enter on the command line:<br />
<br />
<b>sudo sh ./VBoxLinuxAdditions.run</b><br />
<br />
After providing your root password, the additions should compile and install. Without Linux headers installed, the script attempts to add a pre-compiled module. In my attempts, the module failed to be added on reboot. Hence, I took the alternative route via compilation. The compiler, however, depends on the Linux-headers development packages. Reboot the guest!</li>
<li><i>The file sharing path for Linux guests.</i> If shutdown and reboot of the guest proceeded without fail, create a folder in your home directory on the Linux guest as mount point for the folder to be shared on the Windows host. On the Windows host, I created a shared file folder with the name 'share' in the Documents folder, and added the folder's path to the list under the VirtualBox pulldown menu option 'Devices☞Shared Folders':<br />
<br />
<b>C:\Users\Username\Documents\share</b><br />
<br />
If the correct path is inserted, the ok-button will light blue. Press okay.
After that, the folder can be mounted on the Linux guest filesystem just so:<br />
<br />
<b>sudo mount -t vboxsf share /home/Username/Documents/share</b><br />
<br />
</li>
<li><i>The file sharing path for Windows guests.</i> For the Windows guest running on a OS X host, make sure that file sharing is activated under 'System Preferences☞Internet & Wireless☞Sharing' on the host. I made a shared folder with the name 'share' in my documents folder on the host and entered its path in the folder list under the VirtualBox pulldown menu option 'Devices☞Shared Folders':<br />
<br />
<b>/Users/Username/Documents/share</b><br />
<br />
If the correct path is inserted, the ok-button will light blue. Press okay. On the guest, go to 'Windows Explorer☞Networks☞Map network drive,' select a drive, and add under 'Folder':<br />
<br />
<b>\\vboxsvr\share</b><br />
<br />
Check 'Connect using different credentials', which will present a login window for the host, asking for your username and password. After providing the correct answers, the shared folder on the host should pop up in the guest's Windows Explorer.</li>
</ol>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgb4uUNpiASkiYHsXHgNGAMxkt_2GyN6AP_sfjcSWeKLVshOBzmejYYX4dQWjYENUR8_8X7LYWW66yrep61TEQypHcxnWCC9e7hVdLjIvxuSEzEqrH0CubPnUwfA7Q3vvmx_yYo5utki2D2/s1600/Virtualbox_W_OSX.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgb4uUNpiASkiYHsXHgNGAMxkt_2GyN6AP_sfjcSWeKLVshOBzmejYYX4dQWjYENUR8_8X7LYWW66yrep61TEQypHcxnWCC9e7hVdLjIvxuSEzEqrH0CubPnUwfA7Q3vvmx_yYo5utki2D2/s640/Virtualbox_W_OSX.jpg" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: left;">Configuration 1: Windows on OS X.</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjB4ZJwiXSJaCVAd55KwTxL59aM64JiTe6zIJ0x_m_-DLpRVXXiqjx2p2oWQc6u2hXCFvECb79zh3MmhrHPUXswXPRb_XlxSPsDWG5wgQMEODEh0HtSXHYDEgnJ_5oz_JlEEBvhsgLnN1db/s1600/VirtualBox_L_on_W.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="401" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjB4ZJwiXSJaCVAd55KwTxL59aM64JiTe6zIJ0x_m_-DLpRVXXiqjx2p2oWQc6u2hXCFvECb79zh3MmhrHPUXswXPRb_XlxSPsDWG5wgQMEODEh0HtSXHYDEgnJ_5oz_JlEEBvhsgLnN1db/s640/VirtualBox_L_on_W.jpg" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: left;">Configuration 2: Linux on Windows.</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
I have refrained from exploring the Drag-and-Drop option. But in essence, we are all set to go!<br />
<br />
<b>Related Posts</b><br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2009/11/first-peak-at-googles-chrome-os.html">A First Peek at Google's Chrome OS</a></li>
<li><a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2009/04/windows-7-qemu-internet.html">Windows 7, Qemu & the Internet</a></li>
</ul>
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-29110590523629675442012-07-01T17:58:00.000-05:002014-09-21T10:33:37.206-05:00Fukushima: Station Black Out & DelusionAccording to a Japan Times editorial with the title "<a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/ed20120623a1.html#.T-YOuitYvLG">Nuclear power plant collusion</a>" published online Jun. 23, 2012, industry and government experts appointed by the Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission in 1991 to revise safety standards for station blackouts (SBO) concluded in 1993 <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">“that even if an SBO occurs, it would not lead to a severe accident."</span></blockquote>
Last year's nuclear reactor disaster at <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_Nuclear_Power_Plant">Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station</a> (NPS) in the wake of the great <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami">Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake and Tsunami</a> can be considered a station blackout that developed into a severe nuclear accident.<br />
<br />
According to <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/srgreene/nuregcr2182vol1">Cook and others (1981)</a>, “a station blackout is defined as the complete loss of all AC (alternating current, ed.) electrical power to the essential and nonessential switchgear buses in a nuclear power plant.” The authors examined a hypothetical station blackout (SBO) and its consequences, using the boiling water reactor (<a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/teachers/03.pdf">BWR</a>) at Brown's Ferry NPS Unit 1 as model. The unit produces 1152 MW electrical power, and its design resembles closely that of units 1 - 4 at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, except Unit 1 at Fukushima was not equipped with an automatic depressurization system and had an isolation condenser instead of a reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system. The description of events at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS on the day of the earthquake provided in this essay is based on the information the station's operator Tokyo Electric Power Company (<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/index-j.html">TEPCO</a>) has released since the accident.<br />
<br />
In the study of <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/srgreene/nuregcr2182vol1">Cook and others (1981)</a>, the loss of offsite AC power trips the main turbine, scrams the reactor, and the emergency diesel generators fail. Battery-supplied DC power continues to support emergency shutdown systems and components important to reactor safety. The authors explore with models various possible event paths after the batteries are exhausted. Though ground motion rather than a loss of power scrammed the reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS automatically, the authors' predictions on the worst accident progression converge on the chain of events at Fukushima after 4 p.m. on Mar. 11, 2011. Below, <span style="background-color: white;">Unit 1 at </span><span style="background-color: white;">Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS is used as example.</span><br />
<br />
<b>Systems, Structures, and Components Important to Safety</b><br />
In conjunction with a high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system, with which all reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi as well as at Brown's Ferry are outfitted, RCIC system and isolation condenser constitute crucial components designed to keep the nuclear fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) covered with water, when the electrical power-generating turbine trips, the main steam isolation valves close, and the reactor scrams. HPCI and RCIC system are described in detail in the appendix of the study of <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/srgreene/nuregcr2182vol1">Cook and others (1981)</a>.<br />
<br />
In a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scram">scram</a>, all safety control rods are inserted into the fuel core, instantly disrupting the nuclear chain reaction. The closing of the main steam isolation valves disconnects the reactor from the turbine, and the decay heat that the fuel produces cannot be transferred to the main steam condenser. Alternating current is no longer produced onsite. Other sources must supply power needed to operate the reactor. The offsite electrical grid represents the primary alternative source, and should the grid fail, emergency diesel generators are held in reserve onsite. If the emergency generators fail, battery-supplied direct current (DC) is supposed to support important instrumentation and valves for several hours.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; margin-left: 100px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/isolation_condenser_valves.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/isolation_condenser_valves.jpg" height="191" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
<span style="font-size: 10px; text-align: center;">Schema of the isolation condenser at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit 1, labeled here 'emergency steam condenser.' Note subsystem A and subsystem B are both fed by one coolant supply line. The coolant in the condenser is evaporated, while cooling reactor pressure vessel (RPV) steam. The coolant vapor is vented directly into the environment via a pair of exhaust pipes on the west wall of the reactor building. MO - manual-remote actuated motor operated valves (</span><a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110524e16.pdf" style="font-size: 10px; text-align: center;">TEPCO</a><span style="font-size: 10px; text-align: center;">).</span><br />
<br />
The isolation condenser at Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1 consists of two identical subsystems of water-cooled heat exchangers designed to reduce reactor pressure vessel (RPV) temperature and pressure by steam condensation. The condensate is returned to the RPV to help keep the fuel covered. Similar to Brown's Ferry Unit 1, however, when the RPV's safety/relief valves open to protect the vessel from overpressure, large volumes of steam escape. The valves lift automatically when a pressure setpoint is reached, but can also be actuated remote-manually from the control room with battery-supplied DC power and compressed air. As a result, the water level falls.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; margin-left: 75px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/hpci_schema.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/hpci_schema.jpg" height="231" width="320" /></a></div>
<span style="font-size: 10px; text-align: center;">Schema of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit 1. MO - motor operated, HO - hand operated, and AO - air operated valves. Note the reactor steam-driven turbine that powers pump and booster pump. The feedwater for the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is alternatively provided by the condensate storage tank or the wetwell (suppression chamber) pool (<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120312_04-e.pdf">TEPCO</a>).</span><br />
<br />
Low water level automatically starts the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system, a reactor steam-driven pump, which can inject coolant rapidly at high pressure into the RPV, keeping the fuel core covered.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; margin-left: 85px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/hpci_zps64ec1404.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/hpci_zps64ec1404.jpeg" height="237" width="320" /></a></div>
<span style="font-size: 10px; text-align: center;"></span><br />
<center>
<span style="font-size: 10px; text-align: center;">HPCI system with reactor steam turbine-driven pump (source: <a href="http://www.nucleartourist.com/">nuclear tourist</a>).</span></center>
<br />
General Electric's Mark I primary containment system encloses the RPVs of units 1-5 at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. The system consists of a pear-shaped drywell, housing the RPV, connected with large-diameter pipes like spokes to a hub to a doughnut-shaped water-filled wetwell, also known as suppression chamber. The pipes are designed to relieve pressure building up in the drywell into the wetwell. By contrast, the safety/relief valves relieve RPV pressure into the wetwell through separate smaller diameter pipes.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; margin-left: 100px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/containment_base.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/containment_base.jpg" height="320" width="280" /></a></div>
<span style="font-size: 10px; text-align: center;">Schema of the Mark I containment system inside the reactor building of Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1. Note the pear-shaped drywell, housing the reactor pressure vessel, connected with 81-inch pipes to the doughnut-shaped wetwell, also known as suppression chamber, filled halfway with water (courtesy: Simplyinfo.org).</span><br />
<br />
The drywell is designed to operate safely up to 138 °C (<a href="http://www.slideshare.net/srgreene/nuregcr2182vol1">Cook and others, 1981</a>). When the fuel core in the RPV is uncovered, the core temperature will rise above 1,300 °C, the fuel rods will begin to melt, RPV penetration seals begin to leak, and ambient temperature in the drywell will heat to more than 149 °C, or 300 °F. Above this temperature, valve control solenoids, electrical cable insulation and electrical penetration module seals fail.<br />
<br />
Hundreds of kilograms hydrogen are produced at the damaged fuel rods after fuel uncovery, when the super-heated zirconium oxide cladding of the fuel rods reacts with steam. Once the RPV is breached, the hydrogen and gaseous radioactive <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fission_product">fission products</a> will escape into the drywell. Once the drywell seals deteriorate in the heat, the gases will vent into the reactor and turbine building. Hence, rising radiation dose rates in these buildings suggest that a fuel meltdown is in progress.<br />
<br />
<b>Timeline</b><br />
☢ 14:46, the earthquake strikes tripping operating units 1, 2 and 3. Offsite AC power service is lost. The emergency diesel generators start up. Two generators supply Unit 1 (TEPCO press release with the title "<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2012/1205638_1870.html">Release of the Fukushima Nuclear Accidents Investigation Report</a>" dated Jun. 20, 2012).<br />
☢15:27 and ☢15:35, tsunami waves inundate the generator rooms of units 1 to 5. The diesel generators for Unit 1 trip. In the control room wedged between the reactor and the turbine building, charge indicators flash for a brief moment. Alarms ring out and die. The tsunami also floods DC power distribution panels. In rapid succession, control room illumination, displays, indicators, gauges, annunciators and controls dim. On the ground floor below, water stands 80 cm deep.<br />
☢15:30, the RPV pressure recorder for Unit 1 stops. Minutes later, the RPV temperature recorders halt.<br />
☢15:37, control room crew call <b>SBO</b> for units 1 and 2. The government is notified. Crew arriving from the basement of the turbine building confirm that the emergency diesel generators failed and the corridor lights are out.<br />
☢15:50, all DC power is lost. The operators are left with emergency lights on the Unit 1 side of the control room, and in total darkness on the Unit 2 side, unable to read vital reactor parameters and observe the results of their interventions. Unit 1's isolation condenser status is rendered indeterminable. The status indicator for the HPCI system is turned off. The system has fallen into a non-bootable state. The RPV water level displays cease.
<br />
☢16:15, the water level recorders for Unit 1 stop.<br />
☢16:25, the shift supervisor declares the status of the emergency core cooling system and the RPV parameters unobtainable.<br />
☢17:56, preparations begin for fire pumps to inject water into Unit 1's RPV.<br />
☢20:07, crew is able to collect gauge readings in the reactor building for the first time since the SBO's inception, concluding the fuel was covered and RPV pressure held at 6.9 MPa.<br />
☢20:47, some control room power is restored with a portable generator. Auxiliary batteries are connected to the electrical RPV water level displays, re-establishing monitoring capability at 21:19.<br />
<br />
The observed RPV water level on the gauge indicated less than a foot above the fuel and may have been underestimated by several feet, because the reference leg of the water level gauge, also known as Yarway gauge, is located in the drywell. The reference leg is needed to account for vessel pressure and temperature. The drywell was progressively heating up, evaporating water in the gauge's reference leg and producing lower than actual water levels, when the drywell temperature exceeded design basis (<a href="http://web.ornl.gov/info/reports/1992/3445603689514.pdf">Hodge and others, 1992</a>).<br />
<br />
<b>Emergency Cooling</b><br />
☢14:52, both subsystems of Unit 1's isolation condenser started automatically. Control room crew notes a drop in RPV pressure believed commensurate with the rapid diminution of temperature attributed to the isolation condenser activation.<br />
☢15:03, in compliance with instructions, an operator closes valves of the isolation condenser loop. According to manual, the rate of change in RPV temperature was not permitted to be greater than 55 ℃/h because of the risk of RPV failure.<br />
<br />
Line valves were opened to enable HPCI.
The control room crew initially found no indication that Unit 1's HPCI system was inoperable. They reassured themselves that the HPCI system was ready to inject water into the RPV, should the safety/relief valves actuate automatically, that is 7.4 MPa for lifting and 6.9 MPa for reseating, resulting in a drop of RPV water level below the threshold and starting HPCI. However, because the RPV water level seemed to persist at sufficiently high levels, keeping the fuel covered, and pressure remained below safety/relief valve lift point, HPCI was not expected to start before the tsunami struck and was disabled afterwards.<br />
<br />
The crew continued to control RPV pressure remote-manually with isolation condenser subsystem A into the next day, intermittently opening and closing the steam line valves. TEPCO believes that the isolation condenser was effective in avoiding an excessive rise in RPV pressure, because no evidence has been found that safety/relief valves lifted.<br />
<br />
It is important to note that depressurizing the RPV with the help of the safety/relief valves, while adding sufficient coolant with the isolation condenser or the HPCI system, would have been essential for avoiding an immediate fuel meltdown. The operators actuated safety/relief valves at Units 2 and 3, but not at Unit 1. <br />
<br />
<b>Simulations</b><br />
In their SBO simulation study on a BWR-4 <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/teachers/03.pdf">boiling water reactor</a>, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5516/NET.03.2011.046">Park and Ahn (2012)</a> assume that battery power will be available for 6 hours. RCIC and HPCI systems are working, but begin to fail, once the batteries are exhausted. Under these conditions, the author's simulation suggests that, without operator intervention, core uncovery and melt will begin 8 and 9 hours into the SBO, respectively. The drywell will fail after 18 hours. TEPCO's simulation assumes that the drywell temperature beyond which leakage begins is crossed 13 hours into the SBO.<br />
<br />
By contrast, the almost concomitant loss of AC and DC power at Fukushima accelerated the progression of events. TEPCO estimates that Unit 1's fuel core began to uncover already about 2 hours into the SBO ("<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110524e16.pdf">Analysis and evaluation of the operation record and accident record of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station at the time of Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki-Earthquake</a>", TEPCO, May 23, 2011).<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.simplyinfo.org/?page_id=193">Wilkie (2011)</a> suggested that the fuel core in the reactor would uncover and begin to melt in slightly less than one hour, if HPCI, RCIC or the isolation condenser and safety/relief valves failed. Similarly, <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/srgreene/nuregcr2182vol1">Cook and others (1981)</a> predict that, without any power and without coolant injection into the RPV, fuel is uncovered in about half-an-hour, the core meltdown begins after two hours, and the drywell electrical penetration modules fail after 4.5 hours, venting radioactive noble gas, cesium, and iodine-based fission products into the reactor building (their Table 9.7.).<br />
<br />
Furthermore, <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/srgreene/nuregcr2182vol1">Cook and others (1981)</a> conclude that the fuel would uncover twice as rapidly, the fuel rods would begin to melt within less than one hour, and the drywell would begin to vent about 20 minutes earlier, that is within a little more than four hours into the SBO, if a loss of coolant through a small breach in the RPV occurred, also known as small-breach LOCA (loss of coolant accident). The breach could consist of a stuck-open safety/relief valve or a hole in the reactor pressure vessel 13.8 cm in diameter.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/fukushima-daiichi-ucs-analysis-unit-1-first-30-minutes.pdf">Lochbaum (2011)</a> suspected a LOCA might have happened, but could not find any evidence in the data TEPCO released at the time of his evaluation. In accord, <a href="http://cnic.jp/english/topics/safety/earthquake/fukukk19may11.html">Tanaka (2011)</a> hypothesized a LOCA as part of the accident progression of Unit 1, and TEPCO's simulations match the reactor data best, when a LOCA is assumed. Below, I discuss events past 4 p.m. on March 11, 2011, that support the occurrence of a small-breach LOCA.<br />
<br />
<b>Small-Breach LOCA</b><br />
☢17:19 crew that had been sent to Unit 1's reactor building to check on the isolation condenser bilge water level ran into hazardous radiation dose rates at the building entrance, forcing them back ("<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111202e14.pdf">Fukushima Nuclear Accident Analysis Report (Interim Report)</a>," TEPCO, Dec. 2, 2011).<br />
☢23:00, contamination had reached the turbine building. A reconnaissance team recorded 1.2 mSv/h in front of the north side ground floor airlock, which is roughly 20,000 times greater than the 50 nSv/h ordinarily detected on the premises.<br />
<br />
The progressive increase in dose rate, already observed shortly after 5:00 p.m. and corroborated at further distance three hours later, suggests that a fuel meltdown was underway already at that time, consistent with a rapid severe accident development. Without cooling, the drywell must have overheated 90 minutes into the SBO, developed leaks, and allowed substantial radioactive gases to vent into the building, leading to the detected dose rate increases. While, no evidence of a massive RPV water loss has been presented to date, a small RPV breach therefore constitutes a probable cause that would explain fuel uncovery and meltdown within less than one hour.<br />
<br />
To date, TEPCO has not reported that safety/relief valves were actuated. However, after the loss of power a valve could have failed open unnoticed. Hydrogen produced by the fuel rod cladding/water reaction may have accumulated in the piping. Deflagrating gas could have blown open a valve.<br />
<br />
Certainly, we shall learn one day whether a small-breach LOCA occurred at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit 1. Without doubt, the meltdown at Unit 1 progressed more rapidly than initially believed. The remarkably narrow window of opportunity for operator intervention between station blackout and fuel meltdown should give all stakeholders pause.<br />
<br />
<b>Acknowledgement</b><br />
I thank the contributors to <a href="http://simplyinfo.org/">Simplyinfo.org</a>. This evaluation could not have been accomplished without their input.
<br />
<br />
<b>Addendum</b>
<br />
<ul>
<li>Today <i>NHK</i> WORLD aired a video report with the title “<a href="http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/newsline/201404301311.html">Nuclear Watch: Blind Spot in Nuclear Safety</a>“, documenting that an air monitoring station 5.6 km from Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station registered a greater than anticipated spike in radiation on Saturday Mar. 12, 2011, after hardened venting at the station’s Unit 1 had commenced and before a hydrogen explosion damaged that unit. As the <i>NHK</i> WORLD report explains, hardened venting is supposed to reduce primary containment vessel pressure, filtering most radioactive contaminants out by passing the effluent through the primary containment vessel's suppression pool. TEPCO presumed that only 0.01 percent of the initial radioactivity would vent into the atmosphere. However, the radiation dose rates observed at the monitoring station were magnitudes greater than what they should have been according to TEPCO's presumption. <i>NHK</i> WORLD hypothesizes that the greater than expected radiation release resulted from an increase in suppression pool temperature, diminishing the pool's filtering capacity. In a model experiment, the release was increased 500-fold. <i>NHK</i> WORLD suggests that earlier gas and steam releases from the reactor pressure vessel heated the water in the pool via open safety relief valves. According to TEPCO’s reports to date no safety relief valves were opened at Unit 1. A LOCA releasing gas and steam from the reactor pressure vessel into the primary containment vessel represents an ever more likely possibility (04/30/2014).</li>
</ul>
<b>References</b>
<br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.slideshare.net/srgreene/nuregcr2182vol1">Cook DH, Greene SR, Harrington RM, Hodge SA, Yue DD (1981)</a> Station Blackout at Browns Ferry Unit One - Accident Sequence Analysis. NUREG/CR-2182, Vol. 1.</li>
<li><a href="http://web.ornl.gov/info/reports/1992/3445603689514.pdf">Hodge SA, Cleveland JC, Kress TS, Petck M (1992)</a> Identification and assessment of BWR in-vessel severe accident mitigation strategies. NUREG/CR-5869.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/fukushima-daiichi-ucs-analysis-unit-1-first-30-minutes.pdf">Lochbaum D (2011)</a> Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1: The First 30 Minutes.</li>
<li><a href="http://article.nuclear.or.kr/jknsfile/v44/JK0440311.pdf">Park S-Y, Ahn K-I (2012)</a> Comparative Analysis of Station Blackout Accident Progression in Typical PWR, BWR, and PHWR. Nuclear Engineering and Technology 44:311-322.</li>
<li><a href="http://cnic.jp/english/topics/safety/earthquake/fukukk19may11.html">Tanaka M (2011)</a> What Happened at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant? In: Statement by Scientists and Engineers Concerning Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (no.3). Our Views of the Accidents at the Fukushima Nuclear Plants after the Earthquake.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.simplyinfo.org/?page_id=193">Wilkie D (2011)</a> Analysis: Fukushima first hours. Simplyinfo.</li>
</ul><div class="blogger-post-footer"><div align="center"><iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=12&l=ur1&category=amazonhomepage&f=ifr" width="300" height="250" scrolling="no" border="0" marginwidth="0" style="border:none;" frameborder="0"></iframe>
</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-1624224372282555542012-06-11T16:08:00.001-05:002012-06-12T11:02:55.280-05:00Radiological Emergency Plan: North Anna Nuclear Power StationOn March 11, 2011, the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami">Tōhoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake and Tsunami</a> struck Japan's northeastern coast with devastating consequences. Roughly 20,000 people perished that day. In addition, three reactors at the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disaster">Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station</a> (NPS) incurred fuel meltdowns with massive releases of radioactive material into the air and the ocean, contaminating large swaths of land. Roughly 80,000 residents had to be evacuated from the vicinity of the NPS and have not been able to return home.<br />
<br />
About five months later, the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Virginia_earthquake">August 23 Virginia Earthquake</a> precipitated the emergency shutdown of the two pressurized light water reactors at <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Anna_Nuclear_Generating_Station">North Anna Nuclear Power Station</a> (NPS) roughly 35 miles from my home. According to the <a href="http://www.usgs.gov/">U.S. Geological Service</a>, the station is located at a distance of only 8 miles from the quake's epicenter and 20 miles from a quaternary fault zone. Seismologist Dr. James Martin of <a href="http://www.vt.edu/">Virginia Tech.</a> gave a comprehensive <a href="http://kiwi6.com/file/oin7v21fsz">interview</a> on the quake to Beverly Amsler aired on WVTF Radio IQ's <a href="http://www.wvtf.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=51&Itemid=149"><i>Evening Edition</i></a> for Nov. 22, 2011. The events made me wonder what a radiological emergency similar to that in Japan would entail in the U.S.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Quaternary_fault_map_Virginia.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="352" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Quaternary_fault_map_Virginia.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<span style="font-size: 11px;"><span style="text-align: left;">Area of quaternary faults and liquefaction in less than 15,000 years (hatched; source: </span><a href="http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/products/" style="text-align: center;">USGS</a><span style="text-align: center;">). The arrow points at the location of North Anna NPS. The epicenter of last Summer's Virginia quake was located near the junction between state routes 22 and 208.</span></span><br />
<br />
When a utility company applies to the <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission</a> (NRC) for the license to build a nuclear power reactor, an emergency plan for the eventuality of a radiological accident must be submitted. The plan must conform to federal regulations (<a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0047.html">10 CFR § 50.47 Emergency Plans</a>).
<a href="http://www.dom.com/">Dominion</a>, the operator of North Anna NPS, is planning to construct a third unit on the station's premises and has hence developed such plan.<br />
<br />
Examining Dominion's "<a href="http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0733/ML073321242.pdf">North Anna 3 Combined License Application, Part 5: Emergency Plan, Revision 0 November 2007</a>", reveals that much of the responsibility for the immediate decisions to be taken in the course of a severe reactor accident rests with the station operator, that is, primarily on the shoulders of the station's Emergency Coordinator (page II-1 of the proposed emergency plan). This person is instructed to collect information about the radioactive contamination monitored in the surroundings of the station, estimate the source term, that is the amount of radioactivity released from the failed reactor, determine the prevailing winds and precipitation, dispersing the radioactive matter, and constantly keep the relevant local, state and federal agencies up to date about the evolution of the accident.<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/North_Anna_Exposure_Pathway_EPZ.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="393" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/North_Anna_Exposure_Pathway_EPZ.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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<tr><td class="tr-caption"><span style="font-size: 11px;">Map showing county lines and distance radii of Emergency Planning Zones proposed for North Anna NPS Unit 3 (source: Fig. I-2; <a href="http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0733/ML073321242.pdf">Dominion</a>).</span></td></tr>
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Precise recommendations to the public depend on the source term and the progression of the plume in which the radioactivity is dispersed. The anticipated immediate protection measures are contingent mainly upon the distance from the power station. Radii of action are drawn (see drawing above). In addition to the protection of station personel (site emergency), the greatest concern lies with the safety of residents living within a 10-mile radius around the station, for whom precise instructions for health protection, evacuation and shelter have been planned (general emergency). This area is designated as the <i>Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone</i>. Radio stations periodically test emergency alert announcements (texts and further details can be found in the <a href="http://www.jmu.edu/wmra/eas/vaplan.pdf">Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Alert System Plan</a>). Sirens alert residents to tune into local radio and TV stations for detailed announcements. Residents living within the 2 mile perimeter around the stricken NPS and within 5 miles straight downwind, including a margin on both sides (keyhole pattern), will be asked to evacuate immediately. Other residents within the 10-mile perimeter will be asked to stay indoors (<a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/emerg-plan-prep-nuc-power-bg.html">NRC Backgrounder on Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Power Plants</a>).<br />
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The plans for residents beyond 10 miles depend on the amount and the duration of the release of radioactive matter from the reactor. The 50-mile radius encompasses the largest territory taken into consideration in the station's emergency plan. This area is designated as the <i>Ingestion Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone</i>. Dominion set up a series of monitoring stations around the station. Near-real time ionizing radiation measurements available to the public within 100 miles from North Anna NPS, are disseminated by only two Radnet stations: one in <a href="http://www.jmu.edu/wmra/eas/vaplan.pdf">Richmond</a> and one in <a href="http://www.epa.gov/radnet/radnet-data/radnet-harrisonburg-bg.html">Harrisonburg</a>, Virginia.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/nn20110911a3a.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><img border="0" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/nn20110911a3a.jpg" /></span></a></td></tr>
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<span style="font-size: 11px;"><span style="text-align: left;">The color-coded map shows the magnitude of the fallout of cesium-134 and cesium-137, two major radioisotopes released after the severe nuclear reactor accidents at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS in March last year. The deposits were mapped at the beginning of August, 2011. Radii are superimposed for orientation. Note, the plume's impression in red and yellow (source: </span><a href="http://www.mext.go.jp/english/" style="text-align: center;">MEXT</a><span style="text-align: center;">).</span></span><br />
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Local wind and precipitation mainly dictate the shape of the plume in which the radioactivity is transported and disperses. To provide an example the color-coded radiation map above shows the overland plume-shaped radioactivity dispersal reconstructed with computer models from radiation monitor recordings after last year's severe accidents at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/wind_directions_louisa.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 50px; margin-right: auto;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><img border="0" height="205" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/wind_directions_louisa.jpg" width="400" /></span></a></td></tr>
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<span style="font-size: 11px;"><span style="text-align: left;">Average prevalence of wind directions at Louisa County Airport, Virginia, compiled from data collected between 1999 and 2011 (source: </span><a href="http://weatherspark.com/averages/30743/Louisa-Virginia-United-States" style="text-align: left;">weatherspark.com</a><span style="text-align: center;">).</span></span><br />
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In a hypothetical release at North Anna NPS resembling that of Fukushima, local weather conditions could produce a similar plume heading in a different direction. Wind speed and direction recorded at Louisa County Airport (see above) a few miles from North Anna NPS suggest that prevalent local winds blow on average from South/Southwest to North/Northeast. The plume would most likely progress toward Northern Virginia. Dispersal to the South toward the Richmond Metropolitan Area represents the second most probable direction.<br />
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The distance over which the plume eventually extends depends on the amounts of radioactivity released, the altitude of the release, wind speeds affecting the release, and precipitation. In Japan, the plume barely impacted Fukushima City, 35 miles from the nuclear reactor accidents. Note, however, that prevailing winds blew much of the airborne radioactive material out to sea.
<br />
Dominion's proposed emergency plan is most concerned with immediate impact after a severe radiological emergency. The long-term evolution of a wide-spread radioactive contamination can only be extrapolated from experiences after the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster">Tchernobyl reactor disaster</a> in 1986 and the ongoing contamination and clean-up around Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. Regardless of the uncertainties, it seems only prudent to consult our local Radiological Emergency Plan, if we live within the 50-mile ingestion zone around a nuclear power station.<br />
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<b>Acknowledgement</b><br />
I thank the members of the <a href="http://simplyinfo.org/">simplyinfo.org</a> discussion group for their cogent input, without which this post would not have been possible.<br />
<br />
<b>Relevant Sources</b><br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/emerg-plan-prep-nuc-power-bg.html">Backgrounder on Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Power Plants</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0047.html">NRC Regulations (10 CFR) § 50.47 Emergency plans.</a></li>
<li><a href="http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0733/ML073321242.pdf">North Anna 3 Combined License Application, Part 5: Emergency Plan, Revision 0
November 2007.</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.jmu.edu/wmra/eas/vaplan.pdf">Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Alert System Plan.</a></li>
</ul><div class="blogger-post-footer"><div align="center"><iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=12&l=ur1&category=amazonhomepage&f=ifr" width="300" height="250" scrolling="no" border="0" marginwidth="0" style="border:none;" frameborder="0"></iframe>
</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-25017052980415649872012-04-13T20:55:00.001-05:002012-10-03T05:39:20.674-05:00The Value of RadNet Ionizing Radiation DetectionIn this post, I discuss uses of ionizing radiation measurements made available to the public by the <a href="http://www.epa.gov/">U.S. Environmental Protection Agency</a>'s <a href="http://www.epa.gov/radnet/index.html">RadNet</a> stations. In particular, I examine the usefulness of RadNet data for the early detection of radioactive fallout from distant <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0047.html">radiological emergencies</a>. As example, I use the reactor accidents at the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_Nuclear_Power_Plant">Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station</a> in the wake of the Mar. 11, 2011, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami">Tōhoku-chihō Taiheiyō Oki Earthquake and Tsunami</a>.<br />
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<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iodine-131">Iodine-131</a> and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caesium-137">cesium-137</a> are prominent radioisotopes released after severe nuclear reactor accidents with fuel meltdowns. The decay of these isotopes produces a mix of beta and gamma radiation. The gamma radiation is emitted when the atomic nuclei transmute through intermittent energy states at isotope-specific energies.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.epa.gov/radnet00/images/beta-gamma/harrisonburg-gamma.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="272" src="http://www.epa.gov/radnet00/images/beta-gamma/harrisonburg-gamma.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: left;"><span style="text-align: -webkit-auto;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Near-real time air filter gamma gross count rates measured in nine energy ranges at the RadNet station in Harrisonburg, Virginia (courtesy <a href="http://www.epa.gov/radnet/radnet-data/radnet-harrisonburg-bg.html">EPA</a>). Because of the disparate values, the count rates are scaled logarithmically on the ordinate, compressing the peaks at high count rates.</span></span><span style="font-size: small; text-align: -webkit-auto;"> </span></td></tr>
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I used air filter measurements from the RadNet station in Harrisonburg, Virginia. The EPA publishes <a href="https://cdxnode64.epa.gov/radnet-public/query.do">graphs of hourly gamma radiation gross count rates</a> in nine energy ranges (see graph above).<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNbrLRnbT2hW13wKw6oYxbHfnVt52YQwZ40ZVGVJmO3t0IHx8yO5rBcPjDpMajXT8wmf9QVASlzwq5q9hbp7KkcTpT2mTSbsAeglcEgdbWGp-7_9OWfwRmVDQQoqbFclSH0bGoLHXnhZ18/s1600/spectrum_iodine.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNbrLRnbT2hW13wKw6oYxbHfnVt52YQwZ40ZVGVJmO3t0IHx8yO5rBcPjDpMajXT8wmf9QVASlzwq5q9hbp7KkcTpT2mTSbsAeglcEgdbWGp-7_9OWfwRmVDQQoqbFclSH0bGoLHXnhZ18/s320/spectrum_iodine.jpg" width="271" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small; text-align: -webkit-auto;">Gamma spectrum of iodine-131 (<a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0801602785/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=petrevpropro-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0801602785">Arena, 1971</a><img alt="" border="0" height="1" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=petrevpropro-20&l=as2&o=1&a=0801602785" style="border: none !important; margin: 0px !important;" width="1" />). Counts/channel are plotted on a logarithmic scale versus energy [keV]. </span><span style="font-size: x-small; text-align: -webkit-auto;">Peaks are labelled in MeV</span><span style="font-size: x-small; text-align: -webkit-auto;">.</span></td></tr>
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Iodine-131 with a physical half-life of 8.05 days and an effective half-life in the whole body of 7.6 days possesses its greatest energy peak at 360 keV, a second-ranking peak at 280 keV, a third peak at 638 keV and a fourth peak at 724 keV (<a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0801602785/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=petrevpropro-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0801602785">Arena, 1971</a>). The lower couple fall into range 3 (200-400 keV) , whereas the higher couple fall into range 5 (600-800 keV) in the RadNet graph.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkskZ3a6P2FsHqUMKRabma_LaYpk5ZrT3MuMsQMjDXkSi7IZ6s_8g68JUg8UhzEHMA6Pmro8INfZG8x6_mRmKOiE6-nVGlkqDJDQHAQMsz2YxAyJdEiqWd5B80YtctvGRSfyauMFZP3EGp/s1600/spectrum_cesium.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkskZ3a6P2FsHqUMKRabma_LaYpk5ZrT3MuMsQMjDXkSi7IZ6s_8g68JUg8UhzEHMA6Pmro8INfZG8x6_mRmKOiE6-nVGlkqDJDQHAQMsz2YxAyJdEiqWd5B80YtctvGRSfyauMFZP3EGp/s320/spectrum_cesium.jpg" width="249" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="text-align: -webkit-auto;">Gamma spectrum of cesium-137 (</span><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0801602785/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=petrevpropro-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0801602785" style="text-align: -webkit-auto;">Arena, 1971</a><img alt="" border="0" height="1" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=petrevpropro-20&l=as2&o=1&a=0801602785" style="border-bottom-style: none !important; border-color: initial !important; border-image: initial !important; border-left-style: none !important; border-right-style: none !important; border-top-style: none !important; border-width: initial !important; margin-bottom: 0px !important; margin-left: 0px !important; margin-right: 0px !important; margin-top: 0px !important; text-align: -webkit-auto;" width="1" /><span style="text-align: -webkit-auto;">). Counts/channel are plotted on a logarithmic scale versus energy [keV]. </span></span><span style="font-size: x-small; text-align: -webkit-auto;">Peaks are labelled in MeV</span><span style="font-size: x-small; text-align: -webkit-auto;">. </span></td></tr>
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By contrast, cesium-137 with a physical half-life of 30.17 years and an effective half-life in the whole body of 70 days emits gamma radiation at 662 keV, falling into range 5 of the RadNet graph. However, backscatter (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compton_scattering">Compton effect</a>), that is low-energy detector counts produced by incomplete energy transfer between the ionizing radiation and the detector material, contributes a considerable fraction of the total count rate to range 3. Although the precise shape of the spectral curves shown above depends on the radioactivity of the sources and the instruments used for the measurement, the energy peaks remain invariable and representative. Therefore, the spectra may can be employed for the demonstration of principles.<br />
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Partial integration of the areas under the spectral curves taking the logarithmic scale of the counts/channel into account suggests that the iodine-131 decay contributes about 91 percent of the total count rate summed over both ranges to range 3, whereas cesium-137 decay will contribute about one third to this range. Therefore, if both isotopes are present in the sample, the count rate measured in range 3 does not exclusively reflect iodine-131 decay, and iodine-131 will also contribute to the count rate measured in range 5, though to a smaller degree than cesium-137. Despite this cross-contamination, a prominent increase in range 3 suggests the presence of iodine-131 and in range 5 that of cesium-137. Furthermore, the EPA provides offline post-hoc data for identified radioisotopes.<br />
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Regardless of its low spectral resolution, the real-time RadNet graph may potentially have its uses for the identification of a radiological incident. An increase above the average counts per minute (CPM) measured in ranges 3 and 5 beyond three standard errors of the mean can be considered statistically significant with 95 percent confidence. Mean count rates measured in the past can be queried in the <a href="https://cdxnode64.epa.gov/radnet-public/query.do">RadNet database</a>. Sequences of up to 400 measurements can be downloaded in a batch.<br />
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To determine mean count rates for the two energy ranges of interest, that is ranges 3 and 5, I chose the period between Feb. 22 and Mar. 10, 2011, and subsequently compared the means averaged over this epoch to the count rates observed in the same epoch this years. Radioactive decay adheres to the <a href="http://stattrek.com/online-calculator/poisson.aspx">Poisson distribution</a> in which the standard error is equal to the square root of the mean count rate. If the current count rate exceeds the mean by three standard errors, the probability of the increase being random is less than five percent.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi9K2FEkHJXp9N9ajDLS9INL25DwdFrLIY8EKhF9c4wOjy3zctfr_U6fnzdYZ4y1QwVPyvhkaTaafM9L4JTXkXCWWOYDqhzFmG1YxONnmavIN6kKuAAZKwTbouetbFl8OOHPL9vkLmMsJr0/s1600/harrisonburg-gamma_ann2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi9K2FEkHJXp9N9ajDLS9INL25DwdFrLIY8EKhF9c4wOjy3zctfr_U6fnzdYZ4y1QwVPyvhkaTaafM9L4JTXkXCWWOYDqhzFmG1YxONnmavIN6kKuAAZKwTbouetbFl8OOHPL9vkLmMsJr0/s1600/harrisonburg-gamma_ann2.jpg" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: left;"><span style="text-align: -webkit-auto;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Graph of gamma gross count rates measured in nine energy ranges taken from air filter samples at the RadNet Station in Harrisonburg, Virginia. The bottom lines of the red boxes indicate three standard errors above the mean count rate of the same epoch a year ago.</span></span></td></tr>
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The graph above shows that this year's count rates statistically significantly exceeded the mean in the examined time window on roughly a handful of occasions. However, most comprise all energy ranges except 9 (magenta). If increases were only detected in range 3 (blue), we would most likely be confronted with a statistically significant presence of iodine-131. By contrast, a statistically significant increase in ranges 3 (blue) and 5 (yellow) would most likely indicate the presence of cesium-137.<br />
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Concomitant increases in gross beta count rates would further affirm the conclusions above, because both radioisotopes also emit beta radiation. Note, however, that the above assertions are purely based on statistical probability and causal inference. Great care must be taken to establish reasonable cause.<br />
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Iodine-131 and cesium-137 can be distinguished with time, using the difference in physical half-life between the two isotopes. Iodine-131's half-life is at 8.05 days considerably shorter than that of cesium-137 at 30.17 years. Following a pulse release of both isotopes into the atmosphere, iodine-131 should mainly contribute to the count rates measured early after the release. When the samples are remeasured ten half-lives later, that is after 80 days, the contribution of iodine-131 to the count rate will have diminished to one-thousandth. By contrast, the contribution of cesium-137 with its 30-year half-life is going to persist. Therefore, if repeated measurements of the same sample ascertain a decline in count rate commensurate with iodine-131's half-life, the radioisotope was present in the sample, and the remainder ought to be cesium-137.<br />
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Though the RadNet measurements may not immediately lend themselves to the distinction between iodine-131 and cesium-137, they may prove useful for the detection of radioactive fallout from a distant radiological accident. To test this idea, I tapped into the data collected at Harrisonburg in the weeks after the catastrophic nuclear reactor failures at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station situated on the shores of the Pacific Ocean 160 miles north of Tokyo in early March last year, that is between Mar. 12 and Mar. 28, 2011.<br />
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The station's reactors incurred loss of cooling in the wake of a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami">magnitude-9 earthquake</a> on Mar. 11, 2011, followed by 15-meter high tsunami waves inundating the structures (TEPCO press release with the title "<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110524e16.pdf">Analysis and evaluation of the operation record and accident record of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station at the time of Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki-Earthquake</a>," dated May 23, 2011). The nuclear fuel in three operating reactors melted down, producing great amounts of hydrogen. Between Mar. 12 and Mar. 15, hydrogen that had accumulated in the reactor buildings triggered massive explosions devastating the top floors of the structures and releasing vast amounts of radioactive matter into the atmosphere.<br />
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The first unit, Unit 1, exploded in the early afternoon of Mar. 12. The second unit, Unit 3, exploded two days later, and the third unit, Unit 4, though it was shutdown for inspection at the time, incurred an explosion in the early morning of Mar. 15. The reactor building of Unit 2, which was operating, suffered minor visible damage. However, since Unit 2's fuel melted, radioactivity was released from this reactor as well.<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="text-align: -webkit-auto;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"> Gross count rates from air filter samples collected at Harrisonburg, Virginia, over roughly two weeks after the first radioactive release from Fukushima.</span></span></td></tr>
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Iodine-131 and cesium-137 were prominent in the airborne releases from the damaged reactors.
The graph above depicts the gamma gross count rates collected in nine energy ranges at Harrisonburg over roughly two weeks after the first radioactive release from Fukushima, the statistical significance thresholds (dashed black lines) in ranges 3 (dark blue line) and 5 (yellow line), as well as the gross beta count rate (dashed red line). Peaks of significant gamma gross rate increases are evident in almost all energy ranges. None was confined exclusively to ranges 3 and 5. The light-blue line above the abscissa indicates the period in which the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station incurred hydrogen explosions.<br />
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March 14 was the first day after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station began to release vast amounts of radioactivity, on which Harrisonburg registered significant peaks in gamma ranges 3 and 5 concomitant with an increase in beta gross count rate (dashed red line). A second such coincidence followed on Mar. 15. Then a triplet of coincident peaks followed on March 17, 19 and 20 (light blue dots above the abscissa). Because the peaks are spaced in about the same time intervals as the three hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this triplet of peaks represents the most probable harbinger of the arrival of fallout from Fukushima in Virginia, suggesting that radioactive airborne particulate from Fukushima reached Harrisonburg in five days.<br />
<br />
The suggested time of arrival is a day ahead of that predicted by the cesium-137 dispersion model of <a href="http://cerea.enpc.fr/en/fukushima.html">Winiarek and others (2011)</a> at the Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Environnement Atmosphérique (<a href="http://cerea.enpc.fr/en/fukushima.html">CEREA</a>), Marne la Vallée, France, and two days in advance of that of the <a href="http://www.zamg.ac.at/pict/aktuell/20110325_Reanalyse-I131-Period2.gif">iodine-131 dispersion</a> modeled by <a href="http://www.zamg.ac.at/aktuell/index.php?seite=1&artikel=ZAMG_2011-03-25GMT15:41">Wotawa (2011)</a> at the Zentralanstalt für Meteorologie und Geodynamik (<a href="http://www.zamg.ac.at/?ts=1334284201">ZAMG</a>), Vienna, Austria.<br />
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Global iodine-131 dispersion after the Fukushima reactor accidents, 2011, according to the simulation model by <a href="http://www.zamg.ac.at/aktuell/index.php?seite=1&artikel=ZAMG_2011-03-25GMT15:41">Wotawa (2011)</a>, <a href="http://www.zamg.ac.at/aktuell/index.php?seite=1&artikel=ZAMG_2011-03-25GMT15:41">ZAMG</a>, Vienna, Austria. </span><br />
<br />
Taking the above findings together, RadNet air filter count rate measurements seem to provide superb sensitivity for the detection of minute traces of airborne radioactive material, permitting us to identify distant radiological accidents half ways around the globe, if examined in proper factual context. Certainly, RadNet stations represent potent tools capable of alerting us to fallout from radiological accidents closer to home.<br />
<br />
<b>References</b><br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0801602785/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=petrevpropro-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0801602785">Arena V (1971)</a> <img alt="" border="0" height="1" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=petrevpropro-20&l=as2&o=1&a=0801602785" style="border: none !important; margin: 0px !important;" width="1" />Ionizing Radiation and Life. Mosby, St. Louis.</li>
<li><a href="http://cerea.enpc.fr/en/fukushima.html">Winiarek V, Bocquet M, Roustan Y, Birman C, Tran P (2011)</a> Atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides from the Fukushima- Daichii nuclear power plant.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.zamg.ac.at/aktuell/index.php?seite=1&artikel=ZAMG_2011-03-25GMT15:41">Wotawa G (2011)</a> Fukushima: Resümee über bisherige Rechnungen und CTBTO Messungen.</li>
</ul>
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-17423246264410941942012-03-19T19:04:00.000-05:002012-03-20T21:29:45.483-05:00Project X-12: Borst's Imaginary Nuclear LocomotiveAfter half-a-century experience with the commercial use of nuclear power, it may seem difficult to conceive the sustainability of a nuclear-powered train engine.<br />
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In 1954, however, Professor Lyle B. Borst and his colleagues at the <a href="http://www.utah.edu/">University of Utah</a> pursued a concept for a locomotive powered by a nuclear reactor. <a href="http://www.babcock.com/">Babcock & Wilcox Co.</a> co-designed the reactor in a private venture. The project was dubbed X-12 and attracted the interest of five railroad companies, nine manufacturers, and the international media [1,2]. The locomotive was projected to cost 1.2 million dollars in 1954, double the price of four contemporary diesel units coupled together to produce the same horse powers.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfMtxSYUB1m5owkXv_XIkHRynhZAgRFW_YovE2dDG2vTLfv_t-6CrEk3ZiCKGHB2elQpxOu8CrhMKV09dWisueddiDMKSN7_ype1iBwLVwDp5ATlLyiaUYphzvDvKGjSC-EaoTQUcRN81b/s1600/nuke_loco_new.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="262" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfMtxSYUB1m5owkXv_XIkHRynhZAgRFW_YovE2dDG2vTLfv_t-6CrEk3ZiCKGHB2elQpxOu8CrhMKV09dWisueddiDMKSN7_ype1iBwLVwDp5ATlLyiaUYphzvDvKGjSC-EaoTQUcRN81b/s400/nuke_loco_new.jpeg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: left;">
Artist's rendering of the proposed X-12 nuclear powered locomotive from a 1954 hobby article [1] (a - air compressor for brakes; b - 24 driving wheels in six-wheeled trucks; c - engine platform; d - heavy-duty bridge truss supporting the reactor's weight; e - 600 hp electric motors; f - nuclear reactor; g - two of four main generators; h - two-chambered shielding; i - main steam turbine; j - pivoted articulation; k - piping connecting condenser and chiller bank; l - chiller bank; m - trailing truck; n - fans blowing air over radiators for cooling; o - reactor containment; p - condenser; q - gear box; r - electrical cabinet; s - engineer; t - regulator/throttle; u - brake; v - fireman;).</div>
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Operating on only 14 kg liquid fuel, the locomotive was envisaged to span 58 meters in length and muster 7,000 horse powers, rivaling the remarkably strong <a href="http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/BLS_Ae_8/8">Ae 8/8</a> electric locomotives of the Swiss BLS Railway of the same epoch. These double units with Bo'Bo'+Bo'Bo' wheelbase (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UIC_classification_of_locomotive_axle_arrangements">UIC classification</a>) were only half that long.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/28/BLS-Ae88-273-Kandersteg_2001-09-21.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="240" src="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/28/BLS-Ae88-273-Kandersteg_2001-09-21.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Ae 8/8 near Kandersteg, Berne, Switzerland (courtesy: Klaus Kort).</td></tr>
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Though, the X-12 would theoretically reach 60 miles/h in breath-taking 3 minutes and 32 seconds, pulling a 5,000-ton train, the nuclear locomotive would have weighed 360 tons. The reactor's radiation shielding mustered 200 tons alone. By contrast, the whole afore-mentioned electric Ae 8/8 weighs roughly as much as the shielding of the X-12 (180 metric tons).<br />
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The X-12's stream-lined body emulated the diesel locomotive design of the 1950s [1,2]. The two-sectioned behemoth was to consist of a 38-meter long engine, with a cab up front and the power plant behind, plus a 20-meter long 'tender' carrying the radiators for cooling turbine steam. The assembly was conceived to rest on an articulated platform riding on a (Co'Co')(Co'Co')(4) wheelbase (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UIC_classification_of_locomotive_axle_arrangements">UIC classification</a>).<br />
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The power plant was to consist of the nuclear reactor, the main steam turbine for power generation as well as steam condensers and chillers. A gear box coupled the turbine shaft to four electric generators.<br />
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The unavoidable massive radiation shielding called for small components in the engine room. At a rotor shaft length of only 120 inches and a diameter of only 24 inches, the team accomplished to design powerful space-saving generators that, despite their small size, could cope with the demands of the twelve 600-horsepower electric motors driving 24 wheels.<br />
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Further accommodating the limited space available, the engine's reactor was to possess a peculiar design. The reactor core was to be filled with liquid uranium oxide dissolved in sulphuric acid, providing greater symmetry for neutron fluxes at smaller neutron loss than the other popular, less efficient designs that used solid fuel packed into rods [3].<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhW20gefq5ASWbhOwZA4YYJNrzq8Tdc4m00_beywJ-OixGXEMXKJQDX_fLKqk4XQBg5d6CflF4jU9Dy7OXSCsHPwQTh5Y4pk6iqnple-KONlZ6Io_ayJANU7nKI_R8uUgTFy0yXRRZDLh7A/s1600/reactor_pat.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhW20gefq5ASWbhOwZA4YYJNrzq8Tdc4m00_beywJ-OixGXEMXKJQDX_fLKqk4XQBg5d6CflF4jU9Dy7OXSCsHPwQTh5Y4pk6iqnple-KONlZ6Io_ayJANU7nKI_R8uUgTFy0yXRRZDLh7A/s1600/reactor_pat.jpeg" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: left;">
Borst's reactor schema shown in his patent [3] (2 - transverse section on line 2-2; 10 - fuel chamber; 12 - cylindrical pressure wall; 18 - coolant tubes; 24 - recombiner; 26 - external steam separator; 28 - riser; 30 - downcomer; 32 - vapor outlet line; 34 - coolant pump; 36 - suction line; 38 - coolant inlet chamber line; 45 - primary shield; 46 - fuel circulation baffles; 47 - u-shaped primary shield wall; 49 - primary shield roof; 50 - turbine; 51 - catalyst; 52 - liquid fuel surface; 53 - recombiner condenser; 54 - recombiner condenser discharge line; 55 - recombiner condenser feedwater line; 56 - recombined water return line; 58 - emergency cooling heat transfer tube; 60 - inlet header of emergency cooling heat transfer tube; 62 - outlet header of emergency cooling heat transfer tube; 64 - control rod;).</div>
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Furthermore, the heat transfer from a homogeneous liquid core is superior to that of a heterogeneous core consisting of rods because of the rod cladding and the uneven coolant flow among the rods. These advantages lend themselves particularly to small nuclear reactors that must produce high energy output. The Nobel Prize-laureates <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eugene_Wigner">Eugene Wigner</a> and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enrico_Fermi">Enrico Fermi</a> developed the original reactor, known as aqueous homogeneous reactor (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aqueous_homogeneous_reactor">AHR</a>), in the 1940s as an intermediate step to thorium reactors (Hargraves and Moir, 2011[4]). A circulating solution of 242 liters uranyl sulphate, a yellow-green salt, served as fuel [4].<br />
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The fuel core of the X-12's reactor was supposed to measure only 36 inches in diameter and 10 inches deep. The reactor pressure vessel, clad in an eight-inch steel primary shield, was made to fit into the 13 x 13 x 9 feet cavity of a secondary fluid-tight shield, also made of eight inch steel, encompassing the middle section of the engine and measuring 15 by 15 by 10 feet on the outside. The space between the two shields was to be filled with high viscosity hydrocarbon fluid to absorb internal motion on accidental impact and a hydrogenous shielding material to absorb more radiation.<br />
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The reactor consisted of a cylindrical reactor pressure vessel, shorter than wide, in which a steam-driven pump force-circulates the core's fluid, representing the primary coolant circulation for nuclear fission heat transfer. For secondary cooling, roughly 10,000 ¼-inch stainless steel tubes, traversing the core, join an inlet and an outlet chamber attached to each end of the reactor pressure vessel. The water-filled chambers, covering a large part of the reactor core surface, were thought to double as coolers and neutron reflectors, diminishing the escape of neutrons from the core. Coolant pumped through the tube and chamber system feeds steam to the main turbine. An additional coolant loop circulates through the chiller banks in the tender, cooling the turbine's exhaust steam in the main condenser.<br />
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As in any nuclear power plant, the water presumably needed to be filtered for contaminants before reuse, its chemistry needed to be balanced, and some water would be lost in the process. The engine could not do without filter beds and a make-up tank.<br />
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At full power, the engine's reactor would produce 30,000 kW thermal. Despite, the fuel in the reactor pressure vessel was not going to exceed 240 ℃ (460 ℉) at 4.5 MPa (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal_(unit)">megaPascal</a>) gauge and, therefore, would not boil. The secondary cooling water would reach 207 ℃ (405 ℉) at 1.7 MPa gauge. These values are low compared with pressurized light water reactor (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pressurized_water_reactor">PWR</a>) widely used in contemporary commercial nuclear power plants. That design must harness water temperatures of up to 315 ℃ (600 ℉) at 15.5 MPa.<br />
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Because of the intense radiation, however, almost half the solvent would dissociate into hydrogen and oxygen (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiolysis">radiolysis</a>) within 13 minutes. Hence, the liberated hydrogen needed to be continuously recombined with the oxygen in a catalytic platinum recombiner/condenser installed above the pressure vessel. The recovered water could subsequently be returned into the core.<br />
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The liquid fuel concept allowed short-lived, neutron flux-hampering, volatile fission products to simply bubble out of the core fluid, and elegantly combined neutron moderation and efficient heat transfer. In addition, spent fuel could be exchanged without opening the reactor pressure vessel, posing a crucial handling advantage, because the reactor would have needed refueling every two to four months.<br />
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We may wonder whether the locomotive would have proved safe to operate. Borst and his colleagues hardened the reactor components to withstand collisions in an effort to prevent radiation releases and fuel spills. The reactor control rods, mounted at 60 degree angle, possessed shear points that would break on impact at accelerations equal to or above 0.2 g, lowering the rods into the core and scramming the reactor. Coolant forced through a subset of tubes traversing the core was supposed to help remove the resulting decay heat from the core in such emergency shutdown.<br />
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Professor Borst argued that ultimately the benefit versus cost of fuel compared with other sources of energy would decide the X-12's future. In order to sustain a chain reaction, most <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fuel">nuclear fuel </a>used in commercial applications consists of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium-238">uranium-238</a> enriched with the more fissile <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium-235">uranium-235</a> beyond its natural prevalence of 0.7 percent. In commercial light water nuclear power reactors burning solid uranium oxide, the enrichment is in the order of 3.5 percent. By contrast, Prof. Borst intended to run his reactor with <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enriched_uranium">weapon-grade highly enriched uranium</a>, that is uranium-238 enriched with uranium-235 to more than 85 percent. In fact, his patent application called for <span style="color: red;">7 kg pure uranium-235</span>. At today's <a href="http://www.nbl.doe.gov/htm/lists/uranium_certified_reference_materials_price_list.htm">DOE prices</a>, one filling of fuel for the locomotive would cost 104 million dollars.<br />
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The <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fission_products_(by_element)">fission products</a> of uranium-235 mainly comprise radioactive isotopes of barium, cesium, iodine, strontium, and xenon, of which the highly volatile <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iodine-131">iodine-131</a>, with a half-life of 8 days, and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isotopes_of_barium">barium-140</a>, with a half-life of 13 days, pose an immediate health hazard, when released into the environment. Accidental releases of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caesium-137">cesium-137</a> and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strontium-90">strontium-90</a> with half-lives of about 30 years are of long-term concern. Professor Borst mentions little about the enormous expenses to provide radiation safety during fuel handling and maintenance, and eventually the decommissioning of highly radioactive components at the end of the reactors' life span. Moreover, reprocessing of used nuclear fuel has been wrought with unresolved technological pitfalls to date, and endstorage sites where highly radioactive waste can be safely and indefinitely stored remain elusive in the U.S.<br />
<br />
Three scores ago, the advent of nuclear power's commercial use was greeted with exuberant enthusiasm, promising a future of limitless energy and boundless applications. Despite the optimism, Prof. Borst's idea of a mobile reactor must have been met with skepticism from its conception. A prototype X-12 locomotive never gained traction as much as we know, probably because of the enormous investments already involved in the development of the engine alone.<br />
<br />
It seems certain that cost weighed on the minds of the railroad company executives as heavily as the X-12 might have weighed on the tracks. Without substantial government subsidies, particularly for highly purified uranium-235, the railroad companies could not have run such locomotive cost-effectively. Liability insurance would have been enormous. I counted a dozen <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_rail_accidents_(2010%E2%80%932019)#2011">major U.S. train wrecks</a> in 2011 alone. Moreover, safety and security of the use of nuclear-powered train engines would pose daunting challenges to homeland security today.<br />
<br />
Confronted with what arguably must have seemed insurmountable obstacles from the project's conception, Borst and the University of Utah appeared in no particular hurry to obtain approval for a patent [3]. The parties applied in 1955. The application was eventually approved in 1964, consuming almost a decade.
At best, the X-12 may add an illustrious conversation piece to a model railroad today.<br />
<br />
<b>References</b><br />
<ol>
<li>"<a href="http://www.castor.de/technik/atomkraft/7_1954/14_18.html">Auf Bahnsteig 3 - Atom-D-Zug</a>", hobby, July 7, 1954.</li>
<li>"<a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=bVMEAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA78&ots=oNcGmhCvuD&dq=x-12%20locomotive&pg=PA78#v=onepage&q=x-12%20locomotive&f=false">The atomic locomotive. A physics professor's practical dream, the massive X-12 could run for months on a charge of U-235.</a>" Life, Jun 21, 1954.</li>
<li>Borst LB (1964) <a href="http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=4043248">Nuclear reactor for a railway vehicle.</a> U.S. Patent № 3,127,321.</li>
<li>Hargraves R, Moir R (2011) <a href="http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/201101/hargraves.cfm">Liquid Fuel Nuclear Reactors.</a> American Physical Society Forum on Physics & Society.</li>
</ol><div class="blogger-post-footer"><div align="center"><iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=12&l=ur1&category=amazonhomepage&f=ifr" width="300" height="250" scrolling="no" border="0" marginwidth="0" style="border:none;" frameborder="0"></iframe>
</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-43141840532155148072012-02-15T15:54:00.001-06:002017-02-03T10:36:13.325-06:00Fukushima: Fuel Meltdowns & Cold Shutdown<div id="google_translate_element">
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<i>Cold shutdown</i> of an intact nuclear reactor, also known as mode 4 (see <a href="http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1113/ML111370163.pdf">Risk Assessment of Operational Events Volume 4 – Shutdown Events, Revision 1.0, April 2011</a>), essentially denotes the state in which the water in the reactor pressure vessel can be maintained below boiling at atmospheric pressure without the constant need of adding water to the closed-loop cooling system. The operator of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Dai-ichi_nuclear_disaster">Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station</a> severely damaged by the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami">Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami</a> last March, Tokyo Power and Electric Co. (<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/index-j.html">TEPCO</a>), maintains that the three reactors the fuel core of which melted down have reached <i>cold shutdown</i> last autumn.<br />
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The three reactors were in operation at the time of the quake, which triggered seismic <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scram">SCRAM</a>s, precipitating emergency shutdowns.
In its report with the title "<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111130_09-j.pdf">Unit 1-3 core about the state of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station</a>" dated Nov. 30, 2011, TEPCO examines the fuel core meltdowns in the stricken reactors. The company summarizes its synopsis on the state of the reactor cores in the schemas shown in order from Unit 1 to Unit 3 below. The schemas deserve close inspection.<br />
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<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Unit_1_corium.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Unit_1_corium.jpg" /></a></div>
Attention must be paid to the location of the corium, that is the molten fuel rods, and the water levels in each reactor. Corium melted through the reactor pressure vessels of the three reactors. The reactor pressure vessels are enclosed in primary containments consisting of a pear-shaped drywell connected to a ring-shaped, partially water-filled suppression chamber also known as wetwell.
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<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Unit_2_corium.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Unit_2_corium.jpg" /></a></div>
The fuel core of the oldest reactor, Unit 1, melted down most, slumping to the reactor pressure vessel's bottom, burning through its steel and into the 10 meter-thick concrete floor of the drywell below. In the other units, most melted fuel presumably resides inside the reactor pressure vessels, and only small amounts are believed to have reached the drywell floor.
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<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Unit_3_corium.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Unit_3_corium.jpg" /></a></div>
The heat from radioactive decay in the corium must be continuously cooled to confine corium flow and avoid a fuel geometry potentially conducive to re-<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticality_accident">criticality</a>. Hence, TEPCO has been pumping water into the reactor pressure vessels through feedwater and core sprayer (CS) lines at rates ranging from roughly 4 (Unit 1) to 18 m<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">3</span></sup>/h (Unit 2). Paths of the injected water vary among the reactors and flow rates have been altered between paths. Regardless, considering a reactor vessel volume of 400 cubic meters and more, it would take days to fill the vessels at the total flows TEPCO administers.<br />
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Despite the water injections, no reactor pressure vessel is completely filled. Water needs constantly supplied to prevent boil off. At Unit 1, some water seems to collect at the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel. Most water, however, appears to leak via the drywell into the wetwell, which is almost completely filled. Unit 2 shows no water in the reactor pressure vessel, more in the drywell, and less in the wetwell. At Unit 3, the water also seems to pass entirely through the reactor pressure vessel, filling drywell and wetwell to the highest level observed.
Eventually, water leaking from the three reactors wends its way into the turbine building basements from which TEPCO pumps it through newly constructed filter systems for decontamination back into the reactor pressure vessels. The precise leak paths from the reactors remain unknown.<br />
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TEPCO reports reactor temperatures regularly. The measurements are based on thermostats that were originally installed at various strategic locations around the reactor vessels, and may have been damaged during the course of the accident. Verification of sensor functionality is difficult. Repair or replacement is impossible to date because of high radiation. Therefore, the reported temperatures must be taken with a grain of salt. Moreover, location and state of the molten fuel can only be inferred from indirect observation.<br />
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By contrast, <i>cold shutdown</i> implies water temperature control with precise and accurate knowledge of the reactor parameters and may not entirely pertain to the situation at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station.
The water TEPCO injects through the feedwater line mostly flows down the reactor pressure vessel's inside wall, whereas the water injected through the core sprayer irrigates the center where the fuel core used to be located.<br />
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Consistent with the company's hypothesis that most molten fuel in Unit 2 accumulated at the center of the reactor pressure vessel's bottom, TEPCO increased the flow of the core sprayer and reduced the flow through the feedwater orifice about two weeks ago, apparently in the hope of cooling the core melt at the center more effectively (TEPCO press release with the title "<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/12021407-e.html">Plant Status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (as of 3:00 pm, February 14)</a>").
The result was a dramatic increase in temperature above the boiling point measured at one of three locations at the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel. The temperature kept rising until the thermostat failed. Reversing the water flow pattern was to no avail. Only doubling the total flow rate seemed to help.<br />
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TEPCO investigated the possibility of renewed nuclear fission, searching for radioactive fission products in air and water samples with nuclear decay energy spectrometry, and concluded that no re-criticality occurred (TEPCO press release with the title "<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/12021504-e.html">Plant Status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (as of 3:00 pm, February 15)</a>"). Regardless, the fragility of water temperature control in Unit 2's reactor suggests that it is quite possible that much water the company injects bypasses a substantial portion of the molten fuel and only cools the reactor pressure vessel.
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This is the most likely scenario!</div>
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<b>Addenda</b><br />
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<ul>
<li>TEPCO released this video on Jan. 20, 2012. The video was captured with an endoscopic camera inside the primary containment of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 2. This is TEPCO's first visit inside the primary containment of a reactor with a fuel meltdown. Extreme levels of radiation cause the color pixel artifacts. Note water raining from above intensely and persistently, the reddish-brown corrosion on the containment's inside wall and piping, and no standing water anywhere in view of the camera (02/19/2012).</li>
<li>In today's report with the title "<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120326_07-e.pdf">Result of the second investigation inside of
Primary Containment Vessels, Unit 2, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant</a>," TEPCO released its findings from a second endoscopic exploration of Unit 2's primary containment vessel with improved equipment. In addition to the first exploration's findings, TEPCO discovered water standing roughly 60 cm deep at the bottom of the drywell. The water temperature was about 50 ℃; 40 ℃ were measured in the air at higher elevations. These observations suggest that the drywell bottom around the pedestal room does not seem to be leaking. Information of the conditions inside the pedestal room is lacking. This room is located directly under the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and may contain the melted fuel that escaped the RPV. Its doors are normally sealed. Regardless, water TEPCO constantly pumps into the RPV seems to wend its way into the drywell from which it flows into the suppression chamber through the pipes connecting the two. The chamber must have sprung leaks through which the inflowing water seeps into the reactor building's basement (03/26/2012).</li>
<li>The diagram below shows TEPCO's and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency's most recent estimates of the fractions of melted-down fuel residing inside and outside each unit's reactor pressure vessel (RPV). Note, all of unit 1's fuel is presumed to have relocated to the pedestal room below the vessel (05/21/2014).</li>
</ul>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/meltthrough_IRID_zps14381a7e.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/meltthrough_IRID_zps14381a7e.jpg" height="182" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">(source: <a href="http://irid.or.jp/debris/S2-1E.pdf">International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning</a>)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<ul>
<li>Three days ago, almost six years after the accident, TEPCO was able to publish pictures of a first glimpse into the space under Unit 2's reactor pressure vessel (RPV) provided by a robotic camera (TEPCO/IRID, Jan. 31, 2017: <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2017/images/handouts_170130_01-e.pdf">Pre-investigation results of the area inside the pedestal for the Unit 2 Primary Containment Vessel investigation</a>). The robot's dosimeter measured roughly 500 Sv/h. At that exposure rate humans would accumulate a lethal dose in less than a minute. The company identified suspected lumps of melted fuel on a grating five meters beneath the RPV bottom head and subsequently released a collated picture of panned robot images showing an estimated one meter by one meter hole near the center of the grating [TEPCO, Feb. 2, 2017: <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2017/images/handouts_170202_01-e.pdf">Pre-investigation results of the area inside the pedestal for the Unit 2 Primary Containment Vessel Investigation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station(examination results of digital images)</a>]. There can be no doubt now that melted fuel exited the RPV, burnt through the grating and slumped to the bottom of the primary reactor vessel 3.5 meters below in accord with the scenario presumed for Unit 1 above. The picture below shows TEPCO's collation (02/02/2017).</li>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/1F2_fuel_melt_through_2017_zps0su6e3fj.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/1F2_fuel_melt_through_2017_zps0su6e3fj.jpg" height="142" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">source: <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2017/images/handouts_170202_01-e.pdf">TEPCO</a></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
</ul>
<br />
<b>Acknowledgement</b>
<br />
I thank the contributors of <a href="http://simplyinfo.org/">SimplyInfo.org</a> without whose help I could not have written this post.
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-6434512556795512852012-02-12T08:30:00.003-06:002012-03-13T15:33:22.337-05:00The Mark I Containment: Recent Insights from Japan<div id="google_translate_element">
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Last March 11, the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami">Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake and Tsunami</a> struck Japan's east coast. In its wake, three nuclear reactors at the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_Nuclear_Power_Plant">Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station</a> could not be shut down safely. The station's six reactors are <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/teachers/03.pdf">boiling water reactors</a>. Three of the most impacted units, Units 1 - 3, were online at the time of the earthquake; the other units were shutdown for inspection.<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkHDsZbTlAjuAlCgB3s8bpASfRWfsHZAyN26uZ25koyOCsfIa33AX2pDXgj7zfDoM-11xdEO8K8VqtwrYmaQIuln2I3-y_l5mEfHQ3M4zR4UGUajQYrEl33G1QgL6Mqsqk70yFKgjdEgFM/s1600/cond_tank.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkHDsZbTlAjuAlCgB3s8bpASfRWfsHZAyN26uZ25koyOCsfIa33AX2pDXgj7zfDoM-11xdEO8K8VqtwrYmaQIuln2I3-y_l5mEfHQ3M4zR4UGUajQYrEl33G1QgL6Mqsqk70yFKgjdEgFM/s640/cond_tank.jpg" width="489" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Aerial view of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Oct. 3, 2008. The reactor buildings of Units 4 to 1 are in the foreground, and of Units 5 and 6 in the background (courtesy <a href="http://cryptome.org/">cryptome.org</a>).</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The nuclear fuel cores in the operating reactors, however, melted down, generating hydrogen from <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zirconium_alloy">zirconium fuel rod cladding/steam reactions</a> and the <a href="http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fkeiserstudents.tripod.com%2Fsitebuildercontent%2Fsitebuilderfiles%2Fradiolysisofwater.doc&ei=Otk2T93OA6j40gGQw8yrCg&usg=AFQjCNEIcAacbqOzlre09uayoLGX8YiGeQ&sig2=NAPWC8Rjy2aKXFIbLwmI6w">radiolysis of water</a>. The hydrogen accumulated in the buildings, leading to explosions and partially destroying the reactor buildings. The explosions released massive amounts of highly-toxic radioactive material into air, ground and ocean.<br />
<br />
Since then, the power station's operator <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/index-e.html">Tokyo Electric and Power Co.</a> (TEPCO) has striven to diminish the releases of radioactivity, made progress with clean-up and stabilization of the reactor buildings and achieved to reduce the cooling water temperature in the reactor pressure vessels to less than 100 °C. TEPCO estimates that decommissioning the reactors will take three or four decades.<br />
<br />
Roughly 80,000 residents living within a 20-kilometer exclusion zone declared by the government eleven months ago still cannot return home permanently (see Chris Meyers' report with the title "<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-nuclear-evacuees-idUSTRE81C0I520120213">A year on, only brief home visits for Japan nuclear evacuees</a>" published online by Reuters Feb. 13, 2012). The long-term impact on public health and the environment are difficult to estimate, and the costs of the disaster are unfathomable.<br />
<br />
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<a href="http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp/pict46.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="font-size: 14px;"><img border="0" height="425" src="http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp/pict46.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: 13px;">Aerial view of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on March 24, 2011, after hydrogen explosions devastated the upper floors of the reactor buildings of Units 1 (background), 3 and 4 (foreground) in the wake of the March 11 earthquake and tsunami. Unit 4 was offline for inspection. TEPCO believes that hydrogen seeped into its building from Unit 3 via standby gas treatment system piping. The building of Unit 2 lost a blowout panel on the eastern side and was spared (courtesy </span><a href="http://cryptome.org/" style="font-size: 13px;">cryptome.org</a><span style="font-size: 13px;">).</span></div>
<br />
The other day I came across TEPCO's interim report with the title "<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111202e14.pdf">Fukushima Nuclear Accident Analysis Report
(Interim Report)</a>" released Dec. 2, 2011, providing the most detailed narrative of the event sequence resulting in the fuel meltdowns and the explosions. The report unequivocally demonstrates that vital functions of the Mark I primary containment vessel (PCV) failed.<br />
<br />
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<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/005OysterCreekReactorNo40.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="font-size: 14px;"><img border="0" height="475" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/005OysterCreekReactorNo40.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: 13px;">Schematic drawing of a boiling water reactor 3 (BWR-3) similar to Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, prominently featuring the Mark I primary containment vessel (PCV) comprised of the pear-shaped drywell (D/W) and the ring-shaped water-filled suppression chamber (S/C) also known as wetwell (courtesy </span><a href="http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=203287.msg1214995#msg1214995" style="font-size: 13px;">Letsbereal's comment #461</a><span style="font-size: 13px;"> on </span><a href="http://forum.prisonplanet.com/" style="font-size: 13px;">Prison Planet Forum</a><span style="font-size: 13px;">).</span></div>
<span style="font-size: 13px; text-align: center;"><br /></span><br />
The primary containment vessel (PCV) houses the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) in which the heat produced by a sustained nuclear chain reaction generates the steam for driving power generating turbines. The primary containments are supposed to absorb a potentially detrimental transient increase in pressure released from the reactor pressure vessel that is produced by the enormous decay heat emanating from the fuel after a sudden disruption of the nuclear chain reaction in an emergency shutdown known as <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scram">SCRAM</a>.<br />
<br />
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<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Unit3_venting.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="font-size: 14px;"><img border="0" height="481" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/Unit3_venting.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: 13px;">Schema of a Mark I primary containment system, showing the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) inside the containment composed of the pear-shaped drywell (D/W) connected to the ring-shaped, water-filled suppression chamber (S/C). In addition, the schema illustrates the paths for so-called hardened venting as a last resort to relieve pressure from the primary containment, including the motor-operated (MO) and compressed air-operated (AO) valves involved (courtesy </span><a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111202e14.pdf" style="font-size: 13px;">TEPCO</a><span style="font-size: 13px;">).</span></div>
<br />
At Fukushima, seismic sensors triggered the reactor SCRAMS within seconds after the arrival of the first quake jolts. The Mark I containments consist of a pear-shaped drywell (D/W) which surrounds the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The drywell is connected with large radial pipes arranged like spokes on a hub in a wheel to a ring-shaped suppression chamber (S/C) roughly half-filled with water. Pressure building up in the reactor pressure vessel can be relieved with <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec1/2-dr3.html">safety relieve valves</a> (SRVs) through the drywell into the suppression chamber's water pool, thus removing condensible gases and lowering the pressure in the primary containment (<a href="http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/48954447?access_key=key-2ldlqkc76irt97xdd0jo">Lahey and Moody, 1993</a>).<br />
<br />
Concerns were raised in the U.S. already in the early 1970s that the Mark I primary containment system might not be capable of entirely absorbing the extreme pressures that could build up under adverse circumstances (see the famous memo of Stephen H. Hanauer, DRTA, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission with the title <a href="http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/accidents/19720920-hanauer-memo-pressure-suppression-containments.pdf">"Pressure Suppression Containments"</a> dated Sep. 20, 1972). A series of improvements followed. For example, containments could fill with incondensable gases produced as decay products and by radiolysis or, in the worst case, when the fuel rod cladding melted and steam reacted with the cladding material as would happen at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. As a precaution, Mark I containments were retrofitted with hardened vents, permitting the operators to release pressure from the primary containments directly into the atmosphere, should the suppression chamber fail to lower excessive pressure. The Japanese reactors were outfitted with such vent lines exiting from the drywell as well as from the suppression chamber (see schema above).<br />
<br />
Below I excerpt passages verbatim from <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111202e14.pdf">TEPCO's December interim report</a> on the accident that pertain to the company's attempts of controlling reactor pressure at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in the days after the earthquake. Annotations and edits are bracketed in curly braces. The vigilant reader will note that the pressure relief provisions noted above could not reduce the pressure in the reactor pressure vessels adequately.<br />
<br />
{pp. 59:}<br />
<b>8.1 Response Status at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1
</b><br />
<ul>
<li>After the tsunami, monitoring of reactor water level could no longer be conducted, and at 21:19 on March 11, temporary batteries were connected, enabling reactor water level to be monitored. Furthermore, the valve for starting up the IC {isolation condenser} was operated at around 18:00 and 21:00. At 23:00, in front of the air lock on the north side of the first floor of the turbine building, 1.2mSv/h was measured, and at the air lock on the south side, 0.5mSv/h was measured.</li>
<li>The D/W pressure was verified using power from a small generator, and there was the possibility that it might exceed 600 kPa[abs]. At 0:06 on March 12, the site superintendent (director, of ERC {emergency response center} at the power station) gave instructions to proceed with preparations for venting the PCV. At 0:49, because there was a possibility that <span style="background-color: yellow;">the PCV pressure may exceed the maximum operating pressure (maximum operating pressure of 528 kPa[abs] (427 kPa[gage]))</span>, the site superintendent deemed that the condition fell under an event corresponding to Article 15 of the Nuclear Disaster Act (abnormal rise in PCV pressure).</li>
<li>On March 12 at around 1:30, the Prime Minister, the METI {Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry}, as well as the NISA were notified of the implement{at}ion of the PCV venting for Units 1 and 2, and it was accepted.
</li>
<li>On March 12 at 5:46, alternative cooling (freshwater) was started using a fire engine pump.</li>
<li>On March 12 at 9:04, venting the PCV for depressurizing of the D/W was started; however, inside of the reactor building was already a high radiation dose environment. At around 9:15, the motor-operated valve (MO {motor-operated} valve) on the venting line of the PCV was operated manually in accordance with the procedure manual so that it was 25% open. Moreover, workers headed into the field in order to manually open the air-operated value (AO {air-operated} valve), which is on the venting line from the S/C. However the radiation dose was high, and the operation could not be carried out. Consequently, a temporary air compressor was set up for operating the air-operated valve, and the PCV venting was carried out.</li>
<li>On March 12 at 14:30, on confirming that the D/W pressure dropped, it was deemed that venting of the PCV was successful.</li>
<li>On March 12 at around 14:54, the site superintendent ordered the injection of seawater into
the reactor.</li>
<li>Subsequently, on March 12 at 15:36, <span style="color: red;">an explosion</span>, which was thought to be attributable to hydrogen gas, occurred in the upper structure of the reactor building, and the roof and outer walls of the refueling floor (top floor) were damaged. This explosion damaged the hose for seawater injection, and workers were evacuated from the field and confirmation of their safety was carried out. The restoration and preparation work was suspended until the field condit{i}ons could be verified. During these processes, radioactive materials were released into the environment; therefore, the radiation dose in the area surrounding the site increased.</li>
<li>On March 12 at 19:04, a FP {fire pump} line was used, and the seawater injection was commenced.</li>
</ul>
{pp. 68:}<br />
<b>(3) Response Status for PCV Venting at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2 [Attachment 8-5]
</b><br />
<ul>
<li>On March 14 at 22:50, because the D/W pressure <span style="background-color: yellow;">exceeded the maximum operating pressure of 427 kPa[gage], the site superintendent determined that an event corresponding to Article 15 of the Nuclear Disaster Act (abnormal rise in PCV pressure) had occurred.</span></li>
<li><span style="background-color: yellow;">While the D/W pressure tended to increase, the pressure in the S/C was stable at 300 to 400 kPa[abs]; however, the pressure between D/W and S/C would not equalize</span>. The S/C pressure was lower than the pressure to operate the rupture disk while the D/W pressure was increasing; therefore, on March 14 at around 23:35, a decision was made on a course to conduct PCV venting by opening the air-operated valve (bypass valve《(4)》) on the vent line from the D/W.</li>
<li>On March 15 at around 0:02, operators opened the air-operated valve (bypass valve《(4)》) on the venting line from the D/W; however, a few minutes later, it was confirmed to be closed. <span style="background-color: yellow;">The D/W pressure did not decrease from 750 kPa[abs] but remained high, and no effect from the venting was shown.</span></li>
<li>At between 6:00 and 6:10, a large <span style="color: red;">explosive sound</span> occurred. At almost the same time, <<span style="background-color: yellow;">>the pressure of the S/C showed 0 MPa[abs]</span> (Described in “9. Plant Hydrogen Explosion Assessment,” and the explosive sound is believed to have resulted from the explosion at Unit 4).</li>
<li>Meanwhile, the <style="background-color:yellow;">D/W pressure maintained at 730 kPa[abs] as of 7:20.</style="background-color:yellow;"></li>
<li><span style="background-color: yellow;">The D/W pressure as of 11:25, which was when the next measurement was made, had decreased to 155 kPa [abs]</span>, and it is thought that during this time, the gas in the PCV was released into the atmosphere in some way, and the monitoring car reading near the main gate drastically increased.</li>
</ul>
{pp. 76:}<br />
<b>(3) Response Status Pertaining to Venting of PCV at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 [Attachment 8-6]
</b><br />
<ul>
<li>On March 12 at 17:30, the site superintendent ordered the beginning of preparations for
the PCV venting. (Review of the procedures and the necessary valve locations were confirmed along with other details.)</li>
<li>On March 13 at 4:50, in order to open the air-operated valve on the vent line from the S/C, the portable generator being used for temporary lighting in the MCR, was used as a power source for the solenoid valve, and it was forcibly energized.</li>
<li>On March 13 at 5:15, the site superintendent ordered to complete the vent line up except for the rupture disk.</li>
<li>When operators went to the torus room (where the S/C is installed) to confirm the valve opening condition, it was fully closed. Accordingly, beginning at 5:23 on March 13, the compressed air cylinder was replaced, and the vent valve was then able to be opened.</li>
<li>On March 13 at 5:50, a press conference was commenced regarding the implementation of PCV venting, and at 7:35, TEPCO reported to the government agencies and other such institutions the assessment results of radiation exposure to the area surrounding the power station when the PCV venting was to be implemented.</li>
<li>At around 8:35, the MO valve on the vent line from the S/C was manually opened to 15 %.《(1)》Standard procedures call for the vent to be opened to 25%; however, this was lowered in order to prevent excessive decrease in PCV pressure drastically.</li>
<li>At 8:41, alignment of the vent lineup, excluding the rupture disk, was completed. However, <span style="background-color: yellow;">PCV pressure was too low to rupture the rupture disk. (427 kPa[gage])</span> Therefore, the system would not vent (waiting for rupturing the rupture disk), and the vent system alignment was kept open《(2)》and PCV pressure was monitored.</li>
<li>At 9:24, PCV pressure drop was verified; therefore, at approximately 9:20, it was determined that the S/C had been vented. [Attachment 8-7]</li>
<li>On March 13 at 11:17, due to decreasing pressure of the compressed air cylinder, the aforementioned air-operated valve《(2)》was closed. Therefore, the air cylinder was replaced and the valve opened again at 12:30.</li>
<li>After that, the valve needed to be maintained to be an open; however, operators could not keep the valve open due to the difficulty of the high room temperature at the torus room.</li>
<li>On March 13 at around 17:52, workers headed to the field to set up a temporary compressor at the truck bay of the turbine building and connected it to the instrument air system. At around 21:10, as the D/W pressure decreased, it was deemed that the air-operated valve《(2)》on the vent line from the S/C was opened.</li>
<li>On March 14, beginning at around 2:00, the <span style="background-color: yellow;">D/W pressure was uptrending</span>; therefore, at 5:20, another air-operated valve《(3)》(bypass valve), which was also on the vent line from the S/C, was opened and it was confirmed to be open at 6:10.</li>
{From page 70:}<br />
<li>Subsequently, on March 14 at 11:01, a <span style="color: red;">hydrogen explosion</span> occurred in the reactor building, and everything above the refueling floor and the south and north outside walls of one floor below of the refueling floor was damaged. During this event, radioactive materials were released into the environment, and the radiation dose around the power station increased.</li>
</ul>
Taking TEPCO's findings highlighted above together, the three stricken reactors' suppression chambers seemingly failed to fulfill their intended function. The pressure released from the reactor pressure vessels into the primary containments did not sufficiently equilibrate with the suppression chambers and was not absorbed in their pools of water. The retrofitted hardened venting provisions did not help reduce primary containment pressure adequately either.<br />
<br />
As a consequence, the pressure in the reactor pressure vessels could not be lowered enough to permit the operator to inject the amounts of water needed to keep the fuel cores covered and prevent the fuel from melting.
Whether the suppression chambers failed because of inherent design shortcomings or because of explicit seismic impact remains an open question.<br />
<br />
As attested in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) meeting discussed below, the design of the Mark I primary containment system required that comparably small-volumed containments absorb extraordinary pressures. The Fukushima reactor disaster may bear witness that the system could not meet this challenge.<br />
<br />
In response to the reactor disaster in Japan, <a href="http://beyondnuclear.org/">Beyond Nuclear</a> requested a public hearing on the safety of Mark I containments from the NRC in its petition with the title "<a href="http://www.beyondnuclear.org/storage/mark-1-campaign/mk-1-2206/bn_2206_ge_bwr_041320111.pdf">10 CFR 2.206 Petition to immediately suspend the operating licenses of GE BWR Mark I units pending full NRC review with independent expert and public participation from affected emergency planning zone communities</a>" submitted Apr. 11, 2011, and the NRC convened a series of public meetings at the agency's headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. The roughly 90-minute October 7 2011 meeting with the title "<a href="http://video.nrc.gov/MediaPlayer.php?bitrate=150000&view_id=2&clip_id=476">Beyond Nuclear 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Public Meeting</a>" can be viewed in the video below.<br />
<br />
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</a>
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<br />
About 39 minutes into the meeting, retired nuclear engineer and former General Electric program project manager for Mark I containment system safety Dale Bridenbaugh phoned in his opinion as a co-petitioner. General Electric developed the Mark I containment system. Mr. Bridenbaugh submitted an impressive plea for the urgent review of the containment system in its current design, which he believes has not improved to meet the safety goals set in his time with General Electric four decades ago. I transcribed his submission to the best of my ability. My annotations are bracketed in curly braces:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>“Thanks for this opportunity. As I said this is Dale Bridenbaugh. I want to reiterate I am appearing as an individual. I am not representing anyone other than myself.<br />
I am here today to present my opinion on the ongoing operation of the 23 Mark I containment boiling water reactors in the United States. My opinion is based on some 40 years of experience in the commercial nuclear power industry, approximately 20 years as an engineer and manager for General Electric Company's nuclear business, and another 20 as a private consultant in nuclear plant studies performed for more than 20 state agencies and several foreign countries.<br />
The first generation of large boiling water reactors was built by General Electric in spherical dry containment vessels designed to contain the energy that could be released in the event of a break in the primary system. Dresden I, where I first worked, is a 200-megaWatt electric plant and was housed in a 190-foot {58-meter} diameter sphere which had a volume of nearly 3.6 million cubic feet {101,941 m<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">3</span></sup>}. This same concept was followed with the next few plants. But as the design ratings were increased, the dry containment became problematic due to size and cost. With the higher energy content of the larger systems, dry containments were found not to be economically viable.<br />
<span style="background-color: yellow;">The Mark I pressure suppression system concept was developed and the resulting containment size was reduced by nearly a factor of 10. Even for unit ratings some five times greater {for comparison Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 produced 460 MW and Units 2 and 3 each 784 MW}. The result was a cheaper containment at the cost of difficulty in conducting required maintenance and inspections, and with less resistance to severe accident consequences.</span><br />
In early 1975, the NRC issued letters to all licensed Mark I plant owners asking for assurance that the Mark I plants did in fact meet required licensing criteria, and that would include that the containments would provide essentially a leak-tight response to design-basis accidents.<br />
This generic request was in part the result of information shared by GE with the NRC concerning testing of the Mark III containment concept and was backed up by some early failures at the first Mark I plants in operation.<br />
The 16 Mark I utilities contacted GE for assistance in answering the NRC request. GE proposed that a safety re-evaluation program be initiated to determine the nature and extent of the problem, and I was tapped to be the project manager of the program. This program, called the Mark I owners program, began its work in the spring of 1975 and continued well into the 1980s. The intended function of the program was to develop accepted definitions of the unquantified design-basis accident loads and to develop appropriate modifications.<br />
Throughout the program a great deal of uncertainty was encountered in quantifying the loads and the containment response to those loads. The early effort devolved into an exercise in defending continued operation of the plants through arguments of the low probability of the possible event. The owners group program finally resulted in NRC-approved Mark I hydrodynamic load definitions, and subsequent fixes were implemented to overcome the design deficiencies.<br />
The fact remains, however, that the Mark I plants continued operations for as much as 12 or 13 years outside of the requirements under which they were originally licensed. The ongoing period of operation under uncertain safety conditions played a large part in my decision to resign in 1976 from the program and from GE.<br />
The recent experience at the Fukushima Mark I units calls into question, again, whether those fixes, assuming they were properly implemented in Japan, are adequate to meet license requirements so as to safeguard the health and the safety of the public. Even the so-called hardened vent modification in the early nineties seems to have been inadequate at Fukushima to prevent hydrogen explosions and containment damage. It will be at least several years, if ever, before the full extent of the Fukushima accident sequences are known and understood. There are indications that some of the failures at Fukushima are not limited to the combined earthquake and tsunami effects, but may have been initiated by the seismic pulses alone. That remains to be seen.<br />It is unreasonable for all of the U.S. citizens who could be affected by a major accident at a U.S. Mark I plant to be held at risk for yet another period of years, when it is uncertain similar consequences could happen here. In my opinion, it is absolutely essential that commitments be made that plant-specific analyses be performed as soon as possible to consider the broad range of challenges the Fukushima accident presents to the 23 Mark I units in the U.S.<br />
Further, date-certain limits should be issued for all currently licensed Mark I units so as to assure that unlimited periods of operation not be allowed to continue outside of appropriate licensing conditions. Thank you very much for your time.”</i></blockquote>
<br />
General Electric assures that the design of the Mark I containment system remains safe (see GE report with the title "<a href="http://www.gereports.com/setting-the-record-straight-on-mark-i-containment-history/">Setting the Record Straight on Mark I Containment History</a>" published online Mar. 18, 2011). Contrary to General Electric's assurances, TEPCO's experience offered in the company's interim report of last December seems to support the concerns that Mr. Bridenbaugh raised at the October 9 NRC hearing on Beyond Nuclear's petition.<br />
<br />
<b>Acknowledgement</b><br />
I am indebted to the contributors of <a href="http://simplyinfo.org/">SimplyInfo.org</a> without whose input I could not have written this essay. I thank Dale Bridenbaugh for sharing his expertise and extensive experience with General Electric's Mark I containment system.<br />
<br />
<b>Addendum</b>
<br />
<ul>
<li>CNN's Matt Smith discussed GE's Mark I containment systems yesterday in his article with the title "<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/17/us/us-nuclear-reactor-concerns/index.html">U.S. nuclear plants similar to Fukushima spark concerns</a>". The post contains informative illustrations and sparked roughly 1000 comments within 24 hours. In the article, GE is cited blaming the failures at Fukushima squarely on the devastating effects of the tsunami and reiterating that the company's Mark I containment system is safe. CNN is preparing to air a two-installment broadcast on the issue today and tomorrow evening 8 ET/PT on <i><a href="http://cnnpresents.blogs.cnn.com/">CNN Presents</a></i>. I would not be surprised, if lawyers were already assembling briefs for possible litigation, law suites would be filed over damages, and imbroglios between the defendants would ensue similar to those we witness today in the aftermath of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill">2010 Deepwater Horizon Accident</a> in the Gulf of Mexico (see my post with the title "<a href="http://brainmindinst.blogspot.com/2010/04/energy-mind.html">Energy & The Mind</a>" published Apr. 27, 2010 (02/18/2011).</li>
</ul>
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<br />
<b>Literature</b>
<br />
<ul>
<li>Assessment and management of aging of major nuclear power plant components important to safety: Metal components of BWR containment systems. <a href="http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1181_prn.pdf">IAEA-TECDOC-1181, Oct. 2000</a><a href="http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1181_prn.pdf"></a>. IAEA, Vienna, 2000.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/46665937?access_key=key-2h1njp2cb1vulc1izfvc">Boiling water reactor simulator with active safety systems. User manual, Oct. 2009.</a> IAEA, Vienna, 2009.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/13573218">CNIC News 第8回記者会見</a> 2/3, 3/26/2011.</li>
<li>Lahey RT, Moody, FJ (1993) <a href="http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/48954447?access_key=key-2ldlqkc76irt97xdd0jo">The thermal-hydraulics of a boiling water nuclear reactor.</a> American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, IL.</li>
<li>Lochbaum D (2011) <a href="http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/fukushima-daiichi-ucs-analysis-unit-3-first-80-minutes.pdf">Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 3: The first 80 minutes</a>. Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA.</li>
<li>Ragheb M (2011) <a href="https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/mragheb/www/NPRE%20402%20ME%20405%20Nuclear%20Power%20Engineering/Boiling%20Water%20Reactors.pdf">Chapter 3: boiling water reactors</a>, Berkeley, CA.</li>
</ul>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/vcj8SRBq9kk" width="420"></iframe><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">Watch some great animations on the performance of the Mark I containment system at Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1 and potential pitfalls.</span></div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><div align="center"><iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=12&l=ur1&category=amazonhomepage&f=ifr" width="300" height="250" scrolling="no" border="0" marginwidth="0" style="border:none;" frameborder="0"></iframe>
</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-76206412523956005542012-01-22T12:04:00.000-06:002012-01-26T15:51:35.379-06:00Bosch S 800 Linea: Simple Black Out FixRoughly 18 months ago, we bought this shiny marvel of German über-engineering also known as <a href="http://www.bosch-home.com/us/products/refrigerators/freestanding-refrigerators/B22CS80SNS.html">36" Counter-Depth Side-by-Side Refrigerator 800 Series - Stainless Steel</a> (B22CS80SNS). The website slogan proclaims “Invented for Life.” The awesome appliance is absolutely invented for the space age with 21<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">st</span></sup>-century amenities and countless energy-saving features like low-power consuming light fixtures in the backlit refrigerating compartment. Soon after installation, however, the fantastic illumination began to flicker on opening the door and eventually dropped out entirely.<br />
<br />
Our first idea from decades of life experience with refrigerators was that some light bulb needed changing. After thorough inspection, however, no conventional light bulbs were to be found. Under the ceiling cover, we found two tiny LED lights that we first did not recognize as light sources at all and do not look like they should be removed. There is no easy way to open the cover of the back illumination either. The back is lit by a Laser light source. The <a href="http://portal.bsh-partner.com/TCcustomBSH/controller/download_file?PDFOBID=tlyjEqhcdcso0pdmdb---R4G&UMOBID=tlyjEpbcdcso0pdmdb---R4G">manual</a> recommends to call a service technician. Welcome to German precision goods in the 21<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">st</span></sup> century! No way for less-talented rocket scientists to even change a light bulb!<br />
<br />
But before we extend a time-consuming and costly invitation to Herr Dipl. Ing. Bosch's faithful associates, here is a remedy easy enough for us to try. When we open the door to the refrigerator compartment, we see two push button switches at the top of the refrigerator's frame. The left one is a small rod that is pushed in by the door when we close it. The right switch shows a reboot symbol adopted from the PC world. That switch represents the on/off switch for the whole refrigerator. When we pushed it, the lighting in the compartment - ceiling and back - sprang to life briefly, before the refrigerator shut down and the display above the water and ice dispenser fell dark. We pushed the switch again to restart the refrigerator.<br />
<br />
The short resurrection of the compartment lighting during shutdown suggested that the light sources were actually still intact, but were not switched properly.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
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<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The video above shows the push-rod switch in action. </span></div>
<br />
This observation leads us to the function of the push-rod switch on the left. The rod is spring-loaded. That is, the switch turns the light off when the door closes, holding the rod down, and is supposed to switch the light back on when the door is opened and the rod is depressed. We hypothesized that perhaps the switch mechanism was stuck and the spring did not release it when the rod was depressed. To test this idea, we squirted a <span style="color: red;">tiny amount of light spray oil like <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WD-40">WD-40<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">®</span></sup></a> into the small gap between the rod and the switch</span> cover, and sure enough our compartment light is back. Enjoy this otherwise fantastic fridge and good luck with aiming the ice cubes!<br />
<br /><div class="blogger-post-footer"><div align="center"><iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=12&l=ur1&category=amazonhomepage&f=ifr" width="300" height="250" scrolling="no" border="0" marginwidth="0" style="border:none;" frameborder="0"></iframe>
</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-83443221802221794192011-10-27T19:16:00.000-05:002014-10-09T13:39:22.043-05:00Seismic Activity & Reactor Safety: Lessons from Japan<div id="google_translate_element">
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I worked with radioactive isotopes known as radionuclides in laboratory research for almost three decades in my professional career. Since three reactor fuel cores melted down at the Fukushima Dai-ichi (number one) Nuclear Power Station (NPS) owned by <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/index-e.html">Tokyo Electric Power Company</a> (TEPCO) in the aftermath of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami">Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake and Tsunami</a> on March 11, 2011 [1], I have been concerned about the safety of nuclear power reactors.<br />
<br />
At magnitude M<sub>w</sub> 9.0 (I<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;"><sub>JMA</sub></span> 7.0 on the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_Meteorological_Agency_seismic_intensity_scale">Japan Meteorological Agency intensity scale</a>), this earthquake was the strongest recorded in Japan's history, causing massive damage. Moreover, tsunami waves up to 40 meters high inflicted horrible devastation on the coast. The Government of Japan reports that 15,687 people lost their lives and 4,757 are still missing as of Aug. 9, 2011 [2].<br />
<br />
The quake and tsunami caused a total station blackout at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. Reactor fuel core cooling could not be maintained, the fuel began to melt, and radioactive material could not be contained. After powerful hydrogen explosions, still unknown amounts of radioactive material were released into the air and the sea. Roughly 80,000 people living in immediate proximity of the power station were evacuated and have not been able to return home, except for brief visits [2]. Soil and sea near the NPS are highly contaminated with radioactive material. Long-lived radionuclides have been found in foods like rice [3] and beef [4] at levels too high for consumption. Hotspots of radiation are being discovered in Tokyo and further away [5]. The impact on public health is not yet fully comprehended. The costs of this crisis and its long-term consequences are unfathomable, but will be in the hundreds of billion yen.<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp/pict46.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="266" src="http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp/pict46.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Aerial photograph of Fukushima 1 (Dai-ichi) NPS taken March 24, 2011. Note the obliteration of the reactor buildings at Units 1 (top), 3 and 4. Fuel cores melted in Units 1, 2 and 3 because of loss of coolant. Unit 4 was shutdown for service at the time of the earthquake and tsunami (source: <a href="http://cryptome.org/">cryptome.org</a>).</span></div>
<br />
The islands of Japan lie in a seismically active zone near the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacific_Ring_of_Fire">Pacific Rim of Fire</a>. They are situated in close proximity to the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_Trench">Japan Trench</a> in the Pacific Ocean off Japan's northeast coast where two tectonic plates violently collide. No doubt Japanese engineers have collected in-depth theoretical and empirical knowledge on the effects of seismic waves on industrial systems, structures and components, particularly in nuclear engineering.
All nuclear power stations in Japan are equipped with seismometers that record ground motion in the three spatial dimensions and automatically <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scram">scram</a> nuclear reactors at predetermined set-points.<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.jsm.or.jp/ejam/Vol.1.No.3/GA/7/EJAM1-3-GA7_Fig.1_Kashiwazaki-Kariwa_Nuclear_Power_Station%20.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="280" src="http://www.jsm.or.jp/ejam/Vol.1.No.3/GA/7/EJAM1-3-GA7_Fig.1_Kashiwazaki-Kariwa_Nuclear_Power_Station%20.png" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Aerial photograph of Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS. Older Units 1 (bottom, right) to 4 (top) are in the foreground. The most recently built Units 5 to 7 are in the background (top, left) (source: <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/gallery/nuclear-e.html">TEPCO</a>).</span>
</div>
<br />
<b>Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS</b><br />
As recently as Jul. 16, 2007, a M<sub>w</sub> 6.6-magnitude (I<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;"><sub>JMA</sub></span> 6.8) earthquake known as the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Ch%C5%ABetsu_offshore_earthquake">Niigata-ken Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake</a>, or NCO Earthquake for short, struck <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashiwazaki-Kariwa_Nuclear_Power_Plant">Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station</a> (KK) on Japan's northwest coast. The NPS, with seven reactors and 8.2 Gigawatt electrical power output the world's largest, is owned by the same utility as Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, that is TEPCO. The quake automatically tripped the four reactors operating that day.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2007/1365/of2007-1365.pdf">Kayen and others (2007)</a> [6] examined the geotectal causes for the quake in great detail and compiled a comprehensive account on land failure and the damage to infrastructure in the region. I have explained fundamental wave concepts underlying earthquakes in the context of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Haiti_earthquake">Great Haiti Earthquake of Jan. 12, 2010</a>, in my post with the title "<a href="http://brainmindinst.blogspot.com/2010/01/neuroanatomy-of-earthquake.html">Neuroanatomy of an Earthquake</a>" published Jan. 18 of that year. In this essay, I shall attempt to explain in more detail measurements of ground motion, projections of observations, and their relationship with quake damage at nuclear power stations.<br />
<br />
<div style="border-style: ridge; border-width: 5px; margin: 5px;">
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Ground Motion Acceleration Units, Dimensions, and Conversions</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
1 Gal (Galileo) = 1 cm/s<sup><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">2</span></sup></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
1 g (fraction of gravitational acceleration) = 980 Gal</div>
</div>
<br />
At Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS, operators were able to recover recordings of ground motion from only one third of roughly 100 recording locations [7]. Fortunately, recordings could be retrieved from the bottom floors of the seven reactor buildings, known as base mats.<br />
<br />
As typical examples, the accelerogram for the east-west ground motion recorded on the base mat of Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS Unit 2 is shown below as well as the observed acceleration response spectrum (thick line) and the design-basis acceleration response spectrum (S2, thin line) for the same location. The latter is computed, using synthesized time histories of past earthquakes.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; margin-left: 70px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/accelerogram_u2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 70px; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="213" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/accelerogram_u2.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/spectra_KK_2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 70px; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="249" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/spectra_KK_2.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">TEPCO [8]</span></div>
<br />
Peak ground acceleration (<b>PGA</b>) on the reactor building base mats exceeded the design basis for all seven units. The greatest PGA was recorded at Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS Unit 1. The worst exceedance was 3.6-times design basis at Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS Unit 2 [8]. Note 5% damping is assumed in the calculations, because the structures absorb quake energy [9].<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/KK_ground_motion.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 30px; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="218" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/KK_ground_motion.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">TEPCO [8]</span></div>
<br />
The trip points for automatic reactor shutdown known as <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scram"><b>SCRAM</b></a> were set at 100 Gal (0.10 g) in the horizontal directions and at 120 Gal (0.12 g) in the vertical direction [10]. The quake caused a massive switch yard transformer fire. Radioactive gaseous effluent was released into the atmosphere because of a malfunction of the HVAC system. The amount was deemed small enough not to pose a threat to the public.<br />
<br />
Visual inspections were carried out during extensive post-quake walkdowns, as well as pressure and function tests, on about 20,600 components, instruments, panels and valves, and 155,000 meters of pipe [10]. Nuclear power station systems, structures and components (<b>SSC</b>) are classified in three groups of importance for seismic safety. SSCs in the most important group did not appear to have incurred any damage at Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS. This group is known as class A in Japan and seismic design category I, or SDC-I for short, in the US (<a href="http://www.bechtns.com/Content.aspx?cid=195&lvl=3">Antaki and Johnson, 2011</a>) [11]. Damage, deformation, and impeded function were uncovered only on class B (SDC-II) and C (SDC-III) systems, structures and components deemed unimportant to reactor safety.<br />
<br />
Using advanced ultrasonic technology, inspectors detected some <i>hidden</i> damage. For example, cracks were found in the rotor shaft and blades of power-generating low pressure main steam turbines. TEPCO concluded that this damage was a result of fatigue rather than the quake.<br />
<br />
All SSCs at which damage was discovered were repaired. Because of the broad exceedance of the design basis earthquake at the seven units, additional safeguards were installed, and new spectra were computed to ensure that the implemented measures strengthened the design basis.<br />
<br />
The apparent disassociation between earthquake magnitude, observed peak ground acceleration and damage led to the search for new indicators better predicting quake damage. Apparently, the currently used measurements of magnitude and ground motion do not adequately appreciate the temblor's duration. To remedy this shortcoming, cumulative absolute velocity expressed in cm/s or g-sec, <b>CAV</b> for short, was introduced. CAV constitutes the sum of the ground accelerations added over the duration of the quake. Standardized cumulative absolute velocities are filtered for non-damaging ground motion frequencies.<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/rev_CAV_jp-1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 30px; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="312" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/rev_CAV_jp-1.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Standardized cumulative absolute velocities [g-sec] are plotted against the magnitude of quakes that shook nuclear power stations in Japan before 2011. Magnitude is expressed as seismic intensity on the I<sub>JMA</sub> scale used by the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_Meteorological_Agency_seismic_intensity_scale">Japan Meteorological Agency</a> (JMA). Historically, trained JMA agents qualitatively scored quake magnitude. Today, instruments register quake intensity automatically. Damage was detected at main turbines, that is SSCs unimportant to reactor safety. The data suggest a damage threshold for such SSCs at </span><span style="font-size: x-small;">CAV 0.8 g-sec</span><span style="font-size: x-small;"> and</span><span style="font-size: x-small;"> I</span><sub>JMA</sub><span style="font-size: x-small;"> 5.5 [12]. The lowest PGA the JMA allows at this intensity is 0.25 g. </span><br />
<b style="font-size: small;">No quake damage is anticipated for PGAs below 0.25 g</b><span style="font-size: x-small;">.</span></div>
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Foreshadowing the reactor catastrophe at Fukushima, however, in tests during the restart of Kashiwasaki-Kariwa Unit 7 in May 2009 <span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: red;">the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system, or RCIC for short, did not perform as expected because of valve failure. </span>RCIC steam entered a pressure control chamber at the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel, and the cooling water in the chamber rose. Operators had to intervene. At Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, the RCIC systems of the two operating reactors outfitted with this system would fail last March, profoundly impeding the operator's efforts of preventing the reactor fuel cores from melting down. I have described the weaknesses of the RCIC system in detail in my post with the title "<a href="http://brainmindinst.blogspot.com/2011/07/fukushima-failure-by-design.html">Fukushima: Failure by Design</a>" published Jul. 3, 2011.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/acceleration_ground_motion_Daiichi.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 30px; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="202" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/acceleration_ground_motion_Daiichi.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">TEPCO [13]</span></div>
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<b>Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS</b><br />
TEPCO insists that the reactor fuel core meltdowns at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS were precipitated by the total station blackout caused by the loss of emergency diesel power through tsunami inundation [13]. The company has given seismic impact as cause little credence. TEPCO's interpretation is supported by the ground motion recorded on the base mats of the reactor buildings. Though PGAs broadly exceeded design basis in the horizontal east-west direction at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, the greatest exceedance was roughly a third of that found at Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS after the NCO Earthquake, that is the greatest exceedance was only 1.26-fold at Unit 2. CAV values have not yet been released.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp2/pict56.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 30px; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="266" src="http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp2/pict56.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Aerial photograph of Fukushima 1 (Dai-ichi) NPS taken Sep. 18, 2010. Units 4 (left) to 1 (right) were built in a row. Unit 1 closest to the water front is the oldest commercial nuclear power reactor of Japan completed in 1971. Units 5 and 6, set apart on the upper right, are the youngest reactors at the station (source: <a href="http://cryptome.org/">cryptome.org</a>).</span></div>
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Of the six reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, units 5 and 6 were least affected by the tsunami and exhibited the smallest PGA exceedance [13]. They were disconnected from the power grid when the quake struck, undergoing tests fully loaded with fuel. Combined with the findings at Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS after the NCO Earthquake, the seismic impact uncovered at these units may provide valuable lessons for predictions of future quake damage at nuclear power stations.<br />
<br />
In fact, the lessons learned from both quakes in Japan stipulate that ground motion in exceedance of the design basis may impact nuclear power station systems, structures and components (SSC) in subtle ways. Although quake damage may mainly be detected on less quake-resistant SSC categorized B (SBC-II) and C (SBC-III), the subtleties warrant in-depth inspections for potential <i>hidden</i> damage of all SCC, regardless of class.<br />
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<b>North Anna NPS</b><br />
On Aug. 23, 2011, the Northeastern Seaboard of the U.S. was struck by a magnitude M<sub>w</sub> 5.9 earthquake centered near Mineral, Virginia, in the Central Virginia Seismic Zone close to the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Anna_Nuclear_Generating_Station">North Anna Nuclear Power Station</a> with two pressurized water reactors.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/VA_seismic_map.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="229" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/VA_seismic_map.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">USGS [14]</td></tr>
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Both reactors were shut down safely. The quake was felt as far as Boston, Massachusetts [15]. By and large minor damage was found at monuments, as well as governmental, residential and commercial buildings, extending over a surprisingly large area. This Washington Post picture gallery with the title "<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/59-earthquake-hits-dc/2011/08/23/gIQAc28JZJ_gallery.html#photo=24">Magnitude-5.8 earthquake shakes D.C.</a>" provides a sweeping impression of the quake's impact.<br />
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The damage, combined with subjective experience, matches the criteria of a six-lower (6<span class="s1">弱</span>) magnitude quake on the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_Meteorological_Agency_seismic_intensity_scale">shindo scale</a>, pegging the quake's PGA between 0.250 g and 0.315 g. In accord, the United States Geological Service (USGS) estimates 0.26 g [14].<br />
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According to the findings in Japan discussed above, this peak ground acceleration merely touches the threshold at which damage to systems, structures and components must be expected at nuclear power stations. Based on observations after the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Hanshin_earthquake">1995 South Hyogo Prefecture Earthquake</a>, also known as the Kobe Earthquake, <a href="http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/4_sessionC/C-24.pdf">Ochiai and others (2010)</a>[12] suggest that the potential damage at nuclear power plants with ground shaking of the magnitude of the Virginia quake may comprise: falling air ducts, tumble (with weak anchorage), failure of foundation anchorage, circular storage tank wall buckling (elephant foot), contact/hitting of pipes (insulation and grating damage), and buckling of crane basements. On occasion, pulling out/fracture of anchor bolts, overflow (sloshing), pipe support structure damage (pulling out of anchor bolts), and failure of transmission line support may be observed [12].<br />
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North Anna NPS is the first nuclear power station in the Central Eastern United States (CEUS) at which reactors scrammed because of a seismic event. The reactors at North Anna NPS lack automatic seismic scram systems. The reasons for the scrams are not yet fully understood. Offsite power was lost because of ground motion. Emergency diesel generators started up. The ensuing power fluctuations may have tripped the reactors. Seismic recordings were obtained from the Unit 1 reactor containment base mat as well as the turbine buildings and sent out for evaluation in the days after the incident by the station's operator, <a href="http://www.dom.com/dominion-virginia-power/index.jsp">(Dominion) Virginia Electrical and Power Company</a>, or VEPCO for short. In addition, VEPCO immediately carried out walkdowns, visually inspecting the station's systems, structures and components (SSC) for damage. Operability and performance was examined extensively. Underground piping was unearthed, checked, and pressure-tested. Welds were examined with ultrasonic devices.<br />
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In public meetings at Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) headquarters near Washington, D.C., on Sep. 8 and Oct. 21, 2011, VEPCO reported preliminary findings. VEPCO is determined to restart the reactors as soon as the inspections are completed, and the NRC approved the results.<br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Webcast of the <a href="http://video.nrc.gov/MediaPlayer.php?bitrate=28800&view_id=2&clip_id=433">September 8, 2011, NRC meeting with VEPCO</a> on the Aug. 23 Virginia Earthquake near North Anna NPS (Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339;<a href="http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1125/ML11252A006.pdf"> slides</a>).</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Webcast of the <a href="http://video.nrc.gov/MediaPlayer.php?bitrate=28800&view_id=2&clip_id=498">October 21, 2011, NRC meeting</a> with VEPCO on the Aug. 23 Virginia Earthquake near North Anna NPS (<a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/slides/2011/20111021/dominion-20111021.pdf">slides</a>).</span></div>
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At the Oct. 21 meeting, VEPCO presented accelerograms retrieved from the reactor building base mat of North Anna NPS Unit 1. Note the short duration of the quake. The figure below as well as other North Anna NPS data shown in this post were released for the two NRC meetings.<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/NorthAnna_accelerograms.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 80px; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="237" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/NorthAnna_accelerograms.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Accelerograms showing ground motion on the base mat of the North Anna NPS Unit 1 reactor building in the three spatial directions (left ordinate: acceleration [Gal]; right ordinate: [g], abscissa: time [s]). Note the ground motion at the NPS lasted only 3.1 seconds (VEPCO, Oct. 21, 2011).</span></div>
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In addition, VEPCO provided the peak ground accelerations (PGA) the company used to calculate the design basis spectra for North Anna NPS.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/dominion_pgas.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="194" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/dominion_pgas.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Stipulated peak ground acceleration limits for rock (reactor building foundation) and soil (foundation of turbine buildings and ancillary structures) by ground motion direction for Operating Basis Earthquake and Design Basis Earthquake (VEPCO, Sep. 9, 2011).</span></div>
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The stipulated PGAs vary for ground motion direction and ground type, that is rock and soil on which the reactor buildings and ancillary structures are built, respectively. According to <a href="http://www.bechtns.com/Content.aspx?cid=195&lvl=3">Antaki and Johnson (2011)</a>[11], NPS systems, structures and components are designed to withstand ground motion based on the operation basis earthquake, or <b>OBE</b> for short, which is anchored at half the PGA used to determine the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (<b>SSE</b>), that is at the ground motion at which the reactors are to be shut down to protect their safety. By contrast, the design basis earthquake, or <b>DBE</b> for short, is calculated to envelope the expected ground motion envisaged at 80 percent of the NPS sites in the Central and Eastern U.S., assuming an OBE equal to one-third or less of the SSE. Dependent on NPS location, the PGA used to determine the SSE is set between 0.1 g and 0.3 g, which is equal to or higher than the trip points for automatic seismic scram systems used at Japanese nuclear reactors. In sum, the reactors are supposed to be shut down at peak ground accelerations much below DBE. However, note that the greatest anticipated DBE at North Anna NPS is 0.18 g, which is below the USGS estimate for the Virginia quake. Therefore, it is not surprising that recorded peak ground motions were greater than assumed in the DBE.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/dominion_ss2-vert.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 70px; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="285" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/dominion_ss2-vert.jpg" width="400" /></a>
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<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/North_Anna_legend_vertical_spectra.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="77" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/North_Anna_legend_vertical_spectra.jpg" width="200" /></a></div>
<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/dominion_ss2-hor.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 70px; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="282" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/dominion_ss2-hor.jpg" width="400" /></a>
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<a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/northanna_legend_spectra.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="94" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/northanna_legend_spectra.jpg" width="200" /></a></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Recorded (ondulating curves) and computed (smooth curves) seismic response spectra at 5 % percent damping for the vertical (top) and horizontal (bottom) directions at North Anna NPS Unit 1 reactor building base mat (ordinate: acceleration [g]; abscissa: frequency [Hz]). The bottom and middle smooth curves in each graph describe OBE and DBE, respectively. Note that the recorded ground motion exceeded DBE at frequencies greater than 1.0 Hz in the vertical as well as in the north-south direction, and greater than 10.0 Hz in the east-west direction (VEPCO, Sep. 9, 2011).</span></div>
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The two graphs above show the seismic response spectra constructed from the data VEPCO recovered from the base mat seismometers of the North Anna NPS Unit 1 reactor building. Clearly, PGA exceeded DBE at frequencies greater than one Hertz. Damage was to be expected at class B and C systems, structures, and components, that is SSCs unimportant for reactor safety.<br />
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However, VEPCO reasoned that the anticipated damage might not have been detrimental to the safety of North Anna NPS, because quake duration and DBE exceedance were short in comparison with other known damaging quakes. The operator reasoned that cumulative absolute velocity (<b>CAV</b>), which takes the duration of the quake into account, represents a more accurate damage predictor than PGA, as discussed in context with the NCO Earthquake and the Tohoku Earthquake. VEPCO therefore presented standardized CAV values at the NRC meetings.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: 80px; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/dominion_cav.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 80px; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="189" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/dominion_cav.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Standardized cumulative absolute velocities [g-sec] calculated by three expert companies from the accelerations detected on the base mat of North Anna NPS Unit 1's reactor building for ground motion in the three spatial directions. Note that north-south direction motion exceeded the NRC prescribed limit of 0.16 g-sec below which a nuclear power reactor can be operated safely (VEPCO, Sep. 9, 2011).</span></div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/NorthAnna_CAVnew.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 75px; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="214" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/NorthAnna_CAVnew.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Standardized cumulative absolute velocities [g-sec] calculated from recordings and modeled for the three spatial directions of motion on the North Anna NPS Unit 1 reactor building base mat. The observed velocities did not exceed the modeled design base earthquake (DBE) and the limits modeled in the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (<a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/individual-plant-examination-for-external-events-ipeee.html">IPEEE</a>) (VEPCO, Oct. 20, 2011).</span></div>
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The standardized cumulative absolute velocities determined for recorded north-south ground motion on the base mat of North Anna NPS Unit 1 reactor building exceeded OBE, necessitating the shutdown of both units. Yet, the values remained below the cumulative absolute velocities calculated for DBE, as well as the higher limits calculated in the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) stipulated by the NRC. The IPEEE, but not the DBE values, are above 0.8 g-sec, that is the CAV threshold for quake damage at nuclear power stations in Japan, according to the CAV/quake magnitude plot of <a href="http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/4_sessionC/C-24.pdf">Ochiaia and others (2011)</a>[12]. The authors note only one incident with damage that occurred at a CAV below 1.5 g-sec. Main steam turbine damage was detected at Hamaoka NPS Unit 5 after the Aug. 11, 2009, <a href="http://tickerforum.org/cgi-ticker/akcs-www?post=106319">Shizuoka Earthquake</a>, which scrammed the station's units 5 and 6.<br />
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By contrast, the greatest recording-based CAV at Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS reached 2.8 g-sec, 16-times the highest CAV at North Anna NPS. For ground motion predictions, <a href="http://peer.berkeley.edu/publications/peer_reports/reports_2010/webR_PEER10_102_Campbell_Bozorgnia.pdf">Campbell and Bozorgnia (2011)</a> plotted the standardized cumulative absolute velocity against <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_Meteorological_Agency_seismic_intensity_scale">I<sub><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">JMA</span></sub></a>, that is the quake intensity the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) uses (Fig. 4.1) [16]. The plot shows a close direct proportionality between the logarithm of cumulative absolute velocity and the JMA quake intensity scale. VEPCO's cumulative absolute velocities for recorded ground motion fall short of the range between 0.3 and 2.0 g-sec (median = 1.2 g-sec) that the plot predicts for the Virginia quake, though the qualitative descriptions of the damage and the quake experience in the region closely match the ones provided by JMA for a quake of this magnitude. Therefore, VEPCO's cumulative absolute velocities may underrate the possible extent of the damage.<br />
<br />
North Anna NPS lost offside power because of a disruption in the switchyard, necessitating the startup of emergency diesel generators. This event arguably represents the most consequential impact of the Virginia quake on the NPS known to date. So far, the station inspection uncovered minor damage to SDC-II and SDC-III systems, structures, and components unimportant to reactor safety. Intriguingly, the inspectors noted quake impact similar to that found at Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 5 and 6, though the recorded peak ground acceleration at North Anna NPS was only roughly half of that observed at these units and, according to the <a href="http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/2011_Earthquake/2011_Earthquake_Intensity.pdf">Japan Meteorological Agency</a>, the quake reached six-upper (6強) on the shindo scale in the region with seismic intensities I<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;"><sub>JMA</sub></span> between 6.0 and 6.4. By contrast, the Virginia Earthquake qualifies for six-lower (6弱).<br />
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As examples for similar quake impact at Fukushima Dai-ichi and North Anna nuclear power stations, two types of visible damage are explored below:<br />
<i>Component Relocation:</i> At Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 5's turbine building, a support for the moisture separator drain pipe shifted,<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/Fukushima1_5_quake_damage1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="240" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/Fukushima1_5_quake_damage1.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Moisture separator drain pipe support moved in Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 5 turbine building (TEPCO).</span></td></tr>
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while at North Anna, 25 of 27 spent fuel dry storage casks shifted.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/North_Anna_storage_hd.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="288" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/North_Anna_storage_hd.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Dry casks for spent fuel moved at North Anna NPS storage area (VEPCO). </td></tr>
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<i>Concrete damage:</i> At Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 6's turbine building, the concrete pedestal of the feedwater heater chipped at the edges,<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/Fukushima1_6_quake_damage1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="228" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/Fukushima1_6_quake_damage1.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 6 concrete pedestal chipping at feedwater heater in the turbine building (TEPCO).</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
while at North Anna the concrete pedestal of a demineralizer chipped at the edges.<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/North_Anna_chipped_conc_hd.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="202" src="http://i1214.photobucket.com/albums/cc497/Peter_Melzer/seismics/North_Anna_chipped_conc_hd.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">North Anna NPS turbine building chipping of concrete base for demineralizer (VEPCO).</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
These similarities suggest that it may be imprudent to underestimate the possibility of damage to North Anna NPS comparable to that observed at nuclear power stations in Japan after a 6-upper quake, because of similar differences between ground motion anticipated in design and ground motion actually occurring. Notably, differences in ground motion between the reactors built on rock and ancillary structures and components built on soil may exacerbate quake impact on their connections.</div>
<br />
<b>Outlook</b><br />
Learning lessons from the Japanese experience, three areas of focus important to safety at North Anna Nuclear Power Station emerge:<br />
<ol>
<li><u>Seismic risk reduction through automatic seismic scram</u><br />
Only few commercial nuclear power stations in the U.S. are outfitted with the equipment needed to automatically scram the reactors when they are subjected to ground motion reaching stipulated setpoints. The Sep. 8, 2011, meeting revealed that the control room operators at North Anna NPS lacked information on containment motion when they needed it most. At the instant of the quake, seismic instruments had lost power. The alarms that would have informed the operators whether the ground motion warranted a shutdown failed. On Sep. 28, VEPCO informed the NRC that negative power flux rates at the station caused the scrams. The precise cause of the of the negative flux rates remains to be resolved. Automatic seismic scram systems may have benefitted the operators in shutting down the station's two reactors more expediently. VEPCO should be asked to evaluate whether state-of-the-art automated seismic scram systems would reduce current levels of seismic risk. Moreover, it seems prudent to independently retrofit all seismically important instrumentation separately with 24 hour-lived batteries. Additional, solar power may extend battery life.</li>
<li><u>Seismic risk re-evalution of the ultimate heat sink</u><br />
The reactor core decay heat persisting after a scram must be transferred to the ultimate heat sink. For example, North Anna NPS uses Lake Anna, a dammed lake created for the purpose, as ultimate heat sink. The heat transfer to the ultimate sink is crucial to cooling the reactors, preventing fuel core meltdowns with disastrous consequences as the reactor accidents at Fukushima 1 NPS last March strikingly demonstrate. The preservation of the ultimate heat sink and its use via residual heat removal systems are of existential importance to reactor safety.<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
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<br />
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Lake Anna's water level had fallen two feet after the Virginia Earthquake Aug. 23, 2011 (source: <a href="http://www.wtvr.com/videobeta/1a0ae718-372c-4986-84e1-d940ddfd1470/News/Mineral-residents-concerned-about-Nuclear-power-plant">WTVR CBS 6 Richmond, VA</a>) [17].
</span></div>
According to CBS Channel 6 News, Richmond, VA, the water level of Lake Anna had fallen roughly <b>two feet</b> after the quake [17]. At the Sep. 8 meeting in Rockville, VEPCO stated that an inspection of the dam provided no evidence of quake damage. At the Oct. 21 meeting, VEPCO elaborated that Lake Anna and its main dam do not represent the ultimate heat sink for the station, but that this function is served by a smaller body of water separated from the lake by another dam. VEPCO inspected this dam and found no damage. Regardless of this barrier, the lake represents the ultimate heat sink, if only indirectly. The question what might have precipitated the reported rapid loss of water from the lake remains to be answered. Uncovering the cause for such drastic water level diminution, should it be confirmed, might be of profound importance for the seismic safety of North Anna NPS, because Lake Anna constitutes the ultimate heat sink for the decay heat of the reactor fuel cores during shutdown. According to <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsunamis_in_lakes">wikipedia</a>, earthquakes of M 4.0 and greater may trigger tsunamis in lakes. Depending on the exact ground motion and the shape and size of the lake, small transient rises on one side may be accompanied by larger drops on the other.</li>
<li><u>Seismic risk re-evaluation of all emergency core cooling system SSC</u><br />
All SSC of the emergency core cooling system, including condensate storage tanks, are important to seismic safety and should be tested structurally and functionally. Particular attention must be paid to SDC-II and III SSC built on soil that are connected with SDC-I SSC built on rock, because soil ground motion is commonly greater than rock ground motion. Differences in ground motion between rock and soil may result in damage to the connections between SSC built on either substrate. At Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, efforts to prevent the meltdowns of the fuel cores of units 2 and 3 were rendered ineffective by the failure of reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems and high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) systems. The meltdown at Unit 1 was precipitated by a failed isolation condenser (IC). Combined with the failure of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system primarily attributed to tsunami damage, these shortcomings contributed in no small part to the failure of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). The inspections at North Anna NPS must ensure that all SSC of the ECCS conform to the highest seismic safety level and can withstand the ground motion the station is anticipated to incur by substantial margin.</li>
</ol>
We shall see how VEPCO's re-evaluation of North Anna NPS proceeds. Like at Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS Unit 7, function tests of ECCS components during restart will show whether the reactors can be operated safely. Decisive insights will be gained at the very end.<br />
<b><br /></b><br />
<b>Acknowledgment</b><br />
I am indebted to the numerous commenters on <a href="http://www.scribblelive.com/Event/Japan_Earthquake5">scribblelive.com Japan Earthquake5</a> without whose up-to-date input I could not have written this post. The information on <a href="http://www.simplyinfo.org/">www.simplyinfo.org</a> was of invaluable help. I thank MJ Racer whose cogent post on <a href="http://www.physicsforums.com/">physicsforums</a> (<a href="http://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3456558&postcount=10945">comment number 10945</a>) provided the lead for this essay.<br />
<br />
<b>References</b>
<br />
<ol>
<li><a href="http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report/">Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety</a> -The Accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations- submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency Jun 7, 2011.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report2/">Additional Report of Japanese Government to IAEA</a> - Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations
Transmitted by Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, Government of Japan, 15 Sep 2011</li>
<li>Kimura S (Sep 24, 2011) <a href="http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ2011092411928">Cesium exceeding safety threshold detected in Fukushima rice</a>. Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo</li>
<li><i>NHK</i> World News (Jul 19 ,2011) <a href="http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/19_h21.html">Govt bans beef cattle shipments from Fukushima</a>. Japan Broadcasting Corporation, Tokyo.</li>
<li>The Japan Times Online (Oct 12, 2011) <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20111012x3.html">Yokohama finds high strontium-90 levels</a>. The Japan Times, Kyodo.</li>
<li>Kayen R, Collins BD, Abrahamson N, Ashford S, Brandenberg SJ, Cluff L, Dickenson S, Johnson L, Kabeyasawa T, Kawamata Y, Koumoto H, Marubashi N, Pujol S, Steele C, Sun J, Tanaka Y, Tokimatsu K, Tsai B, Yanev P, Yashinsky M, Yousok K (2007) <a href="http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2007/1365/of2007-1365.pdf">Investigation of the M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki, Japan, Earthquake of July 16, 2007: U.S. Geological Survey, Open File Report 2007-1365.</a></li>
<li>Measures taken by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency concerning the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, affected by the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake (<a href="http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/regulation/nuclearsafety/nuclearpowerreactor/topics/chuetsu/chuetsu.html">2nd Interim Report</a>), June 29, 2009, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency.</li>
<li>TEPCO Press Release (Jul 30, 2007) The (First) Report on the Analysis of Observed Seismic Data Collected in Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station on the Occasion of the Niigata-Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake in 2007. (<a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu07_e/images/070730e1.pdf">Appendix</a>)</li>
<li>Naeim F, Kircher CA (2001) <a href="http://peer2.berkeley.edu/ngawest2_wg/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Naeim-Kircher-2001.pdf">On the damping adjustment factors for earthquake response spectra</a>. Struct Design Tall Build 10: 361–369.</li>
<li>Gaku, S (2010) <a href="http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/4_sessionC/C-13.pdf">Experience of NCO Earthquake and Restart of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP</a>. 1<sup>st</sup> Kashiwazaki International Symposium on Seismic Safety of Nuclear Installations and Embedded Topical Meetings: C-13.</li>
<li>Antaki G, Johnson J (2011) <a href="http://www.bechtns.com/Content.aspx?cid=195&lvl=3">Seismic design and retrofit of essential systems in nuclear power plants</a>. Becht Nuclear Services.</li>
<li>Ochiai, K, Kobayashi K, Chigama A (2010) <a href="http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/4_sessionC/C-24.pdf">Damage Indicating Parameters and Damage Modes of Mechanical Components</a>. 1<sup>st</sup> Kashiwazaki International Symposium on Seismic Safety of Nuclear Installations and Embedded Topical Meetings: C-24.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report2/">Additional Report of Japanese Government to IAEA</a> - Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations
Transmitted by Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, Government of Japan, 15 Sep. 2011.</li>
<li>Leith W (2011) <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/slides/2011/20110914/slides-leith.pdf">Comments on the Japan Near-Term Task Force Report.</a></li>
<li>Joe Dwinell J, Sherman N (Aug 23 ,2011) <a href="http://www.bostonherald.com/news/regional/view.bg?articleid=1360831">Virginia quake shakes up Boston</a>. The Boston Herald, Boston.</li>
<li>Campbell KW, Bozorgnia Y (2010) <a href="http://peer.berkeley.edu/publications/peer_reports/reports_2010/webR_PEER10_102_Campbell_Bozorgnia.pdf">Analysis of cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) and JMA instrumental seismic intensity (I<sub>JMA</sub>) using the PEER-NGA strong motion database.</a> PEER 102.</li>
<li>CBS 6 WTVR News (Aug. 25, 2011) <a href="http://www.wtvr.com/videobeta/1a0ae718-372c-4986-84e1-d940ddfd1470/News/Mineral-residents-concerned-about-Nuclear-power-plant">Mineral residents concerned about nuclear power plant</a>. WTVR CBS 6 Richmond.</li>
</ol>
<b>Related Posts</b>
<br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://brainmindinst.blogspot.com/2011/07/fukushima-failure-by-design.html">Fukushima: Failure by Design</a></li>
<li><a href="http://brainmindinst.blogspot.com/2011/05/enigma-of-1-fukushima-4.html">The Enigma of 1 Fukushima 4 号機</a></li>
<li><a href="http://brainmindinst.blogspot.com/2011/05/fukushima-failure-of-mind.html">Fukushima: Failure of the Mind</a></li>
<li><a href="http://brainmindinst.blogspot.com/2011/03/ionizing-radiation-mind.html">Ionizing Radiation & The Mind</a></li>
</ul>
<b>Addenda</b>
<br />
<ul>
<li>In response to the comment to this essay, I provide a Google-maps image of North Anna NPS. Looking over the station's lay-out, I find it difficult to conceive that Lake Anna does not represent the ultimate heat sink for the station as the commenter claims. I leave the decision to the experts (06/12/2011).</li>
</ul>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0twN0JS6VLUwL8i19QQmOboRu9bP66RM01ODkcB8gvUgjRiB52J47b8M97PfvYeCOejBy-zGciWM9sOanVlgr2LTcs7axqj4yS5jGqQGQXKInpRA0HzZPtn71qqE-NumZtIRR0GrTtUPx/s1600/North_Anna_NPS.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="270" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0twN0JS6VLUwL8i19QQmOboRu9bP66RM01ODkcB8gvUgjRiB52J47b8M97PfvYeCOejBy-zGciWM9sOanVlgr2LTcs7axqj4yS5jGqQGQXKInpRA0HzZPtn71qqE-NumZtIRR0GrTtUPx/s400/North_Anna_NPS.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Bird's eye view of North Anna NPS. Note Lake Anna and two separate small bodies of water on the premises of the station that could potentially serve as the ultimate heat sink (courtesy Google maps).</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<ul>
<li>Listen to <a href="http://www.wvtf.org/">WVTF Radio IQ</a>'s <a href="http://www.wvtf.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=869:evening-edition-for-november-22nd-2011&catid=51:evening-edition&Itemid=149">Evening Edition for Nov. 22, 2011</a>. There are three contributions. In the second contribution, Beverly Amsler interviews <a href="http://www.vt.edu/">Virginia Tech</a> seismologist James Martin about the after-effects of the Aug. 23, 2011, Virginia Earthquake. Dr. Martin's assessment suggests that it would be only prudent to retrofit all nuclear power stations on the Northeastern Seaboard with automatic seismic scram systems like nuclear power stations in Japan. The broadcast can be heard with the embedded mp3-player below (06/01/2012):
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<div style="color: #aaaaaa; font: 10px Arial,sans-serif;">
Hosted by <a href="http://kiwi6.com/" style="color: #999999;">kiwi6.com file hosting</a>.
<a href="http://kiwi6.com/file/oin7v21fsz" style="color: #999999;">Download mp3</a> - <a href="http://kiwi6.com/">Free File Hosting</a>.</div>
</div>
</li>
<li> The damage rendering the emergency core cooling systems of the reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS inoperable seems to have been mainly inflicted by flooding because of the tsunami. According to <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsunamis_in_lakes">wikipedia</a>, tsunamis do not occur in oceans alone, but can also be generated in lakes by fault displacement beneath or around the body of water, resulting in earthquakes of 4.0 magnitude or greater.</li>
</ul><div class="blogger-post-footer"><div align="center"><iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=12&l=ur1&category=amazonhomepage&f=ifr" width="300" height="250" scrolling="no" border="0" marginwidth="0" style="border:none;" frameborder="0"></iframe>
</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-14886406895002703752011-10-10T09:59:00.000-05:002011-10-10T09:59:39.180-05:00The True Speed of Our NetHave you ever wondered what internet speed your provider truly delivers. According to this google gadget, the speed in our home is a fraction of the promise. Test it yourself and be surprised!
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-35103144344131491092010-11-23T13:02:00.023-06:002015-06-24T12:59:47.860-05:00Kinect on OSX Snow Leopard<div align="center"><object data="http://www.reuters.com/resources_v2/flash/video_embed.swf?videoId=165735780" height="259" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" width="460"><param name="movie" value="http://www.reuters.com/resources_v2/flash/video_embed.swf?videoId=165735780"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowScriptAccess" value="always"></param><param name="wmode" value="transparent"><embed src="http://www.reuters.com/resources_v2/flash/video_embed.swf?videoId=165735780" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowfullscreen="true" allowScriptAccess="always" width="460" height="259" wmode="transparent"></embed></object><br />
Exhilarating Madness!</div><br />
<iframe align="left" frameborder="0" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://rcm-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/cm?lt1=_blank&bc1=none&IS2=1&bg1=none&fc1=000000&lc1=0000FF&t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=8&l=as1&m=amazon&f=ifr&md=10FE9736YVPPT7A0FBG2&asins=B002BSA298" style="height: 240px; width: 120px;"></iframe>Microsoft's <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B002BSA298?ie=UTF8&tag=petrevpropro-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B002BSA298">XB360 Kinect Sensor</a><img alt="" border="0" height="1" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=petrevpropro-20&l=as2&o=1&a=B002BSA298" style="border: medium none ! important; margin: 0px ! important;" width="1" /> reached the market the other day to enrich games on the <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B003O6JJKY?ie=UTF8&tag=petrevpropro-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B003O6JJKY">Microsoft Xbox 360 Console</a><img alt="" border="0" height="1" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=petrevpropro-20&l=as2&o=1&a=B003O6JJKY" style="border: medium none ! important; margin: 0px ! important;" width="1" /> with biological motion detection and superb three-dimensional enhancements. Kinect has received good marks to date. The possibility of creating three-dimensional images with Kinect caught my eye yesterday in a post with the title "<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/22/technology/22hack.html">With Kinect Controller, Hackers Take Liberties</a>" by Jenna Wortham published online in The New York Times Nov. 21, 2010. The potentials are intriguing. Watch Oliver Kreylos' demonstration below:<br />
<br />
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I decided to give this a try and compile the software driver needed to run the sensor on a MacBook running Snow Leopard (OSX 10.6.5). Sean Nicholls provides useful information in his post with the title "<a href="http://www.spoofscript.com/blog/?p=327">Compiling OpenKinect on a stubborn OSX 10.6.5 (Updated 21/Nov)</a>", first published Nov. 13, 2010. Sean's instructions are straight forward, leading to a functional application that provides as with a simple start. Below I added a few annotations that may be helpful to the novice builder.<br />
<br />
In order to obtain the source codes and compile them into binaries, we need to install the packages 'git' (<a href="http://code.google.com/p/git-osx-installer/downloads/detail?name=git-1.7.3.2-intel-leopard.dmg&can=2&q=">git-1.7.3.2-intel-leopard.dmg</a>) and 'cmake' (<a href="http://www.cmake.org/files/v2.8/cmake-2.8.3-Darwin-universal.dmg">cmake-2.8.3-Darwin-universal.dmg</a>), respectively. Both can be downloaded ready for installation from the links Sean provides in his post. Note that third party unix programs traditionally are installed into the directory /usr/local. The header files needed for compiling other packages are installed in the directory /usr/local/include. Compiled executable binaries will be installed in /usr/local/bin. Libraries will be found in /usr/local/lib, and files with information to be shared in /usr/local/share. This is the default map for the directory tree of all installs that conform to <a href="http://www.gnu.org/">GNU</a> conventions.<br />
<br />
However, some software designers prefer to have their packages installed into their own directory tree in a separate subdirectory to /usr/local. This is the case with 'git'. We will find the package in /usr/local/git. If we wish to use 'git' commands in a terminal without providing the full path where they are located each time, we must add this path to our environmental PATH variable just so:<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;"><li><b>export PATH="$PATH:/usr/local/git/bin</b></li>
</ul>If we now type:<br />
<ul><li><b>echo $PATH</b></li>
</ul>The terminal should print a colon-separated chain of bin directory paths ending with /usr/local/git/bin.<br />
<br />
The next package to install is 'cmake'. The installer will prompt us to provide a directory where to install the executables; the default is /usr/bin. This is a directory for commands that the operating system uses. To avoid mixing system commands with others, I chose /usr/local/bin according to the above conventions. Again we add /usr/local/bin to our PATH variable as suggested above. Then we create a folder for the driver application, change to this directory in the terminal in which we previously set the PATH variable, and follow Sean's further instructions.<br />
<br />
Note our additions to the PATH variable pertain only to this terminal window and are lost when we close it. To make them permanent, we need to edit the PATH variable listed in the .bashrc file in our home directory. But this is not strictly necessary for our purpose here.<br />
<br />
Sean instructs us to download the sources for two packages that we must compile ourselves, using <b>git</b>: OpenKinect and LibUSB. The first depends on the latter. Hence, LibUSB must be patched for the use with Openkinect, built and installed first, using the OSX generic <b>make</b> command. Note that the package will install into the appropriate subdirectories of /usr/local.<br />
<br />
In the next step, we build OpenKinect, more precisely libfreenect, with <b>cmake</b>. The compiler needs to be pointed to the header files that come with LibUSB. This is accomplished with providing /usr/local/include/usblib-1.0/ on the appropriate line in the cmake configuration gui opened using the <b>ccmake</b> command as Sean illustrates. After cmake has configured the build successfully, we compile the package using the <b>make</b> command.<br />
<br />
In my configuration, the build also needed to have the path to libjpeg specified, in order to successfully complete its last stage known as linking. The compiler complaint reads:<br />
<div style="color: red;">Linking C executable as3-server</div>ld: library not found for -lJPEG<br />
<br />
In OSX, this library is located in: /System/Library/Frameworks/ApplicationServices.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/ImageIO.framework/Versions/A/Resources/. There must be ways to configure cmake with this path, probably by adding "-framework ApplicationServices -framework CoreFoundation" to the LDFLAGS variable. Proper configuration is crucial, if we wish to deploy our binaries to other systems. Because I was not planning to deploy the binaries, I decided to avoid re-configuration. Since the compiler always checks /usr/local/lib, I helped myself with providing a soft link in /usr/local/lib to the library's true location just so:<br />
<ul><li><b>sudo ln -s /System/Library/Frameworks/ApplicationServices.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/ImageIO.framework/Versions/A/Resources/libJPEG.dylib /usr/local/lib/libJPEG.dylib</b></li>
</ul>With the repeat of the <b>make</b> step the build finished successfully and was ready to install.<br />
<br />
<b>Addenda</b><br />
<ul><li>I just received the Kinect and have been running a test for close to one hour without fail (11/29/10).</li>
</ul><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfdTjFnhK4l2neB6Ed9NNWIzJu6JPSZpPbfMYwd0aveDOE-WDi7Qo2UsXk-dRUc8_0BnSexjqLZre3DX91eX2hVmu3v6OtJOXVHYyBK2Am1oi1j9mp3YNUy4JpTQHCb566BvexCxxXCklg/s1600/konnect_try.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="126" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfdTjFnhK4l2neB6Ed9NNWIzJu6JPSZpPbfMYwd0aveDOE-WDi7Qo2UsXk-dRUc8_0BnSexjqLZre3DX91eX2hVmu3v6OtJOXVHYyBK2Am1oi1j9mp3YNUy4JpTQHCb566BvexCxxXCklg/s320/konnect_try.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Kinect on the Mac</td></tr>
</tbody></table><ul><li>The next step to more functionality entails hooking the kinect video stream up to an Actionscript3 flash server. The openkinect package provides help. Juan Carlos del Valle posted a video of the procedure to be followed with the title "<a href="http://www.freenect.com/kinect-now-accessible-from-flash">Kinect now accessible from Flash</a>" on the Freenect - Kinect projects site. The video moves along at a fast clip. I had to review the steps over and over again. Below I wrote out a step-by-step protocol of the procedure.<br />
<br />
Juan uses two <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adobe_Flash_ActionScript_File">Adobe Flash ActionScript</a> files named <b>test_depth.as</b> and <b>test_rgb.as</b> which can be found in the <b>libfreenect/actionscript</b> directory. We need to download <a href="http://www.adobe.com/cfusion/entitlement/index.cfm?e=flex4sdk">Adobe flex SDK_2.4</a> from the Adobe <a href="http://flex.org/">flex.org</a> site to accomplish this. Once unzipped, we move the folder to our preferred location. The folder contains a bin-directory that is home to the <a href="http://livedocs.adobe.com/flex/3/html/help.html?content=compilers_13.html"><b>mxmlc</b></a> executable we need to use. Hence, it is helpful to add the path to this bin-directory to our PATH variable on the command line in the terminal window, as we added paths to bin-directories earlier. Then, we change into 'libfreenect/actionscript' directory using the <b>cd</b> command and type:<br />
<br />
<ul><li> <b>mxmlc test_depth.as</b></li>
</ul><br />
With a little delay the terminal will respond:<br />
"Loading configuration file {your path}t/flex_sdk_4.1/frameworks/flex-config.xml<br />
{your path}/kinekt/libfreenect/actionscript/test_depth.as: Warning: This compilation unit did not have a factoryClass specified in Frame metadata to load the configured runtime shared libraries. To compile without runtime shared libraries either set the -static-link-runtime-shared-libraries option to true or remove the -runtime-shared-libraries option."<br />
<br />
Juan Carlos ignored the message. The command produces the file <b>test_depth.swf</b> in the same directory. We repeat the last step for test_rgb.as to generate <b>test_rgb.swf</b>. <br />
<br />
Next we need to start the Actionscript3 flash server. The subdirectory 'libfreenect/c/build/examples' containing the <b>glview</b> executable which generated the twin view in our earlier work is also home to the <b>as3-server</b> excecutable. Because I had not added this directory to my PATH variable, I changed into it and typed:<br />
<br />
<ul><li> <b>./as3-server</b></li>
</ul><br />
The terminal responded:<br />
Number of devices found: 1<br />
### Wait depth client<br />
### Wait rgb client<br />
### Wait data client<br />
<br />
Opening test_rgb in my browser produced a live test image for color beginning with the comment:<br />
### Got rgb client<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhzsRuXxLIhmCPbWz_vuUnEkGZMTQgLbcnVU1b7d09OR10dUgmClxOMd-SsKnpEQmfOHEOB4dygRkTCVxyBcONs1vzCuYsBwHV3qFGwx7j8f9vj8EYknqv39HvYWrWCRDsb0pSBseuO7gfR/s1600/test_rgb.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="237" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhzsRuXxLIhmCPbWz_vuUnEkGZMTQgLbcnVU1b7d09OR10dUgmClxOMd-SsKnpEQmfOHEOB4dygRkTCVxyBcONs1vzCuYsBwHV3qFGwx7j8f9vj8EYknqv39HvYWrWCRDsb0pSBseuO7gfR/s320/test_rgb.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br />
We kill the server with <b>ctr C</b>, and restart it with:<br />
<ul><li> <b>./as3-server</b></li>
</ul>Then we opening test_depth.swf in our browser, producing a live image for depth beginning with the comment:<br />
### Got depth client<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiHAkORxIBIOnUQbgdpRi2k-LUPqqvzWMXHqpa-G475jwMkgOOk16RjTABMx5qTPE5x2t1Hh5qVOcUxSjbV0ExK8a83meE8UftuoOdzV2_f6xJg2PWbuywzdRnYMbUdm2h6UCaNztyBybQn/s1600/test_depth.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="190" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiHAkORxIBIOnUQbgdpRi2k-LUPqqvzWMXHqpa-G475jwMkgOOk16RjTABMx5qTPE5x2t1Hh5qVOcUxSjbV0ExK8a83meE8UftuoOdzV2_f6xJg2PWbuywzdRnYMbUdm2h6UCaNztyBybQn/s320/test_depth.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br />
However, note that the red channel is not working. I am investigating (12/01/10).</li>
</ul><ul><li>The red channel works with as3-server built using a current libfreenect clone obtained with: <br />
<ul><li><b>git clone git://github.com/imekinox/openkinect.git</b></li>
</ul>In order to prompt <b>cmake</b> to include as3-server in the build, we must first change the target option for as3-server in CMakeLists.txt to "ON" (12/07/10).<br />
</li>
</ul><div align="center"><a href="http://click.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/click?id=zD8V87uy2II&offerid=20738.10000047&type=4&subid=0"><img alt="textbookx.com (Akademos, Inc.)" border="0" src="http://www.textbookx.com/img/fgames_banner.jpg" /></a><img border="0" height="1" src="http://ad.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/show?id=zD8V87uy2II&bids=20738.10000047&type=4&subid=0" width="1" /></div><div align="center"><iframe border="0" frameborder="0" height="60" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://rcm-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=42&l=ur1&category=amazon3d101&banner=18FTPZ5Z33S9V15VRJ82&m=amazon&f=ifr" style="border: medium none;" width="234"></iframe></div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><div align="center"><iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=12&l=ur1&category=amazonhomepage&f=ifr" width="300" height="250" scrolling="no" border="0" marginwidth="0" style="border:none;" frameborder="0"></iframe>
</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-47129011059072566832010-09-26T10:21:00.050-05:002015-06-24T13:00:21.481-05:00The Stuxnet Worm, Windows & The InternetA malware known as Stuxnet has attracted major media attention in recent days. This software inserts itself into computer systems using <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/en/us/default.aspx">Microsoft Windows</a>, <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/windows/internet-explorer/default.aspx">Microsoft Explorer</a>, and WinCC developed by the German electrical engineering giant <a href="http://www.usa.siemens.com/entry/en/index.htm?stc=27">Siemens AG</a>. The latter piece of software is a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA, application named Simatic S-7 that controls large scale industrial processes like power plants.<br />
<br />
Stuxnet is a type of computer worm. That is, the program self-installs executable files that can be hidden on a USB flash memory stick or hard drive to the host computer. Subsequently, the executables are capable of transferring other files through the internet, if a connection is available. Stuxnet checks for narrowly specified system configurations and only acts if WinCC is running. Therefore, its mission consists of taking control of only a small number of exclusive targets. <br />
<br />
An East European security firm was first to report Stuxnet last July. The worm is believed to have been active for about a year and has caused considerable disruptions in Asia, notably Iran. Potentially, the program may be capable of disrupting plant operations leading up to the destruction of the facilities. Its release is considered the first discovered cyber attack meant not only to disrupt information technology, but furthermore destroy capabilities. <br />
<br />
The Chertoff Group's internet security expert David Falkenrath provides interesting insights on Stuxnet's impact and its ramifications in this interview by Bloomberg's Deidre Bolton entitled "<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/video/63225920/">Virus May Target Nuke Plant</a>" aired Sep. 24, 2010.<br />
<br />
<div align="center" border="0" height="336" width="400">
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<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/video/63225920/">Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, Iran (Bloomberg, 2010)</a></span></div>
</div>
<br />
Supposedly the vulnerabilities in Microsoft Explorer exploited by Stuxnet have been plugged. What may be of interest to the common user is that the worm used Microsoft approved security signatures from the network interface card chipset maker <a href="http://www.realtek.com.tw/">Realtek</a> and the flash memory controller developer <a href="http://www.realtek.com.tw/">JMicron</a> to install its files via the internet in the disguise of seemingly legitimate Microsoft-certified driver updates.<br />
<br />
We should be safe as long as we keep our system and browser up to date with the latest security patches and avoid legacy hardware with obsolete drivers. That is, we should upgrade to the newest generation of internet adapter cards and regularly update the drivers, downloading directly from manufacturer sites.<br />
<br />
<b>Addenda</b><br />
<ul>
<li>In 2007, a large-scale bribery scandal broke in Germany, implicating Siemens AG's business in Southeast Asia. By 2008, a number of employees involved in this affair were let go. It only takes one disgruntled software engineer with intricate knowledge of the SCADA program running the targeted facility, maybe with the help of one or two other hackers knowledgeable in Microsoft Explorer and USB driver vulnerabilities, to accomplish Stuxnet in revenge. Perhaps, Iran is a clever diversion, Siemens already paid, and we never find out the actually intended target (10/04/10).</li>
<li>According to William J. Broad and David E. Sanger's article with the title "<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/world/middleeast/19stuxnet.html">Worm Was Perfect for Sabotaging Centrifuges</a>" published online in the New York Times today, recent results from the ongoing examination of Stuxnet code suggest that the worm was meant to target the speed control of ultra-centrifuges as those used for uranium enrichment, revving up their speeds to destructive levels. Since the implicated controllers were identified as products manufactured by companies in Finland and Iran, uranium enrichment facilities in Iran may have been the target (11/18/10).</li>
<li>According to William Broad, John Markoff and David Sanger's article with the title "<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html">Israel Tests on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay</a>" published online in The New York Times yesterday, more signs point to Israel and the U.S. as Stuxnet's originators with centrifuges in Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment plant as the target (01/16/11).</li>
<li>John Markoff reports in his article with the title "<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/science/13stuxnet.html">Malware Aimed at Iran Hit Five Sites, Report Says</a>" posted online Feb. 11, 2011, that according to a Symantec study Stuxnet may have infiltrated as many as five Iranian institutions in three, possibly four, waves (01/13/11).</li>
<li>Listen to KCRW TO THE POINT's Warren Olney interview David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security, on Stuxnet's effects in Iran 44 minutes into today's show with the title "A New Paradigm in the Middle East". According to Albright, Stuxnet disrupted the Iranian uranium enrichment program noticeably, but only in small ways. The greater threat may lie in the potential of adversaries using the worm, now public, as prototype for future attacks elsewhere (02/16/11). <br />
<object height="268" width="424"><param name="movie" value="http://www.kcrw.com/news/programs/tp/tp110216a_new_paradigm_in_th/embed-audio">
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<embed src="http://www.kcrw.com/news/programs/tp/tp110216a_new_paradigm_in_th/embed-audio" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" wmode="transparent" width="424" height="268"></embed></object></li>
<li>According to Noah Shachtman's WIRED report with the title "<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/10/tech/innovation/virus-hits-drone-fleet-wired/index.html?hpt=hp_t2">Computer virus hits U.S. drone fleet</a>" published online on CNN today, U.S. drones have been infected with a tracking virus, possibly through USB flash memory devices. This is not quite stuxnet yet, but a first step seems taken (10/10/11).</li>
<li><iframe align="left" frameborder="0" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://rcm-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/cm?lt1=_blank&bc1=none&IS2=1&npa=1&bg1=none&fc1=000000&lc1=0000FF&t=petsblo00-20&o=1&p=8&l=as4&m=amazon&f=ifr&ref=ss_til&asins=0307718026" style="height: 240px; width: 120px;"></iframe>According to David Sanger's article with the title "<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html">Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran</a>" published online in The New York Times today, U.S. officials unofficially admitted that U.S. intelligence agencies created Stuxnet in collaboration with Israeli cyber warfare specialists to destroy ultra-centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran. The article is scant on detail and Sanger's book <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0307718026/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=petsblo00-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0307718026">"Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power"</a><img alt="" border="0" height="1" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=petsblo00-20&l=as2&o=1&a=0307718026" style="border: none !important; margin: 0px !important;" width="1" /> to be published next week may be more illuminating (06/01/2012).
</li>
</ul>
<b>Related Posts</b><br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2009/04/windows-7-qemu-internet.html">Windows 7, Qemu & the Internet </a></li>
</ul>
<b>Sources</b><br />
<ul>
<li>ako (07/28/08) <a href="http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3517817,00.html">Siemens-Prozess: Erstes Urteil im Schmiergeld-Skandal</a>. Deutsche Welle.</li>
<li>Gjelten T (09/27/2010) <a href="http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130162219">Who's Behind Cyber-Worm Targeting Iran</a>? National Public Radio's <i>All Things Considered</i>.</li>
<li>Gorman S (/09/27/10) <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704082104575515581009698978.html">Computer Worm Hits Iran Power Plant</a>. The Wall Street Journal.</li>
<li>Gorman S, Fidler S (09/25/10) <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703793804575511961264943300.html">Cyber Attacks Test Pentagon, Allies and Foes</a>. The Wall Street Journal.</li>
<li>Li P (08/22/07) <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/english/business/221736.htm">Siemens China Linked to Bribery Scandal</a>. China.org.cn.</li>
<li>Maclean W (09/24/10) <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68N2DY20100924">Cyber attack appears to target Iran: tech firms</a>. Reuters.</li>
<li>Richmond R (09/24/10) <a href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/malware-hits-computerized-industrial-equipment/">Malware Hits Computerized Industrial Equipment</a>. The New York Times.</li>
<li>Sanger, DE (09/25/10) <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/world/middleeast/26iran.html">Iran Fights Malware Attacking Computers</a>. The New York Times.</li>
<li>S.T. (09/24/10) <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/09/stuxnet_worm">A cyber-missile aimed at Iran?</a> The Economist.</li>
</ul>
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-34967520595471005912010-09-15T09:21:00.009-05:002015-06-24T13:01:13.411-05:00Solar Power: Way to Go!We own a 12.0-inch diameter, 9.0-inch high urn-shaped fountain carved from limestone by the Tennessee artist <a href="http://scottwisesculptor.com/">Scott Wise</a>. The fountain features a round shallow indentation on top into which water needs to be pumped slowly through a 0.5-inch center bore to feed a gentle, steady glistening pour over the ledge and down the sides of the rugged surface of the stone. <br />
<br />
<iframe align="left" frameborder="0" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://rcm-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/cm?lt1=_blank&bc1=none&IS2=1&bg1=none&fc1=000000&lc1=0000FF&t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=8&l=as1&m=amazon&f=ifr&md=10FE9736YVPPT7A0FBG2&asins=B0002HFTKW" style="height: 240px; width: 120px;"></iframe>I set the fountain on two weathered brownstones in a 14.5-inch diameter, 4.0-inch deep pan sold for changing automotive oil, threaded a plastic hose through the center bore, sealed it with <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B000S7ZSTS?ie=UTF8&tag=petrevpropro-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B000S7ZSTS">Macco Adhesives LN903 Liquid Nails Heavy-Duty Construction and Remodeling Adhesive</a><img alt="" border="0" height="1" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=petrevpropro-20&l=as2&o=1&a=B000S7ZSTS" style="border: medium none ! important; margin: 0px ! important;" width="1" />, and connected it to a small pump nestled between the stones. I balanced the fountain stone with small flat river stones to allow the water flow down evenly on all sides. The pan holds more than enough water for the fountain to perform properly. However, owing to evaporation we need to top the water in the pan at least once a week to protect the pump from overheating. If we live in a dry climate, we need to check more regularly. At our first home, I used a pump fed by a power line laid underground in 0.75-inch diameter PVC tubing. I had to dig a foot-deep trench from our home across the entire yard. The job meant considerable work for a small flow of water.<br />
<br />
<iframe align="left" frameborder="0" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://rcm-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/cm?lt1=_blank&bc1=none&IS2=1&bg1=none&fc1=000000&lc1=0000FF&t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=8&l=as1&m=amazon&f=ifr&md=10FE9736YVPPT7A0FBG2&asins=B002KMCBLM" style="height: 240px; width: 120px;"></iframe>To minimize the effort at the fountain's new location, I opted for a solar-powered pump which I purchased from Shore Power Inc. / <a href="http://batteryjunction.com/">BatteryJunction.com</a>.<br />
<br />
Power is generated with a 5.875-inch by 9.625-inch solar panel that can be installed at a distance from the fountain. The pump is equipped with a 14-foot long power cable. Where we live in the Southeastern U.S., the setup works great. However, the panel's effective angle is narrow; it must face the sun directly to produce the greatest power. We had to place it in the sunniest spot of our yard. Perhaps, mounting the panel on top of a wind-up clockwork that turns it along the sun's course is worth a consideration. Regardless, the smallest cloud blocking the sun will shut the fountain down. Despite, I got used to the intermissions, enjoying the sight of the bubbling little flow glistening in the sunlight as an affirmation that solar power does work indeed. However, if we wish to power our home with solar panels, it must be located in a particularly sunny spot, we probably need plenty panel surface, and the panels must be oriented such that a sufficient number face the sun at any time of the day. My small experiment is supposed to constitute an affordable test, informing us on the costs we may have to anticipate, if we aspire to convert our home.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<br />
<b>Addenda</b><br />
<ul>
<li>Solar power windows sound like a great idea. Watch this Reuters report (08/11/2011):</li>
</ul>
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<ul>
<li>Listen to this broadcast by Laura Krantz and Nicole Beemsterboer with the title "<a href="http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/10/03/162187622/colorado-voters-get-revved-up-over-energy-policy">Colorado Voters get Revved Up Over Energy Policy</a>" aired on National Public Radio's Morning Edition today. The New Belgium Brewing Co. in Fort Collins, CO, known for Fat Tire Beer, has got ideas on energy conservation worth pondering (10/3/2012).<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhvtj_hnPvxuxyQ1qS-wigAB77BO8U9lQg-GxDOJDBUofnczzY-hAUn-1HVI-ZBZItH9d7OEmF0ghg4lG3UdzAFWD-Um3y2j43ETAZ1K32QOloY8EyP0KOQ_fqoobkeFEFeuwXm-9Q847x6/s1600/MyNewBelgiumBikePhoto.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="251" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhvtj_hnPvxuxyQ1qS-wigAB77BO8U9lQg-GxDOJDBUofnczzY-hAUn-1HVI-ZBZItH9d7OEmF0ghg4lG3UdzAFWD-Um3y2j43ETAZ1K32QOloY8EyP0KOQ_fqoobkeFEFeuwXm-9Q847x6/s320/MyNewBelgiumBikePhoto.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
</li>
</ul>
<br />
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-54702983981444226062010-01-06T10:07:00.008-06:002015-06-24T13:01:41.642-05:00Nexus One: The Google PhoneWith Google's Nexus One officially introduced to the world yesterday, a new potent competitor has entered the highly-contested smartphone market. I won't comment much on the phone's features. Nexus One appears to be a solid product based on Google's <a href="http://www.android.com/">Android</a> operating system and Google applications not unlike the <a href="http://phones.verizonwireless.com/motorola/droid/#/home">Droid</a> introduced late last year. However, while the Droid is only available locked in with a particular cell phone service provider, the customer will be free to choose a plan to her/his liking with the Nexus One. <br />
<br />
By contrast to their strongest competitor, Apple's <a href="http://www.apple.com/iphone/">iPhone</a>, Android-based smartphones are open to <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_%28programming_language%29">Java</a> programming. This constitutes a great advantage for application developers. However, beware! The libraries are restricted. Conventional Java applications will not run without major tweaking.<br />
<br />
The footage below highlights last week's news development on the issue: <br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;"><b>Review (01/05/10)</b></div><div align="center"><object height="284" id="wsj_fp" width="400"><param name="movie" value="http://s.wsj.net/media/swf/main.swf"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><param name="flashvars" value="videoGUID={CC1A608F-7C23-4886-8F1F-4A312DEAF344}&playerid=1000&plyMediaEnabled=1&configURL=http://wsj.vo.llnwd.net/o28/players/&autoStart=false" base="http://s.wsj.net/media/swf/"name="flashPlayer"></param><embed src="http://s.wsj.net/media/swf/main.swf" bgcolor="#FFFFFF"flashVars="videoGUID={CC1A608F-7C23-4886-8F1F-4A312DEAF344}&playerid=1000&plyMediaEnabled=1&configURL=http://wsj.vo.llnwd.net/o28/players/&autoStart=false" base="http://s.wsj.net/media/swf/" name="flashPlayer" width="400" height="284" seamlesstabbing="false" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" swLiveConnect="true" pluginspage="http://www.macromedia.com/shockwave/download/index.cgi?P1_Prod_Version=ShockwaveFlash"></embed></object></div><br />
<div style="text-align: center;"><b>Revelation (01/05/10)</b></div><div align="center"><object data="http://static.reuters.com/resources/flash/include_video_aculios.swf?edition=UK&videoId=23976503" height="327" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" width="400"><param name="wmode" value="transparent" /><param name="movie" value="http://www.reuters.com/resources/flash/include_video_aculios.swf?edition=UK&videoId=23976503" /><embed src="http://www.reuters.com/resources/flash/include_video_aculios.swf?edition=UK&videoId=23976503" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" wmode="transparent" width="400" height="327"></embed></object></div><br />
<div style="text-align: center;"><b>Rumor (12/31/09)</b></div><div align="center"><object height="327" width="400"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/hvzxZ8tOBcQ&hl=en_US&fs=1&color1=0x234900&color2=0x4e9e00&border=1"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/hvzxZ8tOBcQ&hl=en_US&fs=1&color1=0x234900&color2=0x4e9e00&border=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="400" height="327"></embed></object></div><br />
<b>Addenda</b><br />
<ul><li>Alexei Oreskovic reported in his post entitled "<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6494UO20100510">Google's Android takes No 2 spot from iPhone</a>" on Reuters yesterday that according to <a href="http://www.npd.com/">NPD Group</a> market research Google's Android has become at 28 percent market share the second most prevalent smartphone operating system in the U.S. after <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbian_OS">Symbian</a> used on Blackberry (36 percent market share) in this year's first quarter, displacing Apple's IPhone using OS X (21 percent market share). The figure comprises all phones running Android. Google's own Nexus One has not had such great success yet (05/11/10).</li>
<li>According to Doug Gross' CNN post today entitled "<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/mobile/07/19/nexus.one.discontinued/index.html?hpt=T2">Google quietly kills its once-hyped Nexus One phone</a>", Google Inc. decided to stop selling its own smartphone Nexus One entirely because of sluggish sales. Nexus One uses Google's Android operating system. Other smartphones with the same operating system like <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B003HC8NUW?ie=UTF8&tag=petrevpropro-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B003HC8NUW">HTC's Droid Incredible</a><img alt="" border="0" height="1" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=petrevpropro-20&l=as2&o=1&a=B003HC8NUW" style="border: medium none ! important; margin: 0px ! important;" width="1" /> are selling briskly, and Google will maintain full support for the operating system (07/19/10).</li>
</ul><iframe align="center" border="0" frameborder="0" height="60" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://rcm-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=13&l=ur1&category=wireless&banner=0SESQPYNEXXSWMYDWG02&f=ifr" style="border: medium none;" width="468"></iframe><div class="blogger-post-footer"><div align="center"><iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=12&l=ur1&category=amazonhomepage&f=ifr" width="300" height="250" scrolling="no" border="0" marginwidth="0" style="border:none;" frameborder="0"></iframe>
</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-79815652842106133002009-11-25T16:18:00.013-06:002015-06-24T13:02:14.630-05:00A First Peek at Google's Chrome OSLast Thursday, <a href="http://www.google.com/corporate/">Google Inc.</a> introduced Chrome OS aka Chromium OS, to the public with quite considerable fanfare. The news enjoyed universal coverage in the media. Chromium OS is an operating system that the company is developing on its own as an open source effort. Sources and build directions are now easily accessible. <br />
<br />
I gave it try. In short, Chromium OS consists of a <a href="http://www.debian.org/">Debian</a>-derived operating system using a Linux 2.6 kernel and Google's Chrome browser. It is meant to run on personal computers with the i386 architecture with either 32- or 64-bit processors. With the packages Google includes, the compressed install image is roughly 800 megabytes in size and takes up 2.8 gigabytes of disk space expanded. <br />
<br />
The distribution is open to customization. Adding applications is possible. Only, the packages have to comply with the Debian distribution format. <br />
<br />
Obviously, Chrome OS is meant to run bare-bones on very thin clients. Non-essential applications and data are intended to be stored elsewhere in the cloud. The small footprint and, hopefully, the ensuing speed may harbor this operating system's greatest strengths, potentially turning Chrome OS into a powerful, cost-efficient tool for corporate users. <br />
<br />
In view of the current governmental push for patient record digitization, the health care sector appears particularly suited. I regularly visit a large academic outpatient clinic. Every examination room is equipped with a conventional stand-alone personal computer connected to an intranet. Across the entire hospital campus, these computers must number in the thousands. In such environment, thin clients appear superbly suited to drastically diminish cost for hardware, software and IT maintenance. Here, Chrome OS may provide a rich resource.<br />
<br />
The build instructions for Chrome OS on the <a href="http://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/chromium-os/building-chromium-os/build-instructions">Chromium project</a> site are straight forward. I compiled the system with <a href="http://www.ubuntu.com/">Ubuntu</a>'s Karmic Koala (9.10) hosted on a work station with two 64-bit <a href="http://www.amd.com/us-en/Processors/ProductInformation/0,,30_118_8796_9240,00.html">AMD Opteron 246</a> processors. The hardware is described in detail in my <a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2008/05/build-your-own-pc-episode-i.html">post</a> dated May 22, 2008. I opted not to compile the <a href="http://www.google.com/chrome/">Chrome browser</a> myself. Instead, I downloaded the pre-built package available from Google and copied it to the build directory as directed in the Chromium project documentation. Do not omit to provide a user name and a shared user password. They may be essential for log in and system administration later. <br />
<br />
The build process unfolded uneventful. However, complications arose, when I had to decide how to actually run the Chrome OS. <br />
<br />
<iframe align="left" frameborder="0" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://rcm-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/cm?lt1=_blank&bc1=none&IS2=1&npa=1&bg1=none&fc1=000000&lc1=0000FF&t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=8&l=as1&m=amazon&f=ifr&md=10FE9736YVPPT7A0FBG2&asins=B0017V8AW6" style="height: 240px; width: 120px;"></iframe>Google provides two options to ready the successful build for installation. One method uses a bootable USB 1-gigabyte flash memory drive, from which the system can be installed on a dedicated computer. For this procedure to work, USB devices have to be enabled in the boot list of the bios first. <br />
<br />
The other installation option bundles the build in a <a href="http://www.vmware.com/">VMware</a> image named ide.vmdk.<br />
<br />
Since I did not wish to dedicate a computer to testing Chrome OS quite yet, I chose this option. Eventually, I managed to install the image on a virtual personal computer emulated with <a href="http://www.qemu.org/">qemu-kvm</a> (version 0.11.0). Unfortunately, the emulation slows operations down considerably. Regardless, the procedure worked sufficiently fast for preliminary exploration. <br />
<br />
I used qemu with the following options on the command line to start the emulator:<br />
<ul><li><b>qemu-system-x86_64 -localtime -m 256 -vga std ide.vmdk</b></li>
</ul><br />
The screenshots below illustrate the sequence of steps I encountered starting up Chrome OS.<br />
<br />
After a successful boot, the system introduces itself with a login screen. <br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhzZq5D8PcB7-9kDn5Pqi5yDDUfhx7EbVHH23jiGgvxgMwoQq6HQsw0ZIECwGZl8u0j1ssh6unRt0NM0cYzTk_Ngt8ORd5t8jpMAzrkRSkbO9lDaLZbw89UmfQGQwi9TYwEsU_M9szzcfWO/s1600/Screenshot_chrome_2.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="250" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhzZq5D8PcB7-9kDn5Pqi5yDDUfhx7EbVHH23jiGgvxgMwoQq6HQsw0ZIECwGZl8u0j1ssh6unRt0NM0cYzTk_Ngt8ORd5t8jpMAzrkRSkbO9lDaLZbw89UmfQGQwi9TYwEsU_M9szzcfWO/s320/Screenshot_chrome_2.png" width="320" /></a></div>I used my preset shared user password to log in. After we are signed in successfully, the Chrome browser launches. automatically.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigosg5lIZnIcxBaTD3JOujArdhv36L8M357jcNhF6dBkA3lNTgFaP5F4SPuxMryy-JvjabcAXMuR6p-9_7ZRZV6XmbrskeLvt6grkUmoszdMdmQItkwZv3Z_nMbcDGKoMnZj0DHuy9EGou/s1600/Screenshot_chrome_3.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="248" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigosg5lIZnIcxBaTD3JOujArdhv36L8M357jcNhF6dBkA3lNTgFaP5F4SPuxMryy-JvjabcAXMuR6p-9_7ZRZV6XmbrskeLvt6grkUmoszdMdmQItkwZv3Z_nMbcDGKoMnZj0DHuy9EGou/s320/Screenshot_chrome_3.png" width="320" /></a></div>We may browse the web or start our web applications.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgT02JbLdo5c7mt5sjLsBeQFJg7oygVN0xeHsPt-L07v4ePNplBawuza5YAqbDzCmznYGeAdiuza8b_B_JqGm_TOrMxUqcYfd5YZdwfKKpu0ZEXwU73Fhbw87v3HETkYx8pcfrVVXMCEZl6/s1600/Screenshot_chrome_4.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="249" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgT02JbLdo5c7mt5sjLsBeQFJg7oygVN0xeHsPt-L07v4ePNplBawuza5YAqbDzCmznYGeAdiuza8b_B_JqGm_TOrMxUqcYfd5YZdwfKKpu0ZEXwU73Fhbw87v3HETkYx8pcfrVVXMCEZl6/s320/Screenshot_chrome_4.png" width="320" /></a></div>Not too bad at this point!<br />
<br />
Alas, I was not able to bring Chrome OS up to speed with qemu. I found a satisfactory solution in <a href="http://www.virtualbox.org/">virtualbox</a>. This emulator, however, does not accept the format of ide.vmdk. It has to be converted to vdi. The conversion takes two steps: We have to convert the Chrome OS vmdk image to a raw image with the suffix .bin with two commands in the directory where the image resides:<br />
<ol><li>We have toconvert the Chrome OS vmdk image to a raw image with the suffix .bin using <b>qemu-img convert ide.vmdk chrome_os.bin</b></li>
<li>Then, we convert the raw image into a vdi image using a virtualbox tool with the command <b>VBoxManage convertdd chrome_os.bin chrome_os.vdi</b></li>
</ol><br />
If we have not installed virtualbox yet, we shall be instructed to do so using sudo apt-get while trying to execute the second command.<br />
<br />
After opening the virtualbox graphic user interface with the command <b>virtualbox</b>, we attach the vdi image as a hard drive from the menu by clicking <b>Add</b> in the <b>Hard Disks</b> tab under <b>File</b> > <b>Virtual Media Manager</b>. We locate and select the chrome_os.vdi image and click <b>Open</b>. Once the image has been added to the list, we click <b>OK</b>, and continue to create the remaining virtual machine profile. I reserved <b>256 megabytes</b> as Base Memory. The operating system is <b>Linux</b>. The version is <b>2.6</b>. The rest is set by default or optional. Now, Chrome OS is ready for boot. <br />
<br />
Virtualbox is also available for Apple Macintosh computers with the intel architecture. Following the same steps as above, I successfully installed Chrome OS using the vdi image in virtualbox on a Mac Mini running OS X 10.5 (Leopard).<br />
<br />
The emulator runs Chrome OS on both computers surprisingly fast. <br />
<br />
<b>Addendum</b><br />
<ul><li>According to Stephen Shankland' s post with the title "<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/02/02/cnet.google.chrome.tablet/index.html?hpt=Sbin">Google shows off Chrome OS tablet ideas</a>" on CNET.com dated Dec. 29, 2009, that I found on CNN.com today, the ideal thin client running Chromium could be a tablet (02/07/10).</li>
</ul><b>Related Posts</b><br />
<ul><li><a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2008/05/build-your-own-pc-episode-i.html">Build your own PC: Episode I</a></li>
</ul><br />
<b>Related Links</b><br />
<ul><li>Alexei Oreskovic's report on Reuters entitled "<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSTRE5AI4UQ20091119">Google shows off Chrome operating system</a>" and dated Nov. 19, 2009.</li>
<li>Miguel Helft's article in The New York Times entitled "<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/technology/companies/20chrome.html">Google Offers Peek at Operating System, a Potential Challenge to Windows</a>" and dated Nov. 19, 2009.</li>
<li>Jessica Vascellaro and Scott Morrison's article in The Wall Street Journal entitled "<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704204304574545874128475870.html?mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTWhatsNews#articleTabs%3Darticle">Google Outlines Chrome OS Plans</a>" and dated Nov. 19, 2009.</li>
<li>David Goldman's post on CNN.Money.com with the title "<a href="http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/04/technology/apple_ipad_google_chrome/index.htm">Tablet wars: Google looks to take on Apple iPad</a>" dated Feb. 4, 2010.</li>
</ul><div align="center"><object width="400" height="321"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/p/BE177DE92B6CF7EF&hl=en_US&fs=1"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/p/BE177DE92B6CF7EF&hl=en_US&fs=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" width="400" height="321" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true"></embed></object></div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><div align="center"><iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=12&l=ur1&category=amazonhomepage&f=ifr" width="300" height="250" scrolling="no" border="0" marginwidth="0" style="border:none;" frameborder="0"></iframe>
</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-29757895128000111562009-11-23T11:32:00.014-06:002012-10-15T10:10:24.309-05:00Chinese Drywall: kleiner Hinweis!Auf Grund des rasanten Immobilienpreisverfalls in den amerikanischen Golfanrainerstaaten und des zur Zeit niedrigen Dollarkurses bereisen wachsende Zahlen deutscher Interessenten Florida auf der Suche nach günstigen Ferienbehausungen. <br />
<br />
Sollten Sie den Ankauf einer Immobilie in Florida ernsthaft in Erwägung ziehen, achten Sie darauf, daß bei Reparaturarbeiten keine Rigipsplatten aus China verwendet worden sind. <br />
<br />
Die tropischen Stürme der letzten Jahre haben an vielen Gebäuden an der Golfküste beträchtliche Wasserschäden hinterlassen. Der enorme Bedarf an Baumaterial hatte die Liefermöglichkeiten heimischer Hersteller schnell erschöpft. Importeure, zum Teil aus Deutschland, sprangen mit Billigware ein. Vielfach wurden zur Wandinnenverkleidung Kartongipsplatten aus China eingebaut. <br />
<br />
Es stellte sich schnell heraus, daß diese Rigipsplatten stark korrosive Stoffe (vor allem Schwefelwasserstoff und Formaldehyd) in hoher Konzentration enthalten. Dies führte in kurzer Zeit zu erheblichen Schäden an elektrischer und sanitärer Installation. Darüber hinaus klagen einige Bewohner über chronische Gesundheitsbeschwerden.<br />
<br />
Die Rigipsplatten müssen in diesen Häusern letztendlich ausgetauscht werden. Die geschädigte Infrastruktur, inklusive Heizung und Klimaanlage, muß ersetzt werden. Die Umbauarbeiten sind mit erheblichen Kosten verbunden, die keine Versicherung erstattet.<br />
<br />
Bestehen Sie deshalb vor dem Kauf ihres Ferientraumes im Sonnenscheinstaat auf eine rechtsgültiges Gutachten, daß bei Instandsetzungsarbeiten keine chinesischen Rigipsplatten verwendet worden sind. Falls dies der Fall gewesen sein sollte, müssen die Schäden adequat behoben sein. Gutachten und Schadstofftests sind vor Ort erhältlich. Immobilien ohne Zertifikat sind weder versicherbar, noch weiterverkäuflich!<br />
<br />
<b>Anhang</b><br />
<ul>
<li>Immobilienversicherungen sind in Florida recht teuer, insbesondere an der Küste. Flut- und Wasserschäden sind in Minimalversicherungspolicen nicht inbegriffen. Die staatliche Zusatzversicherung deckt Windschäden ab. Es ist darauf wertzulegen, sich neben Feuerschäden auch gegen Flut- und Wasserschäden abzusichern. Schäden durch starken Regen und Flutwasser treten in Florida häufig auf. Mit ihnen muß gerade bei tropischen Stürmen gerechnet werden. Je nach Lage und Wert der Immobilie kann eine Versicherungsprämie $15.000. im Jahr überschreiten.</li>
<li>Bob Van Voris and Allen Johnson Jr. berichteten letzte Woche in ihrem Bloomberg News Artikel mit dem Titel "<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a1xa.a_K2U6g">Judge Awards $2.6 Million in Chinese Drywall Suit</a>", daß ein Bundesrichter in New Orleans im ersten Urteil über eine Klage von geschädigten Hausbesitzern gegen den Hersteller chinesischer Kartongipsplatten im Sinne der Kläger entschieden hat. Das Urteil wird einer Vielzahl ähnlicher Klagen als Vorbild dienen (13.4.10).</li>
<li>Zu Folge des heutigen Berichts von Robbie Whelan and Dawn Wotapka im Wall Street Journal mit der Überschrift "<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704379004575248702878436076.html">Wallboard Exporter in Settlement With Beazer Over Costly Repairs</a>" ist einer der größten Vertreiber chinesischer Kartongipsplatten in den USA, Knauf Plasterboard Tianjin Co mit Sitz in Deutschland unter dem Namen Knauf Gips KG, bemüht, durch zügigen Vergleich teure Gerichtsprozesse mit geschädigten Baufirmen zu vermeiden (16.5.10).</li>
<li>National Public Radio berichtete heute in seinen Nachrichten unter dem Titel "<a href="http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127940776">Jury Awards $2.4M In First Chinese Drywall Tria</a>l", daß ein Jurygericht in Florida einem Ehepaar, dessen Neubau durch chinesische Gipsplatten ruiniert wurde, Schadenersatz in der Höhe von 2,4 Millionen Dollar zugesprochen hat. Der Betrag ist zu 55 Prozent vom Vertreiber der Platten, Banner Supply Co., zu bestreiten. Der Rest soll vom Hersteller Knauf Plasterboard Tianjian getragen werden (19.9.10).</li>
<li>M.P. McQueen berichtet in seinem Betrag mit der Überschrift "<a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2010/10/14/major-settlement-reached-in-chinese-drywall-drama/">Chinese Drywall Settlement Reached</a>" im Wall Street Journal, dass sich heute im chinesischen Kartongipsplatten Prozess in New Orleans die klagenden Eigentümer von 300 Häusern in vier Staaten mit dem Plattenhersteller Knauf Plasterboard Tianjin (KPT) auf einen Vergleich geeinigt haben. KPT, die Zulieferer und deren Versicherungen erklären sich bereit, die Kosten für den Austausch der Platten und alle notwendigen Hausreparaturen zu tragen, Klimaanlage ausgeschlossen. Die Beklagten gestehen dabei nicht ein, dass die von den Klägern aufgeführten Schäden auf die fehlerhaften Platten zurückzufüheren sind. Die Reparaturarbeiten sind von den Beklagten bewilligten Bauunternehmen durchzuführen. Kosten für Ersatzwohnungen während der Reparaturarbeiten und die damit verbundenen Umzüge werden ebenfalls bestritten. Es ist anzunehmen, dass dieser Vergleich noch ausstehenden Klagen zur Vorlage dienen wird. Klagen gegen das deutsche Unternehmen Knauf Gips KG sind noch nicht entschieden. Die Firma steht auf dem Standpunkt, mit KPT nur eine lose Partnerschaft ohne jegliche Kontrolle zu unterhalten und daher nicht für das Geschäftsgebaren von KPT verantwortlich zu sein (14.10.10).</li>
<li>Zu Folge Dawn Wotapkas Artikel mit der Überschrift "<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204026804577100803035527884.html">Homeowners to Be Repaid in Drywall Settlement</a>", der heute im Wall Street Journal erschien, könnte es in der 'class-action' Schadenersatzklage gegen KPT und anderen chinesischen Kartongipsplattenherstellern im frühen nächsten Jahr zu einer endgültigen Einigung kommen (15.12.2011).</li>
<li>Knauf ist nicht der einzige chinesische Hersteller, der schadhafte Kartongipsplatten in die USA lieferte. Wie Andrew Martin in seinem Artikel in der New York Times mit der Überschrift "<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/business/chinese-drywall-lawsuits-at-a-turning-point.htm">Turning Point for Suite Over Chinese Drywall</a>" vom 13.10.2012 berichtet, haben U.S. Bundes- und Landesgerichte in den letzten Monaten Taishan Gipsum für die Auslieferung schadhaften Produktes vornehmlich in den Südoststaaten verantwortlich befunden. Diese Entscheidungen eröffenen zwischen 7000 und 10000 betroffenen Hausbesitzern den Weg zur Schadensersatzklage. Der Hersteller ist in Berufung gegangen (15.11.2012).</li>
</ul>
<br />
<b>Lesestoff zum Thema:</b><br />
<ul>
<li>Beitrag von Charlotte Cuthbertson, erschienen am 17.4.2009 in der Epochtimes, mit der Überschrift " <a href="http://www.epochtimes.de/articles/2009/04/17/433704.html">Giftige chinesische Gipsplatten von Knauf in den USA aufgetaucht.</a>" <br />
</li>
<li>Beitrag von Michael Corkery, erschienen am 17.4.2009 im Wall Street Journal, mit der Überschrift "<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123993444645927999.html">Homeowner Problems With Chinese-Made Drywall Spread.</a>"</li>
<li> CNN Betrag von Rich Phillips vom 23.11.2009 mit der Überschrift "<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/11/23/chinese.drywall/index.html">Preliminary reports link Chinese drywall, corrosion in U.S. homes.</a>"</li>
<li>Beitrag von Andrew Martin vom 17.09.2010 in der New York Times mit der Überschrift "<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/18/business/18drywall.html">Drywall Flaws: Owners Gain Limited Relief.</a>"</li>
<li>Beitrag von M.P. McQueen, erschienen am 14.10.2010 im Wall Street Journal, mit der Überschrift "<a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2010/10/14/major-settlement-reached-in-chinese-drywall-drama/">Chinese Drywall Settlement Reached</a>".</li>
<li>Beitrag von Andrew Martin, erschienen am 13.10.2012 in der New York Times mit der Überschrift"<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/business/chinese-drywall-lawsuits-at-a-turning-point.htm">Turning Point for Suite Over Chinese Drywall.</a>"</li>
</ul>
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-53536901074885046142009-09-25T12:41:00.018-05:002015-06-24T10:58:21.912-05:00Netgear WG311v2 Wireless Adapter & 64-bit Operating Systems<iframe align="left" frameborder="0" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://rcm-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/cm?lt1=_top&bc1=none&IS2=1&npa=1&bg1=none&fc1=000000&lc1=0000FF&t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=8&l=as1&m=amazon&f=ifr&md=10FE9736YVPPT7A0FBG2&asins=B00009YW8B" style="height: 240px; width: 120px;"></iframe>I was trying to make a Netgear <a href="http://kb.netgear.com/app/products/model/a_id/2565">WG311v2</a> wireless PCI adapter connect to our <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B001UE8LRY?ie=UTF8&tag=petrevpropro-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B001UE8LRY">Apple MB763LL/A AirPort Extreme Dual-band Base Station</a><img alt="" border="0" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=petrevpropro-20&l=as2&o=1&a=B001UE8LRY" height="1" style="border: medium none ! important; margin: 0px ! important;" width="1" /> router using WPA password protection. I am running Ubuntu 9.04 (Jaunty Jackalope) on a machine with two AMD Opteron 64-bit CPUs. Note the card works out of the box with the driver provided by ubuntu on unprotected networks as well as on networks with WEP password protection, but not with WPA password protection. <br />
<br />
I spent a whole week on the idea of adding WPA capability with the result that VERSION 2 of the adapter JUST WILL NOT work with this option on machines with 64-bit processors, because nobody compiled drivers for the 64-bit architecture. This simple truth applies to ALL wireless adapters based on the TEXAS INSTRUMENTS ACX100/111 aka TNETW1450 chipsets, regardless of brand, and also applies to ALL Windows 64-bit operating system users. <br />
<br />
The careful examiner will already notice this bitter truth on the adapter label shown on the Netgear <a href="http://kbserver.netgear.com/products/wg311.asp">support site</a>. On the label of WG311v2, you will find 32-bit PCI. <span style="color: red;">They mean it!</span> By contrast, WG311v3 uses a <a href="http://www.ralinktech.com/">Ralink</a> chipset, for which 64-bit drivers are available.<br />
<br />
Ubuntu 9.04 supports WG311v2 cards on the AMD 64-bit architecture, using the drivers that the <a href="http://acx100.sourceforge.net/">Acx100</a> sourceforge project provides. This project develops Linux drivers for the acx100/111 chipset without help from manufacturers. In my situation, this meant that the card was immediately recognized after boot and the driver was loaded. I could configure the default wlan0 connection with a WPA key in NetworkManager (0.7.0.100). The spinning wheel in place of the network icon on the menu bar indicated repeated attempts to associate with the router. However, the connection was never successfully established. <br />
<br />
I reckoned that perhaps NetworkManager did not set up the WPA password properly and delved into the use of WPA_supplicant for setting up a connection without using NetworkManager. This ubuntu geek <a href="http://www.ubuntugeek.com/how-to-troubleshoot-wireless-network-connection-in-ubuntu.html">tutorial</a> was instructive. Still I could not associate the card with the router.<br />
<br />
I decided that perhaps the driver module provided with the ubuntu distribution did not support WPA. I began to search for alternatives. Since Netgear claimed on their <a href="http://kb.netgear.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/740/related/1">site</a> that WPA was supported by their latest driver software (version 2.0.0.7), perhaps there was a way to use their driver.<br />
<br />
I happened upon Ndiswrapper. This application wraps windows wireless adapter drivers into a Linux module. Because I could use a wired internet connection temporarily, I was able to install version 1.9 with ubuntu's Synaptic Package Manager. I found good instructions how to proceed on this ubuntu forum <a href="http://ubuntuforums.org/archive/index.php/t-574501.html">here</a>. Most importantly, in order to load the new ndiswrapped acx module successfully, you need to blacklist the old module provided by ubuntu in /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist.conf. The name of the module to be blacklisted is "acx".<br />
<br />
Ndiswrapper recognized the card correctly and installed the Netgear driver without complaint. However, the command <b>sudo modprobe ndiswrapper</b> failed.<br />
<br />
Why?<br />
<br />
Because the Netgear driver was not compiled for a 64-bit architecture.<br />
<br />
Remember the label on the card says "32-bit"! The constraint does not stem from the hardware, but from the unavailability of a compatible driver. I checked with all other adapter manufactures using this chipset. No luck! <br />
<br />
So unless the next version of ubuntu's acx driver will support WPA, consider buying a new adapter card, making sure that the manufacturer provides <span style="color: red;">drivers for a 64-bit architecture</span>. Since most adapters are available in several versions, make sure to pick the correct one. Remember the difference between Netgear's WG311v2 and WG311v3, I noted above? You may have to check the label on the pci card. Once you obtained an adapter with a 64-bit driver, you may use ndiswrapper, if ubuntu does not support the options you want out of the box.<br />
<br />
If I am not mistaken, 64-bit Microsoft Windows users (be it XP_64, vista or windows 7) will run into this incompatibility-of-driver problem as well.<br />
<br />
<b>Addendum</b><br />
<ul>
<li>The Sabrent PCI-G802 adapter works on Ubuntu 9.10 out of the box. Mine is based on the Ralink RT2561 chipset. If needed, the latest Windows 64-bit drivers are available for download on <a href="http://www.ralinktech.com/support.php?s=1">Ralink's software support site</a> (01/14/10):<br />
<a href="http://click.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/click?id=zD8V87uy2II&offerid=102327.3246388&type=2&subid=0"><img border="0" src="http://images.tigerdirect.com/SKUimages/medium/M501-1318-main01-op.jpg" /></a><img border="0" src="http://ad.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/show?id=zD8V87uy2II&bids=102327.3246388&type=2&subid=0" height="1" width="1" /></li>
</ul>
<br />
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-40820650017820443852009-07-09T22:30:00.026-05:002011-03-19T19:09:32.477-05:00National Security & Intellectual Property III have written about the recent purported computer software code theft at <a href="http://www2.goldmansachs.com/">Goldman Sachs Group Inc</a> in my <a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2009/07/national-security-intellectual-property.html">post</a> dated Jul. 6, 2009. Developments in the past 72 hours support the idea that Sergey Aleynikov intended to use the computer files he allegedly stole from his former employer in his new job. <br />
<br />
He uploaded compressed program code files for an automated low latency stock trading software platform he helped develop at Goldman Sachs onto a server overseas. The number of files was so large that the compressed RAR file archive supposedly topped at 32 MB in size. Assuming text files and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_file_archivers#Comparison_of_efficiency">23% compression</a>, Sergey copied roughly a whopping 140 MB of code, that is almost three times the size needed to install a small operating system like <a href="http://www.minix3.org/">Minix</a>. Compiled, the code could produce binaries for a 300 MB application, approximately a third of <a href="http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/FX100647101033.aspx?pid=CL100569831033">Microsoft's Office suite</a>.<br />
<br />
Today, Svea Herbst-Bayliss and Christian Plumb report in their <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNews/idUSTRE56862R20090709">post</a> on Reuters that the three founding members of the startup Teza Technologies LLC, that had wooed Sergey from Goldman Sachs for three times the salary, were sued by their own old employer, <a href="http://www.citadelgroup.com/">Citadel Investment Group</a>, for violation of noncompete clauses. Citadel of Chicago manages hedge funds. The three worked in the quantitative trading branch of Citadel using automated high frequency methods which yielded extraordinary returns last year.<br />
<br />
<object height="341" width="405"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube-nocookie.com/v/lrlQSMCx-aE&hl=en&fs=1&color1=0x234900&color2=0x4e9e00&border=1"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube-nocookie.com/v/lrlQSMCx-aE&hl=en&fs=1&color1=0x234900&color2=0x4e9e00&border=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="405" height="341"></embed></object><br />
<br />
In all likelihood, the foursome planned to use the fruits of their labor at their respective former employers for the development of an own low latency quantitative trading platform. Could they have manipulated the market? Did their plan threaten national security?<br />
<br />
<b>Related Posts</b><br />
<ul><li><a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2009/07/national-security-intellectual-property.html">National Security & Intellectual Property</a></li>
</ul><br />
<br />
<b>Addenda</b><br />
<ul><li>According to Laurence Fletcher's <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSN1052651420090710?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0">post</a> on Reuters this afternoon, Sergey's transferred files were accessible on the server abroad until last Monday. Sergey allegedly transferred them in the days before he left Goldman Sachs at the beginning of June. Hence, there was potential access to the data for about a month (07/10/09).</li>
<li>The owner of the service that hosted Sergey's upload recounts his experience in the past week <a href="http://www.xp-dev.com/blogs/1/home/">here</a>. Note that this company's home is in the U.K., whereas its servers are located in Bavaria (07/13/09).</li>
<li>Rob Iati summarized the fundamental implications of low latency high frequency trading (<a href="http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/2009/07/introduction-to-high-frequency-finance.html">HFT</a>) in his <a href="http://advancedtrading.com/algorithms/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=218401501#undefined">post</a> on <a href="http://advancedtrading.com/">advancedtrading.com</a> dated Jul. 10, 2009 (07/17/09).</li>
<li>Today, Jonathan Spicer reports in his <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE56Q4B320090727">post</a> on Reuters about the role of flash programs in high frequency trading, like Direct Edge's Enhanced Liquidity Provider (ELP). Direct Edge flashes stock orders to select costumers for milliseconds, giving them a peak preview of the order flow. In combination with high frequency trading platforms that access dark pools matching orders anonymously, the ELPs may create a two-tired trading system, disadvantaging traders who cannot execute such fast trades. Direct Edge is owned by a consortium consisting of <a href="http://www.citadelgroup.com/">Citadel Investment Group</a>, <a href="http://www2.goldmansachs.com/">Goldman Sachs Group Inc</a>, <a href="http://www.jpmorganchase.com/">JPMorgan Chase & Co</a>, <a href="http://www.knight.com/">Knight Capital Group</a>, and <a href="http://www.ise.com/">International Securities Exchange LLC</a> (07/27/09)</li>
<li>According to Grant McCool's <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE5725YK20090803">post</a> on Reuters today, the case USA versus Aleynikov (09-mj-01553, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York) may find a quiet, anticlimactic ending. In any case, Sergey's alleged theft brought the potential dangers of HFT to the attention of the media and the public (08/03/09).</li>
<li>According to Alex Berenson's <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/business/24trading.html?ref=us">post</a> on The New York Times yesterday, the size of Goldman Sachs' HFT program is 1,224 MB. Sergey transferred no more than a quarter of that (08/24/09).</li>
<li><span id="articleText">Today, Sergey Aleynikov appeared in federal court for the first time and pleaded "not guilty" to all charges of code theft from Goldman Sachs. The trial is scheduled to begin Nov. 29, 2010. The case is now assigned as "USA versus Aleynikov, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, No. 10-00096"</span> (02/17/10).</li>
<li>According to Chad Bray's report with the title "<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704457604576011564066524404.html">Ex-Goldman Programmer Found Guilty in Code Theft</a>" published online in The Wall Street Journal today, a jury found Sergey Aleynikov guilty of theft of trade secrets and transportation of stolen property. Read Ted Thomas' insightful <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704457604576011564066524404.html#articleTabs%3Dcomments%26commentId%3D1860683">comment</a> on high frequency trading added to this report (12/10/10).</li>
<li>According to Grant McCool's post with the title "<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/19/us-goldman-aleynikov-idUSTRE72H8BK20110319">Ex-Goldman programmer gets 8 years for code theft</a>" published online on Reuters yesterday, Sergey was sentenced to eight years in prison. I presume he will appeal the sentence (03/19/11).<br />
</li>
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</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-74087067541733440532009-07-07T16:31:00.014-05:002015-06-24T13:03:36.502-05:00National Security & Intellectual PropertyI am rarely willing to accept conspiracy theories, except maybe the assassination of President Kennedy only because it is highly improbable that a man like Lee Harvey Oswald with the rifle he used could hit a person in a moving car from such distance. Therefore, I do believe in Lee Harvey Oswald's claim that he was "just a patsy" and reckon that Jim Garrison was onto something real after reading his book entitled <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/094178102X?ie=UTF8&tag=petsblo00-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=094178102X">"On the Trail of the Assassins: My Investigation and Prosecution of the Murder of President Kennedy."</a><img alt="" border="0" height="1" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=petsblo00-20&l=as2&o=1&a=094178102X" style="border: medium none ! important; margin: 0px ! important;" width="1" />Unfortunately, his trails ran cold. We may never find out the truth.<br />
<br />
Two days ago another story broke with a whiff of conspiracy. Compared to President Kennedy's assassination, the event seems minor, but appears to fascinate many in the business of stock trades. The incidence was first reported by Tyler Durden in his <a href="http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/2009/07/is-case-of-quant-trading-industrial.html">post</a> on Zero Hedge and Mathew Goldstein in a <a href="http://blogs.reuters.com/commentaries/2009/07/05/a-goldman-trading-scandal/">post</a> on Reuters.<br />
<br />
Sergey Aleynikov worked as a programmer in a supervisory function for <a href="http://www2.goldmansachs.com/">Goldman Sachs Group Inc.</a> on an application that allows the firm to execute stock trades within milliseconds. The application is known as low latency or high frequency trading (<a href="http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/2009/07/introduction-to-high-frequency-finance.html">HFT</a>) platform. About a month ago, he started a new post with a start up company for three-times his salary at Goldman Sachs. Before he left Goldman Sachs, he transferred a large volume of files with program code from his computer at the firm to a server in Germany. He encrypted the data and attempted to obscure the transfer.<br />
<br />
Weeks later IT security at the firm found out about Sergey's actions and reported the purported "theft" to the FBI. Sergey was arrested last Friday and was freed on $750,000.- bail yesterday, according to Martha Graybow's <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSTRE5653U020090707">report</a> on Reuters today. Furthermore, Brent McCool <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSTRE5653U020090707">reports</a> on Reuters that U.S. prosecutor Joseph Facciponte told the court in Saturday's hearing of Aleynikov's case that the program in the hands of competitors could cost Goldman Sachs millions. The firm's bearing appears to lend extraordinary importance to what could be just a blatant case of a programmer sloppiness, leaving ample room for speculation about the company secrets that may be contained in the "stolen" files. Conspiracy theories begin to blossom.<br />
<br />
Sergey claims in his defense that he intended to copy only opensource files free for anyone's use, but may have included proprietory files inadvertently. He routinely downloaded such files to work on them at home. He did not believe that his actions breached his contract. <br />
<br />
Goldman Sachs is a leader in the business of computed millisecond stock trades, reaping great profits from the transactions. The business is highly controversial because of its considerable impact on the market and its potential of market manipulation. When huge volumes of stock are moved in such short time, fortunes are made and lost before anyone without such fast access can respond. The market changes faster than the trader on the floor can pick up his phone. Critics loath Goldman Sachs for their advantage and surmise that the firm is manipulating the entire national economy in its favor with its fast trades. Hence, some hope that this incident may uncover information that precipitates Goldman Sach's demise. Others elevate Sergey's actions to a case of industrial espionage that may endanger national security, since he transferred sensitive information abroad. Hence, Sergey's purported crime quickly garnered intense media attention in recent days. <br />
<br />
I see two possible explanations for Sergey's actions:<br />
<ol>
<li>either Sergey truly did not understand what he was doing when he transferred the data, </li>
<li>or he knew exactly what he was doing, but acted that way in order to be able to claim that he did not know what he was doing,once the data transfer was discovered.</li>
</ol>
Finding out whether he shared the data with third parties and with whom may provide an answer. The download history should be retrievable from the server in Germany he uploaded the files to. Moreover, anyone who was going to use the files needed Sergey's encryption key. <br />
<br />
Furthermore, I reckon that even if third parties got hold of the files, the data would be of limited use to them. Direct implementation is impossible, since the program is dependent on file libraries stored in company-localized systems and needs access to company-specific data bases. In addition, you would have to be situated physically close to the New York Stock Exchange in order to achieve the necessary velocity in data transfer.<br />
<br />
Data is transferred across the internet via nodes. The fewer nodes the data has to travel, the faster the transfer. Physical distance adds nodes. Even if a firm in Europe could fully implement Goldman Sachs' program, they would not be able to beat the firm's trades because of the difference in the number of nodes.<br />
<br />
On the other hand, if you were installed on Wall Street, close emulation of Goldman Sachs' trading program would be discovered swiftly, and the perpetrator would have to face costly litigation over patent infringements.<br />
<br />
Perhaps the third party could examine the strategies and methods used in the programs in an attempt to develop superior ones. I was told that this was an undertaking bound to fail because of the sheer endless lines of code that have to be studied closely and the enormous complexity of such program. Perhaps, savants could run tests on the program to discover vulnerabilities that own programs could exploit to edge out the Goldman Sachs trades. Perhaps, they could uncover the secrets of the decision making engine. I assume you need considerable expertise in the field of fast trade programs in order to accomplish these goals.<br />
<br />
The above limitations leave one other possibility that has been suggested as the most likely scenario. Sergey copied the code files for the programs in whose development he was most intimately involved to use them as reference in future work on his new job. <br />
<br />
Hence, Sergey's "crime" may consist of nothing more than a misinterpretation of clauses in his job contract and does not merit the media attention it attracted. I find it astounding that a firm like Goldman Sachs was not taking more precautions against such data misuse by employees, particularly when the employees are known to move on to a potential competitor. You only have to monitor the users' shell history and the syslog files. After all, the possibility remains that company secrets vital to the firm's mode of operation are included in the files Sergey knowingly or inadvertently transferred.<br />
<br />
We shall find out more. Stay <a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2009/07/national-security-intellectual-property_09.html">tuned</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>Related Posts</b><br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://brainmindinstrev.blogspot.com/2009/07/national-security-intellectual-property_09.html">National Security & Intellectual Property II</a></li>
</ul>
<br />
<b>Addenda</b><br />
<ul>
<li>On a funny note, according to Nick Carey's <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/ousivMolt/idUSTRE5667JR20090707">post</a> on Reuter's yesterday a business school professor concluded that Sergey's brain told him to transfer the files. Surprised (07/09/09)?</li>
<li><iframe align="left" frameborder="0" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://rcm-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/cm?lt1=_blank&bc1=none&IS2=1&npa=1&bg1=none&fc1=000000&lc1=0000FF&t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=8&l=as4&m=amazon&f=ifr&ref=ss_til&asins=0307957934" style="height: 240px; width: 120px;"></iframe>Introducing <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0307957934/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=petrevpropro-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0307957934">his latest thriller novel</a><img alt="" border="0" height="1" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/e/ir?t=petrevpropro-20&l=as2&o=1&a=0307957934" style="border: none !important; margin: 0px !important;" width="1" /> on reckless computer-assisted global financial crime, Robert Harris gave a remarkable interview to Steve Inskeep for National Public Radio's <i>Morning Edition</i> today. The author concludes the interview with the title "<a href="http://www.npr.org/2012/02/06/146358625/the-fear-index-trades-in-thrills">'The Fear Index': A Hedge Fund Frankenstein</a>" in reference to the power of networked computers executing high-speed financial transactions that “they are not alive in any recognizable sense, and yet in a strange way, (they are) determining our existence, and (they are) also slightly outside human control. I mean, one cannot see any world leader who has got a grip on the financial markets these days. They're too big, too fast. I think that's quite scary (02/06/2012).”</li>
</ul>
<b>Acknowledgment</b><br />
I am grateful for the insights of the coding experts posting comments on <a href="http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/">Zero Hedge</a>. They helped me better understand the issues involved.<div class="blogger-post-footer"><div align="center"><iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=12&l=ur1&category=amazonhomepage&f=ifr" width="300" height="250" scrolling="no" border="0" marginwidth="0" style="border:none;" frameborder="0"></iframe>
</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-555835656466815511.post-48970868131034870542009-05-13T16:02:00.034-05:002015-06-24T13:04:07.012-05:00Negative Equity, Recovery & MobilityLes Christie reported in his <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/05/real_estate/underwater_homeowners/index.htm?postversion=2009050609">post</a> for CNNMoney dated May 6, 2009, that according to a <a href="http://www.zillow.com/reports/RealEstateMarketReports.htm">market analysis</a> published on <a href="http://zillow.com/">Zillow.com</a> about 22 percent of American homes were "underwater" at the end of March. That is, in today's market the value of these homes is less than the outstanding balance on their mortgages. Home owners may wonder, how long recovery may take. The calculator below provides an estimate, regardless of the price of the home. The default entries are explained in the next paragraph. You may replace them with your own data:<br />
<div><form action="" method="post" name="form1"><script type="text/javascript">
<!--
function Convert_years()
{
var pr = 1;
int = eval(document.forms.form1.interest.value);
appr = eval(document.forms.form1.appreciation.value);
dim_perc = eval(document.forms.form1.dim_perc.value);
var loss = (pr + 0.2) * (100 - dim_perc) / 100;
var years_of_loan = 30;
var installments = 12;
var periods = installments * years_of_loan;
var payments = periods * pr * int / 1200 / (1 - Math.pow((1 + int / 1200), -periods));
var years = (Math.log(payments) - Math.log(loss)) / Math.log(1 + appr / 100);
//var years = appr;
document.forms.form1.years.value = years.toFixed(2);
}
//-->
</script><br />
<table align="center" border="2" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="2" height="35" style="width: 100%;"><tbody>
<tr><td align="left" bgcolor="#33ccff"><span style="color: black;">Interests:<br />
<input id="in" name="interest" size="4" type="text" value="5.92" />%</span></td><td align="left" bgcolor="#33ccff"><span style="color: black;">Appreciation:<br />
<input id="appr" name="appreciation" size="4" type="text" value="6.34" />%</span></td><td align="left" bgcolor="#33ccff"><span style="color: black;">Depreciation:<br />
<input id="dim_perc" name="dim_perc" size="3" type="text" value="50" />%</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right" bgcolor="#00ff00"><input id="ye" name="ye" onclick="Convert_years(this.value);" type="button" value="You need" /></td><td bgcolor="#00ff00"><input id="years" name="years" size="4" type="text" value="" /> <span style="color: black; font-size: small;">years.</span></td> <td bgcolor="#00ff00"></td></tr>
</tbody></table><div style="color: #444444; text-align: center;"> © You may donate for further development through <i>PayPal</i><a href="http://www.myspace.com/brainmind">here</a>.</div></form></div><br />
Suppose we bought a home with a down payment of 20 percent and a 30-year mortgage at 5.92% APR two years ago. According to a <a href="http://www.realestateabc.com/insights/appreciation.htm">report</a> on <a href="http://realestateabc.com/">RealEstateabc.com</a>, the annual rate of appreciation for American homes has been on average 6.34 % over the past 40 years. This value seems high. Local rates may be lower. According to my own observations over the past 10 years, and these were years of unprecedented economic growth where I live, property values have appreciated at 5.7% annually. The rate may be substantially less in current circumstances.<br />
<br />
Be it as it may, let us take the optimistic view and enter 6.34% as annual appreciation rate in the calculator as default. If we lived in an area of the country hardest hit by the recent slump in the real estate market, our new home may have lost half of its value since we bought it. That is, its value depreciated 50%. According to the result calculated above, we need to keep this home for <b style="color: black;">21 years</b> to recoup our loss. As a consequence, mobility loses its luster. Many home owners may choose to stay put.<br />
<div align="center"><script type="text/javascript">
<!--
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/* 300x250, created 9/26/08 */
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</script> <script src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js" type="text/javascript">
</script></div><br />
<b>Addenda</b><br />
<ul><li>According to The Economist's daily chart <a href="http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=7933596&story_id=14291870">post</a> dated Aug. 21, 2009, Deutsche Bank's securitization team estimates that roughly every second American home with a mortgage will be underwater in 2011 (08/29/09).</li>
<li>Lisa Lambert reports in her <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE58G5U320090917">post</a> on Reuters dated Sep. 17, 2009, that another wave of troubled mortgages is about to ensue, potentially unleashing more foreclosures. That is, adjustable rate mortgages with payment options are beginning to reset in large numbers burdening home owners with ever higher cost. In Arizona alone, 128,000 payment option ARMs will adjust to higher rates within the next 12 months. In the meantime, the unemployment rate rose to 9.7 percent nationwide according to the <a href="http://www.bls.gov/cps/">Bureau of Labor Statistics</a> (09/19/09).</li>
<li>According to Les Christie's report entitled "<a href="http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/23/real_estate/underwater_rates_rise/?hpt=P1">Nearly 25% of all mortgages are underwater</a>" on CNNMoney yesterday, <a href="http://www.facorelogic.com/">First American CoreLogic</a> estimated that home values are still dropping under the value of their mortage. The company found that in the last quarter of 2009 mortgages on homes underwater increased by one percent to 10.7 million (02/24/10).<br />
<br />
<br />
<div><object classid="clsid:D27CDB6E-AE6D-11cf-96B8-444553540000" height="356" id="ep" width="384"><param name="allowfullscreen" value="true" /><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always" /><param name="wmode" value="transparent" /><param name="movie" value="http://i.cdn.turner.com/money/.element/apps/cvp/4.0/swf/cnn_money_384x216_embed.swf?context=embed&videoId=/video/news/2010/02/19/n_housing_relief_obama_nv.cnnmoney" /><param name="bgcolor" value="#000000" /><embed src="http://i.cdn.turner.com/money/.element/apps/cvp/4.0/swf/cnn_money_384x216_embed.swf?context=embed&videoId=/video/news/2010/02/19/n_housing_relief_obama_nv.cnnmoney" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" bgcolor="#000000" allowfullscreen="true" allowscriptaccess="always" width="384" wmode="transparent" height="356"></embed></object></div><br />
<br />
</li>
<li><iframe align="left" frameborder="0" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://rcm-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/cm?lt1=_blank&bc1=none&IS2=1&npa=1&bg1=FFFFFF&fc1=none&lc1=0000FF&t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=8&l=as1&m=amazon&f=ifr&md=10FE9736YVPPT7A0FBG2&asins=1880120186" style="height: 240px; width: 120px;"></iframe>M.P. McQueen's post with the title "<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703404004575198603552079406.html">The New Rules of Remodeling</a>" for the Wall Street Journal dated Apr. 24, 2010, confirms my prediction on rising immobility. Remodeling seems a good idea. Let us benefit from tax credits and put some energy efficient insulation in our home. Let us upgrade kitchen appliances and make our home a nicer place to live, because we may stay in it for a long time (04/28/10).</li>
<li>While modifying my calculator after one reader's cogent comment, I noticed that in the parlance of the Goldman Sachs bankers who testified before Congress two days ago our home, looked at as an investment, definitely qualifies as a very long sale. The banks, however, sold our mortgage short. Our mortgage was sold to Citigroup two years after we closed on the home. Since we could keep up with our payments, it probably ended up buried in tranche A of one of those sh***y CDO's alluded to in the hearing (04/29/10).</li>
</ul><div><object height="283" id="wsj_fp" width="400"><param name="movie" value="http://online.wsj.com/media/swf/VideoPlayerMain.swf"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><param name="flashvars" value="videoGUID={CEE0292E-DF63-4AEC-8A6E-84575BAC99E3}&playerid=1000&plyMediaEnabled=1&configURL=http://wsj.vo.llnwd.net/o28/players/&autoStart=false" base="http://online.wsj.com/media/swf/"name="flashPlayer"></param><embed src="http://online.wsj.com/media/swf/VideoPlayerMain.swf" bgcolor="#FFFFFF"flashVars="videoGUID={CEE0292E-DF63-4AEC-8A6E-84575BAC99E3}&playerid=1000&plyMediaEnabled=1&configURL=http://wsj.vo.llnwd.net/o28/players/&autoStart=false" base="http://online.wsj.com/media/swf/" name="flashPlayer" width="400" height="283" seamlesstabbing="false" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" swLiveConnect="true" pluginspage="http://www.macromedia.com/shockwave/download/index.cgi?P1_Prod_Version=ShockwaveFlash"></embed></object></div><ul><li>According to Conor Dougherty's report entitled "<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704879704575236533316039428.html">More Americans Moved in '09, but Not Far</a>" in today's Wall Street Journal, the <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/">Brookings Institution</a> estimates a state-to-state mover rate of 1.6 percent for 2008 and 2009, constituting the steepest decline in interstate migration since the Great Depression (05/10/10).</li>
<li>You may wish to listen to some homeowners whose diminished home value considerably affected their mobility in Yuki Noguchi's report on National Public Radio's Morning Edition today entitled "<a href="http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129427659">Devalued Homes Anchor Prospective Job Seekers</a>" (08/26/10).</li>
</ul><b>Related Posts</b><br />
<ul><li><a href="http://brainmindinst.blogspot.com/2008/09/subprime-lending-truthiness-delusion-of.html">Subprime Lending: Truthiness & Delusion of Mind</a></li>
</ul><div class="blogger-post-footer"><div align="center"><iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=petrevpropro-20&o=1&p=12&l=ur1&category=amazonhomepage&f=ifr" width="300" height="250" scrolling="no" border="0" marginwidth="0" style="border:none;" frameborder="0"></iframe>
</div></div>Peter Melzerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10404231990274257867noreply@blogger.com6