Wednesday, November 20, 2013

Fukushima: Gaseous Effluent Handling & Hydrogen Explosions

In my last post with the title "Why Fukushima's Reactors Failed" published online Nov. 4, 2013, I used the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station disaster to emphasize the existential importance of housing cooling water pumps and electric power equipment essential for emergency reactor shutdowns in flood-resistant buildings, particularly for power stations located in flood-prone areas.

Elaborating on a comment to that post, this essay will point out that exhaust stack elevation could have made a crucial difference in the Fukushima reactor accidents.

Electric motor-driven fans support just about every air handling system in the reactor building of a nuclear power station (see the numerous blower symbols in Fig. 1 from Row, 1971), pumping effluent gases to the main exhaust stack and maintaining a negative building pressure that disallows potentially contaminated air to escape unfiltered into the environment.  Contaminated effluents are forced through filters and vented through the main exhaust stacks, except for hardened venting. During hardened venting, contaminated steam and gases may directly be routed to the exhaust stacks as a means of last resort  in an emergency, relieving pressure from the reactor after all other options have been exhausted. Furthermore, hardened venting may prevent hydrogen produced by melting fuel rod cladding and radiolysis from reaching explosive concentrations.

Bird's eye view of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station after hydrogen explosions destroyed the service floors of units 1 (left), 3 and 4. The tall exhaust stack towers can be seen on the left between units 1 and 2 and at center between units 3 and 4. The small sheds housing the fan gear are located at the base of the towers (source: cyptome.org).

But, the tall exhaust stacks at Fukushima need fan-support to generate sufficient draft. The fan gear is housed in small shed at their base. During a station blackout, the stacks must rely on draft alone.

According to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Report (Interim Report) Dec. 2, 2011, of the stricken power station's operator Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), hardened venting released hydrogen in Unit 1's reactor building, flowing back through open valves and baffles. When mixed with air at concentrations above four percent, hydrogen may explosively deflagrate and detonate. At Unit 3, the hydrogen may have exploded inside the primary containment vessel.

Explosion at units 1 and 4 (courtesy: Goddard's Journal).
By contrast, Unit 4 had been shutdown for inspection at the time of the earthquake, the reactor had been unloaded, and the fuel had been stored in its spent fuel pool. Despite, the reactor incurred a hydrogen explosion during the night after the violent explosion at Unit 3. It appears unlikely that the hydrogen sustaining Unit 4's explosion was produced there.

Junction of SGTS effluent piping of Unit 3 and Unit 4 at the base of shared stack (arrow) (source: TEPCO).
TEPCO contents that hydrogen migrated from Unit 3 to Unit 4 through the Standby Gas Treatment System, or SGTS for short (see lower center of schema in Fig. 1). The SGTS is used to filter contaminated air and funnel it to the main exhaust stack. According to TEPCO, gas from Unit 3's SGTS was permitted to cross over into the piping of Unit 4's SGTS at the junction connecting both systems to the shared stack.

Unit 4's SGTS filter contamination. The connection to the stack shared with Unit 3 is on the right (source: TEPCO).
TEPCO supports this contention with finding progressively greater outside-in contamination of the filter cascade of Unit 4's SGTS.

Had the shared exhaust stacks been tall enough to passively generate sufficient draft, the hydrogen explosions may have been prevented, particularly the one at Unit 4. Therefore, it is prudent to ensure that all nuclear power stations are outfitted with exhaust stacks tall enough to provide sufficient draft when all power fails.

Tomorrow, Nov. 21, 2013, the US Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety will hold a joint hearing on the "NRC's Implementation of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendations and other Actions to Enhance and Maintain Nuclear Safety."

Hopefully, the NRC has incorporated sufficient exhaust stack elevation into its recommendations for US reactor operators.

Reference
  • Row TH (1973) Radioactive waste systems and radioactive effluents. Georgia Institute of Technology Short Course.
Acknowledgement
SimpyInfo.org provided the information for this post.

Monday, November 4, 2013

Why Fukushima's Reactors Failed

Bird's eye view of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station before the earthquake and tsunami on Fri. Mar. 11, 2011. Units 1 (right) to 4 (left) are seen in the foreground and 5 (left) and 6 (right) further back. Units 1, 2 and 3 incurred fuel meltdowns (source: TEPCO).

Three of the six reactors at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 120 miles north of Tokyo on Honshu's east coast incurred nuclear fuel meltdowns after the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami. One reactor had been defueled for inspection. The station's two other reactors could be shutdown safely.

Bird's eye view of Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station before the earthquake and tsunami on Fri. Mar. 11, 2011 (unit 1 is on the right). All units could be safely shutdown. (source: TEPCO).

The four operating reactors at Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station seven miles away could also be saved.

The meltdowns at Daiichi led to powerful hydrogen explosions, releasing amounts of radioactive material over land and sea only rivaled by the 1986 Chernobyl reactor disaster in the Ukraine. The government imposed an exclusion zone around the stricken station, because radiation doses were deemed too high for habitation. To date, roughly 70,000 former residents cannot return home permanently. According to Shigeru Sato, Tsuyoshi Inajima, Monami Yui and Emi Urabe's report with the title "Japan Mulls Plan for One Operator to Run All Reactors: Energy" published by Bloomberg Oct. 22, 2013, cleanup and compensation are currently projected to cost 112 billion dollars, roughly equaling the cost for two Hurricane Sandies.

A multitude of inquiries have attempted to uncover the causes underlying the Fukushima accident. The operator of both power stations, Tokyo Electric Power Company, tells us what happened in its accident reports. The company's fact compilation points to one essential lynchpin: the residual heat removal system must not fail.

The reactors at Daiichi and Daini are boiling water reactors with General Electric's Mark I or Mark II primary containment systems.
Schematic of a boiling water reactor with a Mark I containment(source: IAEA).
The Mark I containments consist of a pear-shaped drywell housing the reactor pressure vessel and a doughnut-shaped wetwell, also known as torus or pressure suppression chamber, holding a large pool of water. The drywell is connected at the bottom to the wetwell with equally spaced radial vent pipes.

Schematic of a boiling water reactor with a Mark II containment(source: IAEA).
The Mark II containments are shaped differently, but still consist of a drywell with the reactor vessel and a wetwell with a pressure suppression pool.

When nuclear reactors need shutdown in an emergency, control and safety rods are inserted between the fuel rods in milliseconds, disrupting the nuclear chain reaction. Furthermore, the reactor pressure vessel's main steam lines may be isolated from the power-generating turbine and main condenser when potential damage to the pipes is anticipated. Without heat transfer, decay heat builds in the reactor pressure vessel, revving up pressure. Water must be injected into the vessel as coolant and to keep the fuel covered to prevent a meltdown.

Though emergency pumps can inject water into the vessel at high pressure, the pressure must be relieved to prevent damage to the vessel and to facilitate greater coolant injection. Safety relief valves are periodically opened to depressurize the vessel. The valves discharge high-pressure steam into the wetwell's pool, in which the steam is condensed and the pressure is absorbed. If the vessel was breached and high pressure steam bursted into the drywell, the pressure would be relieved into the suppression pool through the pipes that directly connect the drywell to the wetwell.

At Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the quake vibrations tripped the operating reactors automatically. Control and safety rods were inserted and the pressure vessels were isolated. Access to outside power was lost because of quake damage. Emergency diesel generators started up to provide power.

About 40 minutes later, tsunami waves flooded power distribution panels and emergency generators located low in the reactor turbine buildings. Battery banks continued to power emergency core cooling systems. Except for Unit 1 which is equipped with a isolation condenser, two reactor steam-driven pumps, the reactor core isolation cooling system and the high pressure coolant injection system, were available to inject water into the reactor pressure vessels, initially from storage tanks and later from the wetwell pools, while the operators attempted to depressurize the reactors, relieving steam into the pools.

  • Eyewitness account of a Daiichi operator:
    “We went into the field in order to open the vent valves. When we were at the near the torus (that is, the wetwell, ed.) room, we heard a large, weird popping sound. The valve is at up high, so I put my foot on the torus to lift myself up. Then, my black rubber boot was melted like butter [source: TEPCO interim report, Dec 2, 2011, page 53].”
  • "The decomposition of the rubber-sulphur compound (that is, vulcanized rubber, ed.) takes place to an appreciable extent at the usual temperatures of vulcanization [source: Bureau of Standards Journal of Research, Volume 4 (1930), page 512]."
  • "A typical vulcanization temperature for a passenger tire is 10 minutes at 170 °C [source: Vulcanization]."

However, once the pool temperature exceeds 100 °C, absorption of reactor pressure becomes progressively less effective. The steam-driven pumps sucking water from the pool stop working above that temperature. Therefore, removing heat from the wetwell pool is absolutely necessary.

Schematic showing the residual heat removal system on the right (source: NRC).
The residual heat removal system fulfills this function. It consists of electric motor-driven pumps that flush cold service water from a large body of water, known as ultimate heat sink, through heat exchangers, cooling the wetwell pool. In Fukushima, the ocean is the ultimate heat sink, and the seawater pumps of the residual heat removal system were built near the water’s edge 4 meters above sea level.
Exposed seawater pumps at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 2011 (source: Daisuke Tsuda). 
At Daiichi the pumps stood exposed on the dock and the tsunami rendered them irreparable, except one that could be re-powered and jury-rigged to supply units 5 and 6.

By contrast, at Daini the pumps were housed in buildings that can be seen dockside in the areal view above. The structures were not flood resistant, but withstood the brunt of the debris-laden waves. The pump for unit 3 persevered without loss of function, and the others could be repaired before the reactor fuel was uncovered. All reactors at both power stations with functioning residual heat removal systems could be shutdown safely within days.

Therefore, electric power must be available and the residual heat removal system must remain operable for nuclear reactors of the Fukushima type to successfully complete an emergency shutdown. These conditions impose a major constraint on accident recovery, representing a fundamental weakness of the reactor design. The residual heat removal system must remain operable under the conditions of flooding and station blackout.

Thirty reactors of this type currently operate in the United States. A number are sited in flood-prone areas. A moratorium should be imposed on these reactors, until the operators can ascertain that service water pumps are protected against inundation, debris, and loss of power.

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Thursday, July 18, 2013

No Cold Shutdown at Fukushima

Steam detected emanating from the refueling floor of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 in July 2013 (source: TEPCO).
According to Hiroko Tabuchi's post with the headline "Steam Detected at Damaged Fukushima Reactor" published by The New York Times today, the operator of the stricken Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) noticed steam emanating from the exposed refueling floor of Unit 3, the nuclear fuel of which melted down in the wake of the 2011 Great Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami and which was severely damaged by a violent hydrogen explosion.

As I discussed in my essay with the title "Fukushima: Fuel Meltdowns & Cold Shutdowns" posted Feb. 15, 2012, TEPCO assumed having reached temperatures below the boiling point of water, that is 100 °C, 17 months ago, using an improvised open-loop cooling water cycle (see IAEA news by Peter Kaiser with the title "Cold Shutdown Conditions Declared at Fukushima" dated Dec. 18, 2011). Reaching reactor pressure vessel temperatures below the boiling point of water with closed cooling water cycles after the shutdown of an intact nuclear reactor is known as cold shutdown, a mode TEPCO proclaimed to have achieved at the time.

TEPCO speculates the steam detected this week is generated by rainwater seeping into the reactor (see TEPCO's press release in Japanese dated Jul. 18, 2013).

Regardless of the source, steam emanating from the primary containment vessel implies that temperatures inside the vessel must be 100 °C or higher. The discovery of new steam proves the company's assertion of cold shutdown incorrect. TEPCO is preparing countermeasures for the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction. Follow the latest developments on simplyinfo.org.

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